### **Home Office Research Study 296**

# An evaluation of the impact of the National Reassurance Policing Programme

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Home Office (nor do they reflect Government policy).

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### Foreword

Neighbourhood policing has become a central part of the Government's police reform programme. The basis of a neighbourhood policing model is to have dedicated police resources for local areas and for police and their partners to work together with the public to understand and tackle the problems that matter to them most. International evidence had shown indications that this type of local policing could serve to reduce both actual and perceived levels of crime and disorder, as well as to improve the public's perceptions of the police. The development of a UK evidence base on the impact of this type of local policing activity is critical to the success of the reform programme and to sustained investment.

The evaluation reported here is one of the most robust tests of a neighbourhood policing model ever completed and therefore marks a key step in building the evidence base. The results presented in the report show that the National Reassurance Policing Programme delivered positive changes in key outcome indicators, such as crime, perceptions of antisocial behaviour, feelings of safety after dark and public confidence in the police. This type of policing seemed to have less impact on neighbours being prepared to intervene to prevent anti-social behaviour. The findings of this study show that the public not only notice increased police foot patrol, they also notice the efforts that the police put into engagement and the effects of properly targeted problem solving designed to reduce anti-social behaviour. All these elements appear key to a successful approach to neighbourhood policing.

This report will be of value both to practitioners and policy makers involved in the development and implementation of neighbourhood policing.

Carole F Willis Assistant Director Research and Statistics Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group

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Rachel Tuffin and Julia Morris are members of the Research, Development and Statistics team within the Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group at the Home Office. Alexis Poole was a member of the same team and is now Principal Analyst in Devon and Cornwall Constabulary.

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### **Executive summary**

Taken together, the evidence presented in this report provides a consistent picture which shows that positive change in key outcome indicators, such as crime, perceptions of antisocial behaviour, feelings of safety after dark and public confidence in the police, was attributable to the National Reassurance Policing Programme. The effort put into engagement was noticed by the public. The public also noticed change delivered through targeted problem-solving, which requires detailed analysis and action in partnership. Visibility and familiarity could not deliver shifts in public perception on their own, according to this evidence. A national roll-out of neighbourhood policing, if properly implemented, can therefore be expected to deliver improvements in crime reduction, public confidence, feelings of safety, and perceptions of anti-social behaviour.

This report sets out the key findings of an evaluation of the outcomes achieved by the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) in England between 2003/04 and 2004/05. The main aim of the study was to fill a gap in the research evidence in England on the impact of a package of local policing activities. The evaluation covered all 16 sites, in eight forces which formed the NRPP. This report presents results from the six sites where it was possible to match control areas. Findings from these six sites constitute the strongest element of the evaluation; findings from the remaining ten sites are published in a companion document. The evaluation measured the impact of the trials on anti-social behaviour, crime, feelings of safety, public confidence and satisfaction, and social capacity.

#### **Key points**

- Comparing results from all six trial sites against all six control sites, the programme overall had a positive impact on crime, perceptions of crime and antisocial behaviour, feelings of safety and public confidence in the police.
- The programme overall delivered statistically significant reductions (by comparison with measures in control areas) in crime, perceptions of five types of anti-social behaviour, and an increase in public confidence in policing and feelings of safety. The programme delivered statistically significant improvements (compared to controls) in trust in the local area, while other measures of social capacity (e.g. the willingness of neighbours to intervene, or increased voluntary activity) did not show change.

- Three of the six sites delivered improvements in perceptions of anti-social behaviour problems, perception of the crime rate, and public confidence, which were statistically significant when compared to their control sites. Two of these three also delivered statistically significant reductions in crime compared to controls. One site showed improvement only in public confidence. The remaining two sites did not achieve improvement against these main outcome indicators compared to their control sites.
- There was no programme effect on those contacting the police other than as a victim of crime. The sample sizes were too small to determine whether or not there was a programme effect on satisfaction of victims or those who were stopped or approached during the previous twelve months.
- There were improvements in indicators of public perception of police engagement activity and resulting public awareness. Five of the six sites saw statistically significant changes on one or more of the indicators. Two sites saw improvements in indicators of social cohesion.
- Analysis of problem-solving and community engagement process data for the individual sites was consistent with the outcomes achieved. Sites that showed a significant positive change in public perceptions of juvenile nuisance, for example, were the same sites that carried out targeted problem-solving activity, which was well-informed by detailed analysis of the problem and where partners and the community were involved. Partnership working data were more limited.

#### Background

'Reassurance policing' was developed in Surrey initially, to address the gap between the public perception of rising crime and the falling crime rate. The idea grew from a paper written on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers – *Civility First* – which first identified a 'reassurance gap' between the delivery of crime reduction and the perception of crime increasing on the part of the majority of the public. The policing approach then developed through collaborative work between Surrey Police and the University of Surrey, drawing on the 'signal crimes' perspective developed by Martin Innes. This perspective held that some crimes and disorders were more important to individual members of the public than others and would act as signals which the police needed to target if they were to reduce feelings of risk and increase perceptions of safety. The NRPP grew out of trials of

'reassurance policing' in Surrey Police and the Metropolitan Police Service, led by the Chief Constable of Surrey, Denis O'Connor and Assistant Commissioner Tim Godwin.

From its initial purposes, the NRPP expanded its objectives in order to test out whether the local schemes could address public perceptions and feelings of safety through tackling antisocial behaviour. The outcomes sought by the NRPP can be summarised as:

- reduced anti-social behaviour and improved quality of life;
- reduced fear of crime and improved sense of safety;
- increased public satisfaction with, and confidence in, the police; and,
- improved social capacity.

The study did not include a specific measure of quality of life. Crime reduction was not a stated aim of the programme at the outset, but was included in the evaluation design on the basis of previous evidence of the potential impact of the policing activities which were planned as part of the programme, particularly problem-solving activity (Sherman *et al*, 2002).

#### **Evaluation design**

- The evaluation covered all 16 sites and collected data on process and outcomes. This report considers only the six sites which were pair matched with controls, in order to provide a clear standard of evidence. Outcomes were measured using police statistics, and principally through a telephone survey in each site, where the same respondents were interviewed at the outset and after one year. A sample of 300 respondents was selected randomly and the panel sample achieved was approximately 200 in each site. The baseline survey was conducted between November 2003 and January 2004, with the follow-up survey carried out after one year between November 2004 and January 2005.
- The control measures allowed the calculation of effect sizes in the analysis of police statistics and survey data and the differences in effect between control and trial sites were tested for statistical significance (testing whether the result might be random, due to chance).

 Analysis of process information suggested that the conditions in some control sites were closer to a neighbourhood policing approach than was the case for the other control sites. Some sites may therefore may have had a harder task in achieving a statistically significant change, relative to their controls.

#### Implementation of the NRPP

The activities of the NRPP in the trial sites were built on the 'signal crimes' perspective and drew on previous models of community policing, for example the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy. They could be summarised as:

- targeted policing activity and problem-solving to tackle crimes and disorder which matter in neighbourhoods;
- community involvement in the process of identifying priorities and taking action to tackle them; and
- the presence of visible, accessible and locally known authority figures in neighbourhoods, in particular police officers and police community support officers.

Alongside the activity in the trial sites, there was a national programme team which was responsible for ensuring implementation in the sites and providing support to site staff and a programme board which oversaw the delivery of the programme. There were two key streams of research running alongside the programme, the 'signal crimes' work, developing the perspective which grew alongside reassurance policing and the outcome and process evaluation project.

The national programme team's assessment of individual sites suggested that two sites' implementation was fully compliant with the approach they were suggesting, whereas there remained issues to address in the other four sites. Analysis of process data on problem-solving, community engagement, visibility and familiarity were considered alongside the outcomes achieved.

#### Crime and anti-social behaviour

- Across the sites, there was a positive programme effect on self-reported victimisation, according to the survey. The decrease in victimisation was five percentage points greater for respondents in the trial sites compared to the control sites.
- Two of the six sites had significantly greater reductions in total recorded crime than their control sites, while three sites saw reductions in individual crime types.
- Across the pair matched sites, there was a positive programme effect on perceptions of five of the eight types of anti-social behaviour measured in the survey. Three of the six individual sites showed reductions compared to controls.
- Analysis of anti-social behaviour incidents was only possible for one site, and there were no data available for the control site. The total number of incidents fell significantly, as did the number of criminal damage incidents.
- There was a positive programme effect on public perception of change in the crime rate over the previous twelve months, in terms of an increase in the percentage of respondents who thought crime had reduced. The percentage of people who thought crime had increased over the previous twelve months did not change.

#### Feelings of safety and worry about crime

- Across the sites, there was a positive programme effect on feelings of safety after dark. The number of people who felt very or fairly safe walking alone in the area after dark rose one percentage point for respondents in the trial sites and fell three percentage points for those in the control sites. There was no effect on feelings of safety during the day, with the vast majority feeling fairly or very safe at the baseline.
- There was a limited effect on fear of crime, which is measured by asking respondents how much they worry. For the majority of worry about crime indicators there was no effect attributable to the programme, they fell in all sites, trials and controls. Only one of the eight indicators improved: worry about being physically attacked by strangers.

• Comparing all trial sites to all control sites, there was a positive programme effect on perceptions of risk of seeing graffiti or experiencing property damage, with no effect on perceived likelihood of being a victim of burglary, vehicle crime or robbery. Four of the six sites saw improvement on one or two of the indicators.

#### Public satisfaction and confidence

- Across the sites, there was a positive programme effect on public confidence in the police. The percentage of people who thought the police in their area were doing an excellent or good job increased by 15 percentage points compared to only three percentage points in the control sites. Four of the six sites experienced positive improvements compared to their control sites.
- There was no programme effect on the satisfaction with police contact during the previous twelve months for those contacting the police for any reason other than being a victim.

#### Social capacity

- There was a positive programme effect on one of the social cohesion indicators. The percentage of people saying they trusted many or some of the people in their area increased by three percentage points across the trial sites and fell by two percentage points in the control sites. The result for one site was significant compared to its control.
- There was no programme effect on other indicators of efficacy or cohesion, although one individual site showed an effect on whether respondents agreed that theirs was a close, tight-knit community. There was no programme effect on involvement in community or voluntary activity and no effect for individual sites.

#### **Public engagement**

 Across all the pair matched sites, there were significant positive improvements in indicators of public perceptions of police engagement and on the impact of the engagement on public awareness. Five of the six sites showed improvements on one or more of the indicators.

- There was an overall programme effect on measures of police visibility and familiarity. Across the trial sites, there was a 15 percentage point increase in those saying that they saw the police on foot patrol at least once a week, compared to a four percentage point increase in the control sites. There was the same degree of difference between improvements in controls and trials, when comparing the change in the number of people who knew the police by name, sight or both. Five of the six sites showed improvements on visibility or familiarity or both indicators.
- There was a significant difference in awareness of public meetings between respondents in trials and controls sites, with four of the six individual sites showing significant differences. Across the sites, however, there was no difference in attendance at public meetings, with only one site showing greater attendance compared to its control. Reports of door knocking were significantly greater in the experimental sites, compared to the control sites, with two sites showing significant results.

#### Patterns of change

Looking across the sources of data, surveys and police statistics, clear patterns were evident across the outcomes consistent with the activity of the NRPP as the explanation for change. The NRPP, in addressing public priorities, principally targeted what is sometimes considered minor crime such as criminal damage, and anti-social behaviour, rather than crime reduction in burglary, vehicle crime or robbery. The improvements were achieved in a twelve month period, relatively short compared to the Chicago community policing experience. Taking sites together, perceptions of risk and problem indicators were consistent in improving for graffiti and vandalism, whilst perceptions of risk and worry indicators were consistent in not moving for vehicle crime, burglary and robbery.

The trial sites demonstrated clear positive results compared to controls in increased public confidence, in terms of the police doing a good job. The NRPP did not focus attention on improving police contact, for victims, those who contacted the police for other reasons, or those who were stopped or approached by the police. Indicators of satisfaction for these groups did not improve significantly when compared to controls. Finally, change in social capacity might be expected to take longer than one year. Measures of community efficacy did not improve in the trial sites compared to the control sites, although there was a significant improvement in trust.

Analysis of the factors explaining variation in improved public confidence in the follow-up survey found further support for the mechanisms adopted in the NRPP: engagement, patrol and targeted problem-solving. The indicators associated with high public confidence in the second survey, aside from confidence in the first survey, were improved perceptions against the following indicators: police effort into finding out what people think, teenagers hanging around and regular foot patrol; being a victim of crime decreased the odds of having high public confidence.

#### Implications for policy

- Neighbourhood policing has developed in the UK building on the NRPP and other models, addressing the same outcomes. A national roll-out of neighbourhood policing, with implementation support from a national programme team, can be expected to deliver improvements in crime, public confidence, feelings of safety, fear of crime and perceptions of anti-social behaviour. Change in social capacity may require a longer timescale, and/or different activity by the police and partners, such as the Together campaign.
- The added value of a neighbourhood policing approach in cost-benefit terms cannot be calculated simply. The funding provided for an increase in police community support officers (PCSOs) could provide some of the resources needed to support dedicated local activity.
- Addressing the wider citizen focus agenda, including accessibility of the police in general and improving victim and user satisfaction, is likely to be an important contributor to public confidence and needs to be integrated with neighbourhood policing.

#### Implications for practice

• This evaluation supports an approach to community engagement which goes beyond public meetings to include, for example, street briefings, door knocking and 'have a say days'. The effort put into engagement is noticed by the public. The public also noticed change delivered through targeted problem-solving, which requires detailed analysis and action in partnership. Visibility and familiarity could not deliver shifts in public perception on their own, according to this evidence. • The results also suggest that activity to improve satisfaction with police contact through routes other than neighbourhood policing (e.g. first response), is still required, if the police are to improve confidence across the board.

#### Implications for research

- NRPP provides evidence for the impact of local policing activity at ward level. Further evaluation is required to test whether neighbourhood policing can deliver results across basic command units (BCUs) and forces as it is rolled out nationally in accordance with government commitments. The Home Office has an evaluation in place to address this issue.
- Further analysis of process issues in the sites, presented alongside outcomes, particularly around community engagement, would provide more detailed material for practitioners.
- The research did not provide a test of the 'signal crimes' perspective developed by Martin Innes but does suggest that a policing approach which targets public priorities can have a positive impact both on crime and on public perceptions. Further work in this area may be of interest.
- The limited improvements in worry and social capacity indicators suggest the need for further survey work to examine future change in the sites. There will be a third survey in selected sites to explore whether there were lagged effects and whether the results achieved were sustainable.
- Cost-benefit analysis would also be a useful contribution to the evidence on neighbourhood policing, particularly for policy makers. Further work in this area will be of interest but limited in the NRPP because cost data were only available for one site and no agreed estimates of the cost of fear of crime or low public confidence are currently available. There will be a specific focus on cost-benefit in the evaluation of the national roll-out of neighbourhood policing.

### Introduction

#### The evaluation of the National Reassurance Policing Programme

The main aim of the study was to fill a gap in the research evidence in England on the impact of a package of local policing activities. The evaluation assessed the impact of the outcomes achieved by the National Reassurance Policing Programme, which ran trials in 16 ward-level sites, in eight forces in England, beginning in October 2003 (see Appendix A for a timeline of the programme and the elements of this study). Process and outcome data were collected on all 16 sites which formed the NRPP. This report presents results from the six sites with allocated controls, which constituted the strongest element of the evaluation design. Findings from the remaining ten sites will be published in a companion document (Morris, 2006). The evaluation aimed to measure the impact of the programme on anti-social behaviour, crime, feelings of safety and public confidence in the police.

#### Background

1

#### The impact of local policing activities

International reviews of the evidence of the impact of policing activity at a local level on reassurance and crime reduction outcomes suggested that a multi-faceted approach could reduce worry about crime, increase public confidence and reduce crime and anti-social behaviour (Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004; National Academy of Sciences, 2004; Sherman *et al.*, 2002). The table overleaf summarises the findings of the reviews, which drew heavily on research from the USA.

	Crime reduction	Anti-social behaviour reduction	Increased public confidence	Reduced worry about crime
Community engagement	Ŷ	?	1	1
Problem-solving	1	1	Ť	?
Community foot patrol	Х	1	1	1
Targeted foot patrol	✓	1	?	?
Package of measures	1	1	1	1
✓ strong evidence that	t it works			
↑ evidence that it is promising				
? unknown impact	2			
X strong evidence that	t it doesn't work			

#### Table 1.1: Impact of local policing activities

X strong evidence that it doesn't work

The most well-known and thoroughly studied community policing intervention of the last two decades is the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (see, for example, Skogan and Hartnett 1997). This model was known for its beat meetings approach and the focus on local problem-solving and had been shown to deliver positive improvements in public perceptions of the police. Foot patrol had been shown to increase public satisfaction and confidence and reduce worry about crime, but was more successful when it was combined with problem-solving approaches (Zhao, 2002; Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004). Targeting rather than reacting had been found to be a key feature of more successful policing activity in general (Sherman *et al.*, 2002). Context and implementation were also critical to delivery of outcomes, while poorly implemented initiatives had been found to be potentially harmful (Crawford *et al.*, 2004). The National Reassurance Policing Programme provided the opportunity to fill a gap in the evidence as to the impact of a locally focused approach to policing in the UK on a range of outcomes.

#### The development of reassurance policing

Reassurance policing began in Surrey Police as a response to what had become known as the 'reassurance gap'. While the British Crime Survey (BCS) had been showing consistent falls in crime since 1995, two-thirds of respondents in 2002/03 (Nicholas and Walker, 2003) still believed that, compared to two years before, the crime rate had risen. After a

paper drafted for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) by a Surrey employee, Jane Harwood, outlined the problem (*Civility First*), the Chief Constable of Surrey Police, Denis O'Connor, sought the assistance of University of Surrey researchers to explore the reasons for the gap, and to help develop an intervention to address the causes.

The 'signal crimes' perspective (SCP) was developed by the leading member of the research team, Martin Innes, to suggest that specific crimes and disorders had a greater impact on public feelings of safety than others. Reassurance policing, which developed alongside the SCP, advocated a primary role for communities in identifying and prioritising local crime and disorder issues, which they would then tackle together with the police and other public services. The 'signal crimes' perspective developed further during the course of research carried out alongside the NRPP, separately to the outcome evaluation.

Seeking other police partners, Denis O'Connor involved the Metropolitan Police in order to test the concept in an urban environment and the two forces began a trial of 'Reassurance Policing' in 2001. On behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers, the two forces then submitted a bid to the Police Standards Unit (PSU) of the Home Office to allow a national trial, involving other forces. The PSU provided £5 million over two years, to fund the programme in eight forces, involving 16 trial sites, and to fund associated research and evaluation.

#### **Overview of the National Reassurance Policing Programme**

The overall NRPP approach consisted of innovation funding to stimulate activity in the trial sites, a national programme team to support implementation in the 16 sites, and research and evaluation. The funding was not intended to resource staffing, as forces were supposed to use their existing staff resources.

The aims of the NRPP were:

- reduced fear of crime, improved sense of safety;
- reduced anti-social behaviour, improved quality of life;
- increased public satisfaction with, and confidence in, the police; and
- improved social capacity.

Crime reduction was not included as an aim at the outset, partly because the 'signal crimes' perspective suggested that local priorities might focus attention on anti-social behaviour. Reduction of crime was a key outcome sought by the Home Office from local policing

activity, and the activities of the NRPP could be expected to reduce crime according to previous research evidence. Over the course of the initiative, members of the national programme team recognised that monitoring data suggested that activity in the trial sites was having an impact on crime.

The three key elements of this approach to policing, as set out in the vision, were:

- the presence of visible, accessible and locally known authority figures in neighbourhoods, in particular police officers and police community support officers (this importance of allocating a dedicated resource was recognised during the programme);
- community involvement in the process of identifying priorities and taking action to tackle them; and
- targeted policing activity and problem-solving to tackle crimes and disorders which matter most to the public in neighbourhoods.

The main implementation phase of the 16 site trial began in October 2003, after a preparatory phase lasting six months, which allowed sites to prepare themselves. The national programme team produced end-of-project reports in April 2005. The evaluation measured change after one year, using crime and incident data in two twelve month periods between November 2002 and October 2004 and surveys in the trial sites carried out between November 2003 – January 2004 and then between November 2004 – January 2005 (see Appendix A for a timeline).

Governance was provided by a programme board, chaired by the senior responsible officers, the then Chief Constable of Surrey Police, Denis O'Connor, and Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner, Tim Godwin. The board had representation from all the participating forces and rotated the venue for meetings amongst them. There was also a steering group, chaired by the Minister for Crime Reduction and Policing, Hazel Blears. The implementation of the programme was monitored and supported by a central team, led by Chief Superintendent Carl Crathern, on behalf of ACPO. Ongoing support and consultation were provided by Barrie Irving from the Police Foundation on process issues, Martin Innes and his team on the development of the signal crimes perspective and an Independent Academic Advisory Group on research issues in general. The outcome evaluation was carried out by Home Office researchers, drawing on independent contractors for survey fieldwork, and the process evaluation was principally conducted by an independent contractor, with quality assurance provided by the Home Office.

#### Neighbourhood policing

During the course of the NRPP, the Home Office Strategic Plan 2004-2008 set out the government's plans for neighbourhood policing. This was followed by the publication of the Police Reform White Paper, *Building Communities, Beating Crime*, which highlighted how neighbourhood policing differed from what had been understood as 'community policing' in the UK. Community policing was seen to have lacked a clear crime focus, and therefore might reassure but not reduce crime (Dalgleish and Myhill 2004; Sherman *et al.*, 2002). A neighbourhood policing package to increase public confidence and reduce crime was seen to need a strongly targeted and problem-solving approach. The National Intelligence Model, a business process for the police service to target resources on crime problems which had been adopted by all police forces in England and Wales, provided a structure to assist forces with targeting and analysis.

Key features of neighbourhood policing set out in the White Paper were consistent with the NRPP approach, and supported by international summaries of the evidence, the Chicago model of community policing, Home Office research, and evaluation of earlier projects which suffered implementation failure. These were:

- dedicated resources for neighbourhoods to avoid excessive abstraction (Skogan and Hartnett 1997; Singer, 2004; Crawford *et al.*, 2004; Irving *et al.*, 1989);
- organisational and cultural change to support an emphasis on local problemsolving (Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Sherman *et al.*, 2002; Skogan *et al.*, 1999);
- engagement with communities with a focus on public involvement in identifying and addressing issues (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997);
- stronger partnership working arrangements and mechanisms to target resources at local priorities such as joint tasking and co-ordination groups (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997; Singer, 2004; Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004).

Reassurance policing provided a model which could be drawn on for the development of neighbourhood policing in England and Wales, alongside other major initiatives, such as Policing Priority Areas and the Community Cohesion project, and approaches developed in police forces outside the reassurance programme.

#### **Evaluation design**

The NRPP was an extensive and complex trial. The evaluation design was required to consider not only the national programme and its objectives, but varying local context and

delivery. The 16 trial sites were selected by the programme to cover the broad range of wards in England<sup>1</sup>. Each site offered learning for the national programme, as well as learning in relation to its specific context and issues.

The evaluation was designed by researchers in the Home Office with support from an Independent Academic Advisory Group, drawing on previous research, summarised in a Home Office review of evidence (Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004) which defined reassurance, and assessed international policing interventions which aimed to positively affect reassurance outcomes. The definition of reassurance developed for the review focused on two key aspects of police effectiveness, and feelings and perceptions of safety:

the intended outcome(s) of actions taken by the police and other agencies to improve perceived police effectiveness (mainly confidence in, and satisfaction with, the police), and to increase feelings and perceptions of safety (including reducing the fear of crime).

This definition provided the main outcomes measured in this evaluation, alongside the NRPP's aims and objectives:

- reduced fear of crime and improved sense of safety;
- reduced anti-social behaviour and improved quality of life;
- increased public satisfaction with and confidence in, the police<sup>2</sup>;
- improved social capacity.

In addition, the evaluation was designed to measure a key outcome sought by the Home Office from policing in neighbourhoods.

• Reduced crime

The design aimed to fill a gap in the evidence as to whether, and to what extent, neighbourhood policing interventions in the UK could influence these key outcomes. To provide a robust test of the impact of the intervention, six of the sites were allocated matched control sites, selected to be as similar as possible to the NRPP sites according to specific demographic variables (see Appendix B). If change were achieved only in the NRPP sites, and not in the control sites, this would provide stronger support for the NRPP as an explanation for change. Only the findings of these six sites are presented here, in order to provide a clear standard of

<sup>1</sup> Details of the wards selected can be found in Appendix B. No Welsh forces participated in the NRPP.

<sup>2</sup> Satisfaction with the police is usually measured for specific contact with the police, as a victim, witness or other user of police services, or as a result of stop and search activity. Public confidence is measured in the wider population.

evidence.<sup>3</sup> Outcome data were collected at the beginning of the initiative, and after one year. Findings from the other ten sites,<sup>4</sup> where measures were taken at the same times, but where controls were not available, are published in a companion document (Morris, 2006).<sup>5</sup>

This report does not present detailed analysis of implementation in the six matched sites, but seeks to provide programme level learning, drawing in particular on material from the extensive implementation support provided by the national programme team, managed by the Association of Chief Police Officers and data collected by an independent contractor and Home Office researchers. Process issues were considered important in testing whether the implementation of the programme and not any other intervention or factor was the most likely cause of change. The process aspect of the study was not considered critical in isolation, as considerable evidence existed on implementing programmes of this nature and managing change in policing (see for example, Irving *et al.*, 1989; Bennett and Kemp, 1995; Hamilton-Smith, 2004). An overall assessment of implementation was not carried out. Instead analysis was focused on the activities which were intended to deliver the outcomes. The report aims to determine whether the NRPP achieved its goals and to draw out lessons for the future development of neighbourhood policing.

#### **Outcome measurement**

Outcomes were measured principally by a panel survey of members of the public, conducted by an independent survey contractor, at baseline and after one year of implementation. The survey measured outcomes, mechanisms (the means by which the NRPP intended to deliver outcomes) and contextual factors which were designed to help understand the different conditions which were operating in trial sites. The survey data were supplemented by recorded crime and incident data from the trial sites, and the basic command units of which they formed a part.

The most important factors which the evaluation needed to control for, such as demographics, were addressed by interviewing the same respondents twice, rather than two cross-sectional samples: the analysis was able to control for a measure of how fearful respondents were before the programme began, and what they reported seeing police in their area doing before the programme began (Skogan, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> Equivalent to Level 4 on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (Sherman et al., 2002), where the highest score is five for a trial with random assignment of sites to control or experimental conditions, which was not possible in this case.

<sup>4</sup> Equivalent to Level 2 on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (Sherman et al., 2002).

<sup>5</sup> http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/rfpubs1.html

The survey of 300 respondents in each trial site was conducted by telephone. The sample was split between randomly selected numbers listed in the directory, and randomly generated numbers, in proportion to the listed and unlisted residents in the area. The household member with the next birthday was then selected to complete the questionnaire. The technical report<sup>6</sup> provides for each ward a breakdown of the achieved sample against demographic information from the 2001 Census. The samples were broadly in line with the Census, except that young people between the ages of 16 and 24 tended to be underrepresented. It could not be assumed that those who responded would be representative of young people that did not, therefore it was deemed inappropriate to apply any weighting to the results of the young people present in the sample.

The baseline survey was conducted between November 2003 and January 2004, and provided the position in each site as they launched the programme. A follow-up survey, or second wave, was run one year later between November 2004 and January 2005. As many as possible of the baseline respondents were recontacted and interviewed. Those that could not be recontacted, or who refused to take part in the follow-up, were replaced with responses from further randomly selected respondents, to allow for a third wave of interviews in the future. The repeat interviews allowed analysis of a panel sample; the cross-sectional sample was not drawn on for the analysis presented in this report. A limited number of questions were removed from the follow-up questionnaire, and there were some new questions introduced.<sup>7</sup>

#### **Control sites**

Of the sixteen trial sites, six were matched to control sites, one each in six forces.<sup>8</sup> Matches were made based on population density, ethnicity and proportion of residents in managerial employment. Appendix B provides details of these for trial sites and controls. Forces were consulted on the choice of control site to ensure crime levels were similar, and there were not interventions or conditions in the proposed control site which made it inappropriate. Ideally control sites were in the same force but not the same basic command unit or crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP) as the trial site. These factors combined meant that it was not always possible to proceed

<sup>6</sup> Further technical details of the survey methodology and response rates can be found in a technical report available to download at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/

<sup>7</sup> Details can be found in the technical report available to download at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/

<sup>8</sup> Initially one trial site from each force was intended to be control matched, making a total of eight controls. Subsequently, as Merseyside had been through a boundary change the Census data required to make a match was not available, so neither of the Merseyside sites were control matched. A site was successfully matched to the West Midlands trial site, but as surveying began, it applied to the Police Standards Unit and became a Priority Policing Area (PPA). This made it an inappropriate match and it was too late to seek another site and collect a baseline. As a result only six sites were control matched.

with what appeared at first to be the best matched site, and results should be read in this light. Control sites were surveyed in the same way as the trial sites.<sup>9</sup> Police staff in control sites were interviewed to ensure the ideas central to the NRPP were not being implemented, and the site was a suitable control for the experiment. These interviews were repeated during the trial to ensure there was no change in local policing which compromised their control status.

Analysis of process information suggested that the conditions in the control site for one of the trial sites which showed limited improvement was closer to the style of policing which the NRPP aimed to achieve than was the case for the other five trial sites and their controls. There were community beat constables or equivalents operating in some control areas one of whom, in Ingol, had won an award for problem-solving activity. Some sites may, therefore, have had a harder task in achieving a statistically significant change relative to their controls. The profile of survey respondents in control sites and trial sites was checked, both in terms of demographics and responses to key indicators, to determine whether any differences between the samples drawn at baseline were large enough to be unlikely to be due to chance and would suggest systematic differences between the sites.<sup>10</sup> Taking respondents together, this process did not find differences in the sites that were substantively significant, except for social capacity where it seemed that the control site respondents were more likely to respond positively.

#### Survey indicators and analysis

The survey indicators were mainly drawn from previous surveys developed by the Home Office, which themselves drew on academic study of crime, anti-social behaviour, feelings of safety and community cohesion and efficacy (see for example Singer, 2004; Sampson *et al.*, 1997; Skogan, 1997; Ekblom and Heal, 1982). The questionnaire therefore included questions from the British Crime Survey, the Citizenship survey and other Home Office research, which had been previously tested, as well as some new questions which were piloted in a small number of interviews before the main survey was carried out.

The analysis of the survey indicators needed to determine whether there was positive change in the trial sites, how large the change was compared to change in the control sites and whether this change was statistically significant (unlikely to be due to chance). Responses in the same category, for example anti-social behaviour problems, were not grouped and scaled because the evaluation needed to be able to distinguish between different types of anti-social behaviour. There were three main stages in the analysis, for most of the principal outcome indicators. Variables were created to assess change for each

<sup>9</sup> At baseline, control sites were surveyed slightly later than the trial sites, between January and February 2004 rather than November 2003 and January 2004. At follow-up, both were surveyed during the same period.

<sup>10</sup> See the technical report available to download at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/

respondent. The numbers of respondents who had changed their views from negative to positive or from positive to negative were then calculated. No weighting was applied in the analysis for this report.

## Table 1.2: An example showing how numbers for effect size analysis were generated – all trial sites and controls sites for perceptions of teenagers hanging around

		Follow-up		
		Not a very big problem or not a problem at all	A very or fairly big problem	
Baseline	Not a very big problem or not a problem at all	305	128	
Dasenne	A very or fairly big problem	187	521	
Control sites				
		Follow-up		
		Not a very big problem or not a problem at all	A very or fairly big problem	
Baseline	Not a very big problem or not a problem at all	325	157	
	A very or fairly big problem	142	477	

The size of the effect achieved by the NRPP was calculated by comparing change in the trial site to change in the site control, and a formula was written to test for the statistical significance of the change at the 95 per cent level, that is whether the reader could be confident, 95 times out of 100, that the results found were not random, due to chance (Dobby, personal communication, see Appendix C). This process was firstly carried out at programme level, comparing all respondents in the trial site samples to all those in the control site samples, and then repeated for each individual site. In the results tables, the size of the difference between the amount of change in controls and trials, or effect size, and the statistical significance is shown for each main outcome indicator (for example, public confidence in policing) and for each mechanism indicator (for example, police engagement activity). Results are rounded with no decimal places.

Appendix B shows the number of respondents in the panel sample for each site. No analysis of respondents who only responded to the first or second survey is presented in this report. All survey findings are based only on panel respondents, that is those who responded in both baseline and follow-up surveys. The base number of responses is slightly different for each indicator and each site; these numbers are excluded from the results tables to make them easier to read. The range of respondents in each site for the majority of questions was between 170 and 205. There were a number of exceptions, such as small numbers of respondents in all sites for contact, and satisfaction with police contact. There were also fourteen questions where some individual site responses fell below 160, these were usually in the New Parks site.<sup>11</sup> The number of interviews achieved could mean that, where only a subsample was required (e.g. victims), quite large percentage point shifts might not be statistically significant.<sup>12</sup> Where sample sizes fell below 80 for individual sites (cell sizes below 10) results are not presented in the report.

For indicators which could only be measured in the second survey, a test for statistical significance in the proportion of respondents responding positively was conducted to establish whether differences between the control and experimental were due to chance. Similarly to the survey analysis using the panel data, analysis on these indicators used a significance test based on the Z statistic.

Effect size analysis was also carried out with recorded crime data. Rates were calculated for each month's data and month to month, then trial to control comparisons were carried out and tested. The detailed explanation is shown in Appendix D.

#### Testing the null hypothesis using p-values

For all analysis, statistical significance is shown by p-values. The p-value is an estimate of probability which provides a way of deciding whether or not to reject the null hypothesis, that is to reject that the interventions had no effect. If the estimated probability that the sample values could have been drawn from a population in which there was no impact was particularly low, for example less than five per cent or less than one per cent, these results would only be drawn on average five times in a 100 or one time in 100. The level of probability used to decide when to reject the null hypothesis and identify an intervention effect – deciding that the result is not a freak of chance – depends on the specific context but p values of less than five per cent or less than one per cent are widely used. The term positive programme effect is used in the text where there is a significant positive difference, across the trial sites compared to the controls. The convention used in tables throughout the report is to use asterisks to denote one of three levels of estimated probability:

<sup>11</sup> The survey data can be accessed on the homeoffice website: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/

<sup>12</sup> This is known as the power of a design; see Chapter 3 for further details.

\* p = <0.05 \*\* p = <0.01 \*\*\* p =<0.001

In estimating the probability that the null hypothesis is true, an alternative hypothesis should be considered. A typical null hypothesis would be that both trial sites and controls site would show the same results, so A=B. The alternative might be that trial sites would have better results than the control sites, that is A>B. This hypothesis results in what is called a one tailed test because the choice is then between A=B or A>B. If the alternative is that the trial sites and control sites will have different results but it is not clear which will do better, so A  $\neq$  B. This hypothesis results in a two tailed test because the choice is between A=B or A > B. All significance tests used on survey data were one-tailed, because there was a strong hypothesis as to the direction of movement of the indicators. The significance tests on the crime data were two-tailed as the direction of movement for individual crime types was not predicted.

#### **Process evaluation**

The aim of the process evaluation was to assist in establishing whether the programme was the explanation for change in outcome measures in the sites. Analysis of the available data was carried out to align with the three main activities, visible presence, community engagement and problem-solving and is presented in Chapter Eight. Process information was provided by trial sites as part of the programme team's performance management, and collected during the programme team's advisory visits. The Home Office research team were given access to all of the necessary documentation to monitor progress in the sites. In particular, full access was given to the substantial implementation material collected for each site by the advisory visit team, and their subsequent reports. These advisory visits were carried out by members of the programme team as part of managing implementation across the 16 sites, and were based on Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary's (HMICs) Going Local inspections.

A seven stage model was developed by the national programme team, to provide a structure for activity in trial sites. The process data for the evaluation were collected and stored by an independent contractor in a database constructed around these seven stages. The database provided the research team with a rapid means of checking process information collected by the programme team and testing it against outcome data from the survey and statistics from the sites.

To supplement the documentary process material collected, a purposive sample of the police officers, police staff, partners and community members involved in the programme were interviewed by the independent process evaluation contractor and/or by a Home Office researcher. These interviews were all semi-structured, allowing the respondents to provide indepth comment on issues of particular concern or interest. Police meetings and other forms of community engagement were observed, as were partnership and police tasking meetings, and notes of each meeting were recorded. An email questionnaire survey of all project managers was also conducted to provide an assessment, from their perspective, of the support provided to them by the national programme team. Project managers from the eight forces responded and findings from the six sites with controls are drawn on in relevant chapters of the report.

All of the process data collection conducted for the evaluation was quality assured by the Home Office lead researcher. Initially, the lead researcher accompanied the contractor on data collection visits to ensure focus on the key relevant issues and to model an approach to interviewing and transcription, which would allow continuity and improve reliability. Subsequently, quality assurance was carried out through regular monthly meetings between the process evaluation contractor and the Home Office lead researcher, during which progress and the database contents were reviewed.

The Home Office lead researcher also sat as a participant observer on the Project Manager's Working Group, and the research team was represented on the Programme Board and Ministerial Steering Group. Attendance at these meetings contributed to the research team's ongoing understanding of how the programme was developing and allowed the programme team to be kept informed of the progress of the research.

#### The role of the evaluation research team

Previous studies have identified concern about outcome evaluation researchers providing advice or input during the course of an intervention. The argument has been made that future projects could not be expected to replicate any results achieved, without the additional resource constituted by the researchers' involvement (see Hough *et al.*, 2004). The national programme team had overtly adopted an action learning approach, which would allow them, and the staff in the sites, to develop ways of working which could inform the development of an infrastructure to support a national roll-out of neighbourhood policing.

Assessment of the action learning aspect of the NRPP was not part of the evaluation team's responsibility. Home Office research staff involved in the project therefore shared information or insights gained from ongoing data collection with sites or the national

programme team, where it might assist implementation, whilst being careful to maintain an independent stance in the assessment of the programme's delivery of outcomes. The panel survey, for example, was carried out by an independent contractor, who selected the sample of respondents in each site randomly, without any contact with the staff responsible for delivering the intervention. The baseline data were shared with the trial sites to increase their understanding of the nature of the reassurance issues in their site and to support the national programme team's activity. To assist the sites, a workshop was held for analysts and guidance was given in interpreting and analysing the data. The evaluation team had very limited contact with those developing the signal crimes work.

#### Principal limitations of the evaluation design

The evaluation design had a number of limitations, the most important of which are presented in this section. The first two are related to attribution of change to the programme. Random allocation of sites to control or experimental condition would have been the most robust design. Allowing random selection would have helped to control for possible differences in the sites at baseline, but was not possible because of the need to allow police forces to select appropriate sites from their perspective to ensure they supported implementation.

A further important limitation was the extent to which trial and controls sites could be matched. Three key measures were selected: population density; percentage of the population from ethnic minority backgrounds; and percentage in managerial positions. After selection had taken place on these criteria, crime rates for the sites were checked to ensure that the starting positions of control and trial sites were not greatly dissimilar. There may have been issues not measured by the evaluation which meant that the control and trial sites had different conditions other than the NRPP. The process data collection attempted to assist in testing for this threat to the validity of the results.

The gap between the baseline measure and the follow-up test was only one year, which arguably might not be long enough to change certain indicators, or alternatively might show positive results which could not be sustained over a longer period. A third wave of surveying will take place in a small number of the NRPP sites in order to ascertain the change over a second year.

The representativeness of the sample could also consititute a limitation. The survey was conducted by telephone and the findings were therefore representative of those who lived in

households with telephones who would be willing to respond to a telephone survey and willing to respond at follow-up. The number of residents who were not in the telephone directory led to the use of random digit dialling which created difficulties in the likely eligibility of the randomly generated sample where the prefix codes would cover a much wider area. Response rates were therefore higher for the sample which was known to be eligible than where eligibility had to be assumed.

A key limitation was the power of the design: its capacity to show statistical significance, where real change occurs. Statistical power describes the probability that a study will demonstrate significant change and relates to the number of cases available to be analysed and the size of the change required. With large sample sizes very small changes may be statistically significant, whereas with small samples only very large changes may be significant. In the evaluation of the NRPP, a sample of 300 survey respondents was drawn in all 16 sites and in the six control sites, with as many as possible being interviewed after twelve months. Larger samples in the six matched sites and in their control sites may, in some cases, have meant that the difference in change between the two would have reached significance. In the case of changes in recorded crime or incidents, the sample was those offences or incidents which occurred during two twelve month periods in each ward. Availability of a longer time series of recorded crime or incident data could have changed the results presented in this report (Kim and Skogan, 2003).

#### Structure of the report


The second chapter presents an overview of NRPP activity, covering the national programme team's activities and introducing the trial sites. Chapters 3 to 7 each follow the same structure and end with a summary of the statistically significant positive findings, when comparing the results for experimental and control sites. The third chapter contains the principal outcome findings on reduction of anti-social behaviour and crime. The fourth chapter presents findings on feelings of safety and worry about crime. The fifth chapter sets out changes in measures of public confidence in and satisfaction with policing. The sixth chapter covers social capacity outcomes. The seventh chapter explores survey findings on engagement with the public and visibility and familiarity of the police. The eighth chapter explores how the changes were delivered, assessing the evidence of links between the mechanisms employed in the programme and the outcomes. The final chapter summarises the findings and draws out the implications for policy and practice.

# 2 Implementation of the National Reassurance Policing Programme

This chapter presents an overview of the implementation of the National Reassurance Policing Programme, beginning with its aims and objectives. The programme management arrangements are then explored, with a particular emphasis on the activity of the national team in support of the staff in the trial sites where the programme was delivered, and how the activity was viewed by those in the trial sites. Details of the individual sites are then presented, followed by a summary of their 'readiness' to implement at the start of the programme, their governance arrangements and resourcing. Further analysis of implementation in the trial sites is presented in Chapter Eight, to assist in understanding the outcomes achieved.

#### Aims and objectives of the programme

The programme defined its aims and objectives iteratively, as part of the action learning approach which had been adopted. Figure 2.1 overleaf shows the benefits determined in the NRPP programme plan. The Home Office research team drew mainly on evidence from the robust reviews of the evidence to determine what should be tested in the survey (Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004; National Academy of Sciences, 2004; Sherman *et al.*, 2002). The evaluation did not specifically measure improved quality of life, but all other aims in the diagram were tested.



**Benefits: what does success look like?** 

The vision set out by the NRPP in Box 2.1 helps to clarify the activities which were expected to ensure delivery of the aims. There was some development in focus over the life of the programme.

#### Box 2.1: The NRPP vision from the programme plan

# **Targeted**

The signal crimes concept is at the heart of reassurance policing. The concept covers a whole spectrum of crimes and disorders from the most serious crimes to disorders that have to date been considered trivial. Some of these crimes and disorders matter more to the public than others and can negatively impact on perceptions of risk and security in a neighbourhood. By identifying these signal crimes and disorders, and targeting them, the police will be directing their efforts to those crimes and disorders that are most likely to improve public confidence.

# **Community focused**

Listening to and responding to neighbourhood priorities is key to success. The process of delivering reassurance is fundamentally subjective because it deals with perceptions. It cannot be dispensed but must be negotiated with the communities involved. Genuine community involvement has to be at the core because it is a necessity for re-establishing the public's sense of its own effectiveness.

# Secure neighbourhoods

An equally important component of reassurance is the presence and role of authority figures. The public sees visible, accessible and locally known and knowledgeable police officers as the means through which secure neighbourhoods can be achieved. In this custodian role the officer provides a 'presence of control' demonstrating 'visible authority'. Reassurance policing aims to make a visible improvement to public spaces, so that people can use them in comfort and safety, by targeting troublesome people and locations. People need to know that the police are on the case, not just responding to the latest case.

In summary, the activities and aims set out in Box 2.2 were interrelated. Certain types of activity might be expected to contribute more towards specific aims, but none were intended to work in isolation, rather they were intended to form part of an overall approach to reassurance.

Activities	Aims
<ul> <li>Problem-solving</li> <li>Community involvement</li> <li>Visible authority figures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Reduced disorder (and reduced perceptions of crime and disorder)</li> <li>Reduced fear of crime and increased feelings of safety</li> </ul>
	<ul><li>Increased public satisfaction and confidence</li><li>Improved social capacity</li></ul>

# Box 2.2: Activities and aims

# **Overall cost**

The programme overall cost £5 million, of which just over half was spent on activity in the individual sites and on workshops and other events to support site staff, while just under a quarter was spent on the signal crimes research and the outcome evaluation. The remainder of the budget was spent on programme management, with a focus on ensuring implementation in the sites. The spend in this area included consultancy to design the management systems, a 'readiness assessment' in each of the trial sites (see below) and staffing the national programme team which supported implementation in the sites. Costs of the programme team and signal crimes research were also part-funded by force contributions.

# Signal crimes research and reassurance policing

The signal crimes perspective was developed to provide an innovative approach for understanding ways in which members of the public interpret crime, disorder and policing, and how this affects their feelings of security. The main implication for reassurance policing was that policing interventions could be 'systematically targeted towards those problems that really matter to the public', and therefore have more impact on key issues contributing to insecurity (Innes *et al.,* 2004). The development of this perspective was part of the action learning approach adopted in the NRPP, and the fieldwork (in-depth interviews, mapping activity and focus groups) was conducted in the trial sites between October 2003 and March 2004. There was a deliberate separation maintained between the research and activity in the trial sites for the first six months. An interim report was produced in January 2004 setting out findings for the sites. The outcome evaluation could not provide a test of the signal crimes perspective because it was developed over the course of the intervention, with the final report published in August 2004.

The reassurance website provided a summary of the signal crimes perspective from the police perspective. The national programme team saw it as 'positioned at the heart of reassurance policing' and summarised the key points as follows:

- some crimes and disorders act as warning signals to people about their exposure to risk;
- these signals impact on the public's sense of security;
- they cause people to change their beliefs and/or behaviours to adjust to the perceived risk;
- the perspective covers a whole spectrum of crimes and disorders;
- the perspective gives an opportunity to target those problems that matter most to the public;
- police and their partners can establish 'control signals' to neutralise signal crimes and disorders.

Project managers' average rating of the usefulness of the signal crimes perspective as a backdrop to the NRPP was 'good' (on a five point scale – excellent to very poor).

#### Readiness assessment

Early in the programme the Police Foundation and the Criminal Policy Research Unit (CPRU) at South Bank University were commissioned to carry out an assessment of the readiness of

each new site wishing to be part of the trial. This assessment considered the following critical factors, which were developed by the Police Foundation as part of their support role in the development phase of the NRPP:

- availability of an appropriate geo-demographic incident database (GIS);
- evidence of interaction with the community;
- capacity for joint problem-solving with the local authorities;
- availability of analytical capacity;
- systems of tasking and co-ordination, and the level of sophistication with regards to problem solving;
- support from non-community oriented police units;
- status of data-sharing negotiations;
- visibility of reassurance related issues in the BCU command; and
- level of dedication of resources for reassurance.

The idea of testing for readiness in the early stages of a trial was ambitious and innovative in the policing context. The criteria used were a best estimate of the infrastructure needed to implement the programme, and they provided a useful benchmark to assess sites' progress during the advisory visits, and how far the sites had developed by the end of the evaluation period. In the survey carried out in November 2004, the site project managers who were aware of the assessment and had used it (five out of six), rated it as fair or good in terms of how useful it was in the implementation of the programme in their site.

#### National programme team activity

A key feature of the NRPP was the national programme team. The directors commissioned consultants to develop a detailed approach to implementation support, which combined performance management and advice and guidance. Over the two-year period, the team comprised five full-time staff, with some additional members for shorter periods, who carried out the following main functions:

- ensuring implementation in the trial sites, including advisory visits;
- programme management, including supporting the programme board, managing the budget and reporting to the Home Office Police Standards Unit;
- performance management, including the development of templates for regular feedback from the sites, and collation of these for reports to the programme board;

- support to site project managers, including a programme of meetings, workshops and visits;
- communications and knowledge management, including the development of a reassurance policing website, which incorporated case study examples, and presentations at events of all types; and
- assistance with central policy development, for example on the National Intelligence Model.

The highly structured programme of support, including in-depth advisory visits to forces and detailed reporting mechanisms, addressed issues contributing to implementation failure which had been identified in Home Office evaluation of previous policing intervention, such as the Reducing Burglary Initiative within the Crime Reduction Programme (Hamilton-Smith, 2004). The most notable elements of the work carried out or commissioned by the national programme team are described in the following sections, alongside an assessment by the project managers of how helpful these were to the teams delivering in the sites.

#### The seven stage model

A seven stage model was developed by the national programme team, in consultation with the signal crimes team to provide a structure for activity in trial sites (see Figure 2.2). The survey of project managers found they all had used the model and assessed it as 'good' or 'excellent' in assisting them to implement the NRPP. The process data for the evaluation were collected and stored in a database constructed around these seven stages. This provided the research team with a rapid means of checking process information collected by the programme team and testing it against outcome data from the survey and statistics from the sites. The model was not used to provide an overall test of implementation success, but is included here to give a flavour of the type of activities which were undertaken in the sites.

#### Advisory visits

The NRPP approach to programme implementation had a strong performance management focus. The advisory visits, which followed on from the readiness assessments outlined above, provided a means of testing sites' progress and providing them with advice and support as to where they needed to improve. Each advisory visit was carried out by two members of the national programme team, and continuity was maintained through the team member who attended all the visits over the course of the NRPP. The advisory visits were usually two days long, and included visits to selected members of the public, interviews with key stakeholders and project staff and examination of documents such as problem-solving profiles. Although the visits required significant preparation activity by the sites, project managers in the survey assessed them as 'good' in their usefulness in delivering the NRPP. The visits were intended to be challenging and to provide a 'reality check' for forces, according to the senior officers responsible for the programme.

#### Headline measures reports

Sites provided reports on their progress to the national team. Originally these were standard project highlight reports, which were produced monthly and included a wealth of detail on activities in the sites. Headline measures reports were introduced to provide a more operational focus, concentrating on data on priorities and interventions. Over the course of the initiative, the programme team recognised that they constituted a burden on the sites and reduced the content to a smaller number of indicators.

#### **Project managers meetings and events**

The project managers' meetings were facilitated best practice sharing opportunities which were held monthly and moved around the country to a different force on each occasion. Four two-day events were also held, to focus on specific areas of development for delegates, such as engagement activities and to generate networks for practitioners to learn from each other. The events were frequently attended by staff who were new to the project, so the information they would require was gradually incorporated into the programme website, to allow the events to focus on development issues.

#### Project managers' assessment of the NRPP infrastructure

The results of the project managers' survey demonstrated positive views of the signal crimes research, readiness assessments and support provided by the national team. The project managers had not all heard of, or used, every aspect of the infrastructure asked about in the survey. The elements which had been used by at least four of the six project managers are listed below and demonstrate the extensive programme activity. The majority of assessments of elements which managers had heard of and used were 'good' or 'excellent', except for the communications managers working group and communication key messages which were rated lower by more project managers.

- The seven stage model.
- The key individuals network (KIN) and the environmental visual audit (EVA).
- The signal crimes perspective as a backdrop to the programme and the signal crimes interim report.
- The pre-launch visit, advisory visits and subsequent reports.
- The best practice case studies.
- The programme website www.reassurancepolicing.co.uk and the members area.
- The project managers working group.
- The headline measures process.
- The operation order and manual produced at the start of the programme.
- The readiness assessment.
- Leciestershire's Rough Guide to Reassurance Policing and Surrey's Tactical Operating Guidance.
- The communication managers working group.
- The communication key messages supplied by the National Programme Team.

The seven stage model and the key individuals network were both rated as good or excellent by all the project managers in the trial sites with controls. For the other elements, there was greater variety in responses, with ratings of poor and fair by individual project managers. Only the last two elements in the list were rated as very poor by any respondent, although they were also rated as excellent by another respondent.

# The trial sites

Trial sites were proposed by the forces which wanted to take part in the programme. These were wards<sup>13</sup> which, being existing geographically defined areas, had the benefit of providing a potential route into the local democratic process. The programme aimed to create a balance of sites which tested the model in a wide range of environments. To this end, the sites covered rural and urban, affluent and deprived areas. The wards were not necessarily neighbourhoods according to residents, which meant that engagement activity might need to be targeted at multiple neighbourhoods within a ward.

Table 2.1 shows the number of people resident according to the 2001 Census, and the percentage of the population who defined themselves as White, which demonstrated that all of the sites with controls had ethnic minority population figures similar to the national average.<sup>14</sup> To

<sup>13</sup> Two wards in the case of East Wickham and Falconwood.

<sup>14</sup> There were sites with higher percentages of residents from minority ethnic backgrounds, but these did not have controls.

provide an indicator of the focus of the activity in the sites, the table shows, for each site, the priorities for action identified by the community during the project. Some of the headings were extremely broad and could cover a range of problems, for example 'juvenile nuisance' and 'antisocial behaviour'. An overall assessment of achievement against these priorities was therefore not possible. An assessment of the problem-solving activity in sites was carried out for examples of juvenile nuisance, as a generic heading, which covered a range of problems. Results of this analysis is presented in Chapter Eight to assist in understanding the delivery of outcomes.

Trial site (and police force)	Population <sup>i</sup>	Population self- defined White (%)	Priorities for action identified by the community during the project
Failsworth West, Oldham (Greater Manchester Police)	9,827	96.6	<ul> <li>Alcohol and drug misuse</li> <li>Juvenile nuisance</li> <li>Nuisance vehicles</li> </ul>
Ingol, Preston" (Lancashire Constabulary)	7,395	96.4	<ul> <li>Drug misuse/dealing</li> <li>Juvenile nuisance</li> <li>Anti-social behaviour</li> <li>Litter and untidiness</li> <li>Dog fouling</li> <li>Condition and security of housing</li> <li>Lighting</li> <li>Vandalism</li> <li>Lack of visible police presence</li> </ul>
New Parks, Leicester (Leicestershire Constabulary)	16,022	91.5	<ul> <li>Youth issues</li> <li>Drugs</li> <li>Criminal damage</li> <li>Burglary</li> </ul>
East Wickham & Falconwood, Bexley (Metropolitan Police)	20,918	93.0	<ul> <li>Anti-social behaviour</li> <li>Graffiti</li> <li>Criminal damage</li> </ul>
Burghfield (Thames Valley Police)	5,894	97.4	<ul> <li>Anti-social behaviour</li> <li>Speeding</li> <li>Criminal damage</li> <li>Litter/rubbish/fly-tipping</li> </ul>
Ash Wharf (Surrey Police)	6,073	97.7	<ul><li>Youth issues</li><li>Parking</li><li>Speeding</li></ul>

 Table 2.1:
 Trial site population and priorities for action

i Source: 2001 Census.

ii The Ingol ward was further subdivided into smaller areas, each with their own priorities. The top three priorities from each subsite are included here.

Appendix B provides further demographic information for the trial sites, alongside their respective control sites.

#### **Readiness of sites**

Each site self-assessed against the criteria identified by the programme team and was then assessed by the researchers from the Police Foundation and CPRU. Some sites identified difficulties in particular areas, for which they hoped that the programme would be a catalyst for improvement. Each of the six sites was assessed in nine areas; in total three of the six sites were considered below the minimum standard in one or more areas. The most common area of concern was the level of dedicated resources for reassurance (see 'resourcing' below). Failsworth, New Parks and Burghfield were assessed as offering only some protection or having no system for ring-fencing staff at ward level.

#### Governance and resourcing in the trial sites

The process evaluation overall had four broad themes. Three of these – community engagement, problem-solving and partnership working issues – are addressed in the context of delivery of outcomes in Chapter Nine. In this chapter, the broader contextual issues of project governance and resourcing in the sites are presented, along with the overall assessment of implementation provided by the national programme team's advisory visit reports.

The governance arrangements in sites were usually fairly similar, with an ACPO sponsor providing senior management commitment at force level, the local BCU commander as project sponsor, a project manager responsible for operational delivery and teams of analysts and operational staff in the individual sites. Appendix E provides an example from Lancashire.

The budgets at each trial site were fairly modest; across the six sites the average budget was just over £100,000. Typically just over a third of this money was spent on problemsolving activities. These included activities such as alley gating, improved lighting and solicitor's fees for evictions. The next biggest outlays were on equipment and computing, whilst other items included engagement activities, publicity and research. Staff costs accounted for quite a small proportion of the total cost. Across the six sites an average of ten per cent of the budget was spent on staff. Staff costs were made up of overtime and recruitment of specialist staff including media officers and outreach workers. Across the six sites just over £40,000 was spent on overtime, constituting only five per cent of the overall spend. Detailed data on opportunity costs for officers, partners and the community were only available for one site. The level of staffing in the sites ranged from two full-time teams of one sergeant, two constables and three police community support officers<sup>15</sup> in the East Wickham and Falconwood site, to a microbeat system in Leicestershire, where reassurance policing was delivered within the existing resource structure and the ward was covered within a beat system containing two to three community officers per beat. A rough estimate of the number of officers (constables or sergeants) or community support officers per resident, showed a range from around one to 1,250 in Ingol to around one to 2,450 in Failsworth. The number of staff per resident did not vary in line with the density of population in the sites. According to a summary of process evaluation data from advisory visits, interviews and project documentation, three sites had low abstraction: Failsworth, New Parks and Ingol. There was an abstraction policy in place in Bexley, although monitoring information was not available for East Wickham and Falconwood. The Ash Wharf site was not mentioned for issues connected with abstraction, while Burghfield had some notable abstraction, with staff reported as having between ten and 15 per cent of their time abstracted for the year ending April 2004. There were subsequently issues with sickness and turnover which led to a gap in coverage of the site in the summer and autumn of 2004.

#### Implementation in the trial sites

Implementation in the East Wickham and Falconwood trial site (in London) was 'green' (options were red, amber, green) throughout the programme according to the national team's criteria tested in advisory visits. Ingol reached 'green' by the third advisory visit, whilst the other four sites were assessed as 'amber' throughout the programme. The advisory visit assessment covered a wide range of issues, reflecting the complex range of activity in the sites. Staff in each area were undertaking a variety of activities to engage with the community, increase visibility, establish what key priorities were and carry out problem-solving in partnership to address them.

#### Summary

• The NRPP overall cost was £5 million, of which just over half was spent on activity in the individual sites; just under a quarter was spent on research and evaluation, with the remainder of the budget spent on programme management, with a focus on ensuring implementation in the sites.

<sup>15</sup> Police community support officers (PCSOs) are members of police staff with partial police powers who are focused on improving community safety and deterring anti-social behaviour.

- The main implication of the signal crimes perspective for reassurance policing was that policing interventions could be 'systematically targeted towards those problems that really matter to the public', and therefore have more impact on key issues contributing to insecurity.
- A highly structured national programme of support, including in-depth advisory visits to forces and detailed reporting mechanisms, addressed issues which had contributed to implementation failure in previous projects. All sites implemented to a reasonable standard according to the national programme team, although there were issues to be addressed in four of the six, according to the team's advisory visit reports.
- The results of the project managers' survey demonstrated positive views of the signal crimes research, readiness assessments and support provided by the national team, in terms of their usefulness in helping trial sites deliver.

# Crime and anti-social behaviour

This chapter presents findings on the impact of the NRPP on perceptions of anti-social behaviour, recorded crime, self-reported victimisation, and perceptions of the crime rate. Perception of the crime rate was one of the measures which first prompted the development of the NRPP in that although crime was falling, the public still perceived it to be rising. Anti-social behaviour reduction was considered to be a primary goal for the NRPP and susceptible to being affected by the main activities of the programme. Crime reduction was not the primary focus of the programme but the evaluation design incorporated measures of this indicator for the three main reasons listed below:

- The process of identifying public priority concerns and tackling them, in order to improve public confidence, meant the programme was likely to impact on specific types of crime and anti-social behaviour.
- Evidence from previous research suggested increased police legitimacy could impact on crime. Legitimacy could be affected by indicators associated with community policing activities such as door knocking and improved perceptions of police responsiveness (Sherman and Eck, 2002).
- There was even stronger evidence to suggest that problem-solving activity, targeted on carefully defined issues, would reduce crime (Sherman and Eck, *op cit*).

Priorities identified by the community suggested that it was most likely that activity to reduce crime would be focused on burglary and criminal damage (the latter is also commonly defined as anti-social behaviour).

#### Measurement of anti-social behaviour

Anti-social behaviour could not be measured consistently across the sites using police statistics. There was no agreed standard for recording incidents in place at the start of the evaluation. The forces involved were also at different stages in implementing the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR), developed by the Home Office in order to allow measurement of non-crime issues for the Policing Performance Assessment Framework. The change meant that their own previous statistics were not comparable over time for the purposes of the evaluation. Only one site, Ingol in Lancashire, had already introduced the NSIR and therefore had consistent data over the time period necessary for a pre and post-intervention comparison. Analysis of Ingol's incidents data were carried out separately (see the end of this chapter).

3

Change in anti-social behaviour across the sites was tested using the perception indicators measured in the British Crime Survey as part of the second Public Service Agreement target for the Home Office. Respondents to the survey were asked how big a problem a series of anti-social behaviours were for them. Two of the anti-social behaviours asked about, graffiti and vandalism, are also crimes. A recent study suggested a strong relationship between perceptions and experience (Allen, 2004b). For young people hanging around, vandalism or graffiti, drunk or rowdy behaviour and noisy neighbours, around nine out of ten who perceived problems had experienced them. Only around half of those who perceived problems with drug dealing, had direct experience of the problem.

Crime reduction was measured in the evaluation through recorded crime statistics collected by the sites and provided to the programme team as part of the headline reports. Four types of crime, measured by the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF), were service-wide priorities for the service at the time of the study; these were burglary, vehicle crime, violent crime and overall crime, and these were measured, in addition to criminal damage. The survey also measured perceptions of the change in the crime rate and victimisation through questions similar to those posed in the British Crime Survey. The victimisation question incorporated experiences outside the local area, in order to make it possible to use respondents' victimisation, where appropriate, as a control factor in analysis of perception outcomes. Two of the types of victimisation measured, burglary and property damage, would by definition have taken place in the local area.

# Perceptions of anti-social behaviour

Table 3.1 shows a summary of performance against the anti-social behaviour indicators.

- Across the pair matched sites there was a positive programme effect on perceptions of five of the eight types of anti-social behaviour measured in the survey. Significant reductions were seen in the proportion of people who felt that teenagers hanging around, vandalism, graffiti and people being drunk or rowdy were very or fairly big problems in the trial sites compared to the control sites.
- Three of the six sites showed reductions in perceptions of anti-social behaviour, compared to their controls. Five of the eight indicators reduced in the Ingol site in Lancashire, while the London and Thames Valley sites showed effects against two of the indicators.

• These results were in the context of a reduction over a similar period in national perceptions as measured by the BCS. The proportion of people in England and Wales considering anti-social behaviour to be a very or fairly big problem reduced significantly across all of the indicators.

#### Teenagers hanging around on the streets

In the year ending September 2003 the BCS<sup>16</sup> reported that 31 per cent of people in England and Wales felt that teenagers hanging around on the streets was a very or fairly big problem. This reduced significantly to 28 per cent in the year ending September 2004. All of the sites were well above the national average before the start of the programme and remained above the national average following implementation.

Two of the trial sites showed significant change in public perceptions of the 'teenagers hanging around' problem when compared to their controls. Ingol saw a 16 percentage point reduction in the proportion of people who felt that this was a very or fairly big problem while the matched control saw an increase of five percentage points. East Wickham & Falconwood saw an eight percentage point reduction while the matched control site witnessed an increase of nine percentage points.

# Rubbish or litter lying around

In the year preceding implementation the BCS<sup>16</sup> reported that 32 per cent of people in England and Wales felt that rubbish or litter lying around was a very or fairly big problem. In the year ending September 2004 this had reduced significantly to 29 per cent. Almost all of the sites were above the national average both before and after implementation.

Only Ingol showed a significant change in the proportion of people who felt that rubbish or litter was a very or fairly big problem. The trial site saw a reduction of eight percentage points while in the control the proportion of people who felt rubbish or litter was a problem increased by one percentage point.

# Vandalism and graffiti

In the year preceding the implementation of NRPP the BCS<sup>16</sup> reported that 32 per cent of people in England and Wales felt that vandalism, graffiti and other deliberate damage to

<sup>16</sup> Home Office Statistical Bulletin (HOSB) OSB 03/05 – Crime in England and Wales: Quarterly update to September 2004.

property was a very or fairly big problem. This reduced significantly to 27 per cent in the year ending September 2004. These figures will be used as approximate national averages for the perceptions of vandalism to bus shelters and phone boxes, vandalism to other types of property and graffiti on public buildings.

#### Vandalism to bus shelters and phone boxes

All of the sites remained above the national average following implementation. Only Burghfield in Thames Valley showed a significant effect on the proportion of people who felt that vandalism to bus shelters was a very or fairly big problem. The trial site saw a reduction of 15 percentage points while in the control the proportion of people who felt vandalism to bus shelters was a problem increased by eight percentage points.

#### Vandalism to other types of property

All the experimental sites were above the national average before the start of the programme and all remained above the national average following implementation.

Lancashire was the only site that showed a significant effect on public perceptions of vandalism to other types of property. In the Ingol site the proportion of people who felt that vandalism to other types of property was a very or fairly big problem reduced by 13 percentage points while in the control it increased by three percentage points.

#### Graffiti on public buildings

Four of the sites were above the national average before the start of the programme and of these four, only one was below the national average following implementation. Only Burghfield showed a significant effect. While the trial site showed an increase of one percentage point in the proportion of people who felt that graffiti was a very or fairly big problem, the control showed an increase of 25 percentage points.

#### People being attacked or harassed because of their skin colour, ethnic origin or religion

Only East Wickham and Falconwood showed a significant change in the proportion of people who felt that being attacked or harassed because of their skin colour was a very or fairly big problem. The London site showed a decrease of three percentage points in those that felt this was a problem while the control showed an increase of seven percentage points.

#### People using or dealing drugs

In the year ending September 2003 the BCS<sup>16</sup> reported that 29 per cent of people in England and Wales felt that people using or dealing drugs was a very or fairly big problem. This reduced significantly to 25 per cent in the year ending September 2004. Almost all of the experimental sites were well above the national average before the start of the programme and, with the exception of East Wickham & Falconwood and Burghfield, all remained above the national average following implementation.

Only Ingol in Lancashire showed a significant effect on the proportion of people who felt that using or dealing drugs was a very or fairly big problem. While Ingol showed a nine percentage point decrease in the proportion of people who felt this was a problem, the control site showed an increase of five percentage points.

# People being drunk or rowdy in public places

In the year preceding implementation the BCS<sup>16</sup> reported that 21 per cent of people in England and Wales felt that people being drunk or rowdy in public places was a very or fairly big problem. There was no change in the year ending September 2004. Almost all of the experimental sites were above the national average both before and after implementation with the exception of Burghfield which saw a reduction from 21 to 16 per cent.

Both the Lancashire and Leicestershire trial sites showed significant effects on the proportion of people who felt that people being drunk or rowdy in public was a very or fairly big problem. The Ingol trial site showed an eleven percentage point decrease in those who felt it was a very or fairly big problem while their control showed an increase of eight percentage points. In New Parks the trial site showed a decrease of six percentage points while the control showed a decrease of three percentage points.

# **Recorded crime**

The following section compares the number of crimes in the six trial sites that had matched controls in the twelve months before and after implementation.<sup>17</sup> The changes in the trial sites are compared to the changes in the control sites. The calculation of effect size was different to that employed for the survey. Rates were calculated for each month's data, after which

<sup>17</sup> For Failsworth and its control, the number of crimes in the *ten* months before and after implementation were compared: 12 months of data were not available due to changes in the recording of crimes within Greater Manchester Police.

month to month, then trial to control comparisons were carried out and tested for statistical significance. A detailed explanation can be found in Appendix D.

### Changes in total crime

A programme effect could not be assessed, in particular because data to assess crime were not for exactly the same time periods. Looking at the individual sites, two of the six, Burghfield and Ingol, had significantly greater reductions in total crime<sup>18</sup> than the changes in the control sites: Burghfield had a reduction of 19 per cent, and Ingol a reduction of twelve per cent, whereas the controls for these sites had increases of 28 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. In addition, both Burghfield and Ingol achieved reductions that were not achieved by the Basic Command Units in which they were located.

In contrast, the four other trial sites did not achieve significantly better results than the control sites. New Parks experienced a reduction of eight per cent similar to that in the control site, although this reduction was not achieved in the Basic Command Unit (BCU), where there was no change. East Wickham experienced a small increase of six per cent similar to the increase in the control, whilst the BCU experienced a slight decrease. Ash Wharf had a slight increase of two per cent, in line with the BCU, but this was significant because the control experienced a large decrease.

<sup>18</sup> Total Notifiable Offences.

Change in the total n (pre-implementation c				2 month p	periods
Forces	Pair matched sites	Total offences 2003/04	Total offences 2004/05	Change (%)	Difference (%)
Greater Manchester	Failsworth Control	1,125 930	862 805	-23 -13	-10
Lancashire	Ingol Control	1,015 504	890 625	-12 24	-36***
Leicestershire	New Parks Control	3,257 1,361	3,006 1,288	-8 -5	-3
Metropolitan Police	East Wickham Falconwood Control	1,425 622	1,512 682	6 10	-4
Surrey	Ash Wharf Control	450 699	460 434	2 -38	40*
Thames Valley	Burghfield Control	419 456	338 584	-19 28	-47***
* p=<0.05 ** p:	= <0.01 ***	p=<0.001			

Table 3.2:	Change in total recorded	crime in experimen	tal and control sites
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# Changes by offence type and police activity

There were significant reductions in burglary, vehicle crime and criminal damage, in individual sites (see Table 3.3).

In Ingol, there was a significantly greater reduction (21%) compared to the rise in the control. Analysis of process information suggested that the initiatives carried out in Ingol targeting vandalism/criminal damage, rubbish/litter and juvenile nuisance had an impact on levels of criminal damage: monthly data show reductions shortly after the implementation of these particular initiatives. Ingol also experienced an increase in violent crime.

In the other trial sites, process information did not suggest that specific targeted interventions carried out as part of the NRPP were responsible for reductions in crime, compared to control sites. There was little policing activity carried out which targeted burglary and there were no specific interventions carried out to target vehicle thefts. The significant burglary reduction experienced in Failsworth and the reduction in vehicle thefts in Burghfield was not related to specific reassurance activity, as far as the process evaluation activity was able to determine.

### Other factors influencing crime trends

There was some expectation that there might be an initial increase in recorded crime in the trial sites, because the community might report more crime.<sup>20</sup> Trends in the monthly data for burglary and criminal damage in the trial sites following implementation of NRPP were therefore explored, but no evidence was found of an initial increase, followed by a fall.

No evidence was found to suggest a relationship between sites' rates of crime in comparison to the national average before the NRPP and the type and extent of change that occurred. Certain sites, with crime a great deal higher or lower than the average, might have been expected to experience different results post-implementation, because of the possibility of regression to the mean, that is the tendency of area scores to even out, those with higher crime tending to improve and those with lower crime to deteriorate.<sup>21</sup>

The crime data for the following six months, November 2004 – Mar 2005, were also examined to explore whether there were, for example, increases after the analysis period in sites which had achieved reductions, compared to those which had not. No consistent patterns were found to suggest that change in the sites was not sustainable.

Data were not available to test for displacement of crime, or diffusion of benefits, to adjoining areas, but this was not considered to be a major limitation because previous summaries of the evidence had found limited evidence that these issues were critical in understanding impact (see Eck, 1997).

#### Victimisation

The findings in Table 3.4 suggest a positive programme effect on the percentage of people who reported that they were victims of specific crime types. Although the measure did not ask about their experiences only in the local area, some crimes, for example burglary and property damage, would by definition take place in the neighbourhood. In the experimental sites there was a ten percentage point decrease in the proportion of people reporting victimisation while in the control site victimisation reduced by only five percentage points.

<sup>20</sup> One potential effect of increased visibility and accessibility of the police is that victims report crime more readily.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/regrmean.htm

	Whether a victim of specific crime types (not only in the local area) <sup>i</sup> Yes						
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference		
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Pair matched sites	Experimental	42	32	-10	-5 *		
	Control	38	32	-5	-0		
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	42	33	-9	0		
	Control	46	37	-9	0		
Lancashire	Ingol	41	30	-11	-7		
	Control	26	22	-4	-/		
Leicestershire	New Parks	42	34	-8	-2		
	Control	44	39	-6	2		
MPS	East Wickham &						
	Falconwood	43	32	-11	-4		
	Control	38	30	-8			
Surrey	Ash Wharf	41	34	-7	-2		
	Control	41	36	-5	2		
Thames Valley	Burghfield	44	31	-13	-12 *		
	Control	33	32	-1	-12		

# Table 3.4: Change in self reported victimisation in experimental and control sites

\* p=<0.05 \*\* p=<0.01 \*\*\* p=<0.001

i Insulted or pestered in public (may not always constitute a criminal offence), property damaged by vandals, vehicle crime, attempted or actual burglary, threatened physical attack by stranger, mugging or robbery, other physical attack.

Burghfield in Thames Valley was the only site to show an effect on levels of victimisation, while the trial site showed a reduction of 13 percentage points, the control only reduced by one percentage point.

When only victimisation for burglary, attempted burglary and/or property damage were measured, there was no significant programme effect. The pattern of responses in individual sites was similar but the sample sizes were too small for detailed analysis.

	experimental and control si		i uumuye 1	rennisarion			
Whether a victim of burglary, attempted burglary or property damage							
Yes							
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference		
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Pair matched s	ites Experimental (n	=671) 12	8	-4	-1		
	Control (n=614	) 10	8	-3	1		

# Change in amount of burglary and criminal damage victimisation in Table 3 5.

# Perception of crime rate

There was a positive programme effect on public perceptions of crime, which was the catalyst for the development of the NRPP. The proportion of people who felt that crime had fallen in their area over the twelve months was greater in the trial sites. In the experimental sites there was a 15 percentage point increase in the proportion of people who felt that there was a little or a lot less crime compared to an increase of four percentage points in the controls.

#### Table 3.6: Change in perceptions of the crime rate in experimental and control sites

How much would you say the crime rate in your area has changed over the last 12 months? A little or a lot less crime							
	Ward	Before (%)	After (%)	Change (%)	Difference (%)		
Pair matched sites Experimental Control		12 11	27 15	15 4	]] ***		
* p=<0.05 **	p= <0.01 *** p=<0.001						

The British Crime Survey reports the percentage of respondents who respond 'a little' or 'a lot' more crime in their local area over the last two years. In the 2002/3 survey, this was 54 per cent, double the percentage for trial and control site respondents who were asked about the last twelve months only.<sup>22</sup> The BCS percentage of respondents perceiving more crime in their local area reduced to 49 per cent in 2003/04. There was no significant change, comparing trial and control site respondents.

<sup>22</sup> These figures are very high when compared to the NRPP results suggesting a need to explore period of recall and the impact on perception for this measure.

Idst I Z	months :					
	A little or a lot more crime					
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference	
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
Pair matched sites	Experimental	20	10	-10	1	
	Control	23	14	-9		

Table 3.7:	How much would you say the crime rate in your area has changed over the
	last 12 months?

The large numbers of respondents who said the crime rate stayed the same in both surveys, meant the number of changed respondents was too small for site by site analysis.

# Anti-social behaviour incidents in Ingol

Analysis of anti-social behaviour incidents was only possible for Ingol, and there were no data available for the control site. The change in the number of incidents in Ingol over the course of the twelve months ending October 2004, compared to the twelve months ending October 2003 was broadly consistent with the results for recorded crime and perception of anti-social behaviour measures. The total number of incidents fell significantly from 1,930 to 1,672 (p<0.001). Incidents of criminal damage fell significantly from 428 to 349 (p<0.001). Incidents of juvenile nuisance fell slightly from 426 to 408, but this change was not statistically significant.

#### Summary

		Fails- worth	Ingol	New Parks	East Wickham and Falconwood	Ash Wharf	Burgh- field
Crime reduction							
Recorded crime	N/A	-	1	-	-	-	1
Self-reported victimisation	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Perception of crime rate	1	-	1	-	1	-	$\checkmark$
Anti-social behaviour reduction							
Teenagers hanging round	1	-	1	-	1	-	-
Rubbish or litter	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Vandalism to bus shelters/ phone boxes Vandalism to other types	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
of property	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Graffiti on public buildings People being attacked/ harassed because of their skin colour/ethnic origin	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
or religion	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
People using or dealing drugs	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
People being drunk or rowdy	1	-	1	$\checkmark$	-	-	-

# Table 3.8: Summary of results for crime and anti-social behaviour

- Across the pair matched sites, there was a positive programme effect on perceptions of five of the eight types of anti-social behaviour measured in the survey. Three of the six individual sites showed reductions, compared to controls.
- Across the sites, there was a positive programme effect on self reported victimisation, according to the survey. The decrease in victimisation was five percentage points greater for respondents in the trial sites, compared to the control sites.
- Two of the six sites had significantly greater reductions in total recorded crime than their control sites, while three sites saw reductions in individual crime types.
- There was a positive programme effect on public perception of change in the crime rate over the previous twelve months, that is an increase in the percentage of respondents who thought crime had reduced. The percentage of people who thought crime had increased over the previous twelve months did not change.

# Feelings of safety

This chapter considers the impact of the NRPP on feelings and perceptions of safety. There has been a great deal of debate about measurement in this area (see for example, Ditton, 1999 and Farrall and Gadd, 2004) and there is no 'acceptable' level of safety. Feelings of safety and worry about crime were key targets of the NRPP. Previous research suggested that increased foot patrol would improve feelings of safety and that community-oriented policing activity, including foot patrol, could reduce worry about crime (Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004, Zhao, 2002). Reassurance policing was specifically developed as a means by which the police could address the gap between falling crime and feelings of safety and the 'signal crimes' perspective highlighted the perception of risk as critical in understanding public perceptions overall (Innes *et al.*, 2004). British Crime Survey analysis had also shown that perceived risk was an important predictor of worry about crime (Allen, 2004a).

#### Measurement of feeling safe

Methodological short comings have been noted in the safety questions commonly used in crime surveys (Farrall and Gadd, 2004). The criticisms include the fact that the questions are leading, they do not mention crime, they refer to an imprecise geographical area, they mix fear and risk assessment and for some people, ask them to comment on something they do not do, i.e. walking after dark. Threat measures, which assess perceived risk outside, have been suggested as most appropriate to evaluate the impact of visible patrol (Skogan, 1997). Safety after dark is highlighted as the most appropriate measure, because survey findings have shown that very few people feel unsafe during the daytime, although this implies that interventions also need to be made after dark. In order to address some of the concerns about the measure, filter questions were added to allow the removal of hypothetical responses from the sample and separate questions were included about perception of risk.

#### Measurement of fear of crime

Fear of crime has been critiqued as a measure (see for example Ditton, 1999). The inclusion in this study was determined by its extensive use in previous research and as an indicator of national trends in public perception, and because it provided the opportunity to compare

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outcomes on this measure with other indicators. The British Crime survey asks about how worried respondents are about specific types of crime and these questions were used in this study. There were two important limitations, in respect of how the measures related to the NRPP. Firstly, the eight indicators were for specific crime types, some of which were not subsequently identified in the individual sites as 'signals' (Innes *et al.*, 2004) nor as public priorities during the engagement process. Secondly, it was not possible to include measures of crime for some of the types for which worry was assessed.

### Measurement of perception of risk

The measure used in the British Crime Survey was employed in the NRPP survey, that is respondents' assessment of how likely they were to be a victim of specific types of crime or anti-social behaviour. Similar limitations to fear of crime measures applied to the perception of risk in terms of crime types measured, although measures were included of the likelihood of seeing graffiti or having property damaged, whereas worry about these was not assessed.

# **Feelings of safety**

#### Safety after dark

There was a positive programme effect on feelings of safety after dark. The proportion of people who felt safe walking alone in their area after dark was greater in the trial sites. In the experimental sites there was a one percentage point increase in the proportion of people who felt safer compared to a decrease of four percentage points in the controls.

Two forces showed significant effects. In Ingol, Lancashire and New Parks in Leicestershire, the proportion of people who felt very or fairly safe walking alone in their local area after dark increased by four percentage points in the trial sites compared to a seven percentage point decrease in the control.

	How safe do you feel walking alone in your local area after dark?							
			ry/fairly s	ate				
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference			
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)			
Pair matched sites	Experimental	50	51	1	5 *			
	Control	57	54	-3	0			
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	47	46	-1	-6			
	Control	41	46	5	-0			
Lancashire	Ingol	39	44	4	11 *			
	Control	70	63	-7				
Leicestershire	New Parks	41	45	4	11 *			
	Control	41	34	-7				
MPS	East Wickham							
	& Falconwood	47	51	4	5			
	Control	59	58	-1	Ũ			
Surrey	Ash Wharf	61	58	-3	1			
	Control	57	52	-5				
Thames Valley	Burghfield	63	62	-1	5			
	Control	73	68	-5	Ũ			

# Table 4.1: Change in feelings of safety after dark

# Safety during the day

There was no programme effect on feelings of safety during the day, with over 90 per cent of respondents in experimental and control areas feeling safe during the day in the baseline survey.

# Fear of crime

Table 4.2 shows a summary of performance against the fear of crime indicators.

• There was limited programme effect on the fear of crime indicators. Worry about crime fell in all sites, both experimentals and controls. A positive programme effect was shown in only one of the eight indicators; worry about being physically attacked by strangers.

- Although four of the six sites showed effects on one or two of the fear of crime eight indicators, no site showed a consistent programme effect across the indicators.
- The BCS<sup>23</sup> reports that over a similar period there was a national shift in fear of crime. The proportion of people in England and Wales who were very worried about burglary, car crime and violent crime reduced significantly over the year ending September 2004.

### Worry about being insulted or pestered in the street or other public place

Only Ingol showed a significant effect on the proportion of people who felt very or fairly worried about being insulted or pestered in public. The Ingol trial site showed a reduction of nine percentage points while their control showed a reduction of only two percentage points.

#### Worry about having a car or van stolen

There was no programme effect on the proportion of people who felt very or fairly worried about having their car or van stolen. Worry about car or van theft fell across both experimental and control sites with no significant differences.

#### Worry about having things stolen from a car or van

Two of the sites showed a significant effect on the proportion of people who felt very or very worried about having things stolen from their car or van. The Ingol trial site showed a 19 percentage point reduction while the control reduced by four percentage points. In London, East Wickham & Falconwood showed an eleven percentage point reduction while their control reduced by only one percentage point.

# Worry about having their home broken into and something stolen

There was no programme effect on the proportion of people who felt very or fairly worried about having their home broken into and something stolen. Worry about burglary fell across both experimental and control sites with no significant differences.

# Worry about being mugged or robbed

There was no programme effect on the proportion of people who felt very or fairly worried about having their home broken into and something stolen. Worry about mugging/robbery fell across both experimental and control sites with no significant differences.

# Worry about being physically attacked by strangers

Only the London site showed a significant effect on the proportion of people who felt very or fairly worried about being physically attacked by strangers. In East Wickham & Falconwood there was a 13 percentage point reduction in those people who felt very or fairly worried while the control showed a two percentage point reduction.

# Worry about being physically attacked because of skin colour, ethnic origin or religion

There was no programme effect on the proportion of people who felt very or fairly worried about being physically attacked because of their skin colour, ethnic origin or religion. Reductions in this indicator were seen across both the experimental and control sites with no significant differences.

# Worry about being sexually assaulted

There was no programme effect on the proportion of people who felt very or fairly worried about being sexually assaulted. Reductions in this indicator were seen across all sites, both experimental and control, and there were no significant differences.

# Perception of risk

Table 4.3 shows a summary of performance against the indicators of perceived risk.

There was a positive programme effect on the indicators relating to perceived risk of criminal damage. Significant effects were seen in the proportion of people who felt that graffiti and property damage were very or fairly likely to occur in the next twelve months. There were no significant effects for the programme overall in the perceived risk of burglary, vehicle crime or robbery.

Four of the six sites showed effects on perceptions of risk. The London site improved against two of the indicators while the Greater Manchester, Lancashire and Thames Valley sites improved against one of the indicators.

#### Likelihood of seeing graffiti

Both the London and Thames Valley trial sites showed an effect on the perceived risk of seeing graffiti in the next twelve months. In East Wickham & Falconwood the trial site showed a decrease of two percentage points in those who felt it was very or fairly likely while their control showed an increase of eight percentage points. In Burghfield the trial site showed an increase of four percentage points in perceived risk of seeing graffiti, however, the control showed an increase of 21 percentage points.

# Likelihood of having property damaged

Only the Lancashire site showed an effect on the perceived risk of property damage. The Ingol site showed a four percentage point reduction in the proportion of people perceiving property damage to be very or fairly likely while the control showed an increase of four percentage points.

# Likelihood of being mugged or robbed

Although no programme effect was detected across the grouped sites, one of the six sites showed a positive effect on the perceived risk of mugging or robbery. The proportion of people in the East Wickham and Falconwood trial site perceiving mugging or robbery to be very or fairly likely reduced by six percentage points while the control site showed an increase of two percentage points. While there was an increase of one percentage point in Failsworth, the control site reduced by seven percentage points.

# Likelihood of experiencing vehicle crime or burglary

No effect was found for these property crime indicators. The proportion of people who felt that victimisation was very or fairly likely reduced across both experimental and control sites with no significant differences for the following indicators:

- Likelihood of having car or van stolen
- Likelihood of having things stolen from car or van
- Likelihood of having home burgled

#### Summary

		Fails- worth	Ingol	New Parks	East Wickham and Falconwood	Ash Wharf	Burgh field
Feelings of safety	1	-	1	1	-	-	-
Fear of crime							
Being insulted or pestered							
in the street	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Having car or van stolen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Having things stolen from							
or van	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Having home broken into and something stolen							
Being mugged or robbed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Being physically attacked							
by strangers	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
Being physically attacked because of skin colour,							
ethnic origin or religion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Being sexually assaulted	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Perception of risk							
Likely to see graffiti	1	-	-	-	1	-	1
Likely to have property							
damaged	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Likely to have car or van stolen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Likely to have things stolen							
from car or van	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Likely to have home burgled	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Likely to be mugged or robbed	-	1	-	-	1	-	-

# Table 4.4: Summary of results for feelings of safety

• Across the sites, there was a positive programme effect on feelings of safety after dark. The number of people who felt very or fairly safe walking alone in the area after dark rose one per cent for respondents the trial sites and fell three per cent for those in the control sites. There was no effect on feelings of safety during the day, with the vast majority feeling fairly or very safe at the baseline.

- There was a limited programme effect on fear of crime indicators. Worry about crime fell in all sites, trials and controls. A positive programme effect was shown in only one of the eight indicators, worry about being physically attacked by strangers. Four of the six sites improved on one or two of the indicators.
- There was a positive programme effect on perceptions of risk of seeing graffiti or experiencing property damage, with no effect on perceived likelihood of being a victim of burglary, vehicle crime or robbery. Four of the six sites saw improvement on one or two of the indicators.

# Public confidence and user satisfaction

This chapter presents findings on the impact of the NRPP on public confidence, defined as how good a job the local police are doing, and on the satisfaction of victims, other users of police services and those stopped and approached by the police during the intervention period. The Home Office reassurance review identified increasing perceived police effectiveness (including confidence in, and satisfaction with the police) as one of two main aspects of reassurance (Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004). Increasing police visibility and familiarity increased perceived police effectiveness according to the review. As the NRPP aimed to increase both visibility and familiarity in trial areas, the survey contained measures of both, alongside the outcomes of police effectiveness. This review also found community engagement, community policing, foot patrol and beat policing to be promising interventions. The NRPP drew on many of these schemes in designing its interventions. Measures of community engagement and visibility and familiarity are reported together in Chapter 7.

The NRPP did not explicitly set out to improve the satisfaction of users of police services or those stopped by the police. Although public satisfaction with policing was part of the aims of the programme, there were no specific interventions aimed at victims or others who contacted the police in the model. Increased police presence in local neighbourhoods, and greater engagement with the community could nonetheless lead to improved user satisfaction (Singer, 2004). The programme although not setting this specific aim, was aware of the need to ensure those who used the police service were satisfied, as part of delivering on the other aims they had set.

#### Measurement of confidence in policing

Measuring public perception of police effectiveness is problematic, there is no 'acceptable' level of perceived police effectiveness, nor are there agreed measures used consistently in evaluations (Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004). The British Crime Survey measures the percentage of people who think their local police do a good job. The Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) considers these issues within its citizen focus domain.<sup>24</sup> Nationally about 49 per cent of people think their local police do a good or excellent job.

<sup>24</sup> For more detail see http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance-and-measurement/assessment-methods/

Six new 'diagnostic indicators', thought to contribute to the overall measure of public confidence in local policing were introduced into the British Crime Survey in 2004, as part of the development of the citizen focus domain of the Police Performance Assessment Framework. As these measures were developed during the NRPP evaluation, it was not possible to replicate them in the survey, although similar indicators were included.

# Measurement of satisfaction with policing

The evaluation measured the satisfaction of victims, other police service users and those that were stopped and searched. These data were also intended to allow the exploration of the impact of service use on other outcomes, particularly public confidence in policing. Analysis of the British Crime Survey found that personal experience of the police was negatively related to people's confidence, particularly for victims.<sup>25</sup>

### **Public confidence**

There was an overall programme effect on the proportion of people who felt that the police in their local area are doing an excellent or a good job. In the experimental sites there was a 15 percentage point increase in the proportion of people who felt the police were doing an excellent or a good job compared to a three percentage point increase in the controls.

In 2003/04 the BCS reported that 47 per cent of people felt that the police in their local area did an excellent or a good job.<sup>26</sup> Two of the trial sites were at or above this average before the programme and following implementation all six trial sites were above the national average. The controls did not show the same rate of change. Before the programme, two control sites were above the national average and over the course of the programme only one further site showed change resulting in three controls being above the average following implementation.

<sup>25</sup> People who had been a victim of crime in the last 12 months were markedly less likely to rate their local police as doing a good job than non-victims (69% compared with 78%), Ringham (2004).

<sup>26</sup> The BCS survey questions about the attitudes towards local police changed in the 2003/04 sweep, therefore the results are not comparable with the previous year's results.

area are doing?				11			
	An excellent or good job						
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference		
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Pair matched sites	Experimental	41	56	15	12 ***		
	Control	44	47	3			
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	45	59	14	14 **		
	Control	42	42	0			
Lancashire	Ingol	47	63	16	12 *		
	Control	56	60	4			
Leicestershire	New Parks	48	56	8	-3		
	Control	35	46	11			
MPS	East Wickham						
	& Falconwood	45	62	17	15 **		
	Control	50	52	2	10		
Surrey	Ash Wharf	50	55	5	1		
	Control	44	48	4			
Thames Valley	Burghfield	27	57	30	28 ***		
	Control	43	45	2			
* p=<0.05 ** p=	<0.01 *** p=<0.00	1					

# Table 5.1: Change in public confidence in the police

Taking everything into account, how good a job do you think the police in your local area are doing?

Four of the six forces showed significant effects. In Burghfield, the proportion of people who felt the police were doing an excellent or good job increased by 30 percentage points from a low baseline result compared to two percentage points in the control. Failsworth West in Greater Manchester saw a 14 percentage point increase while the control showed no change. In East Wickham & Falconwood the trial site showed an increase of 17 points while the control shifted by two points and in Lancashire, Ingol showed an increase of 16 percentage points while the control went up by four percentage points.

### User satisfaction

#### Victim satisfaction

The sample sizes were too small to determine whether or not there was a programme effect on victim satisfaction.

### Other user satisfaction

There was no significant programme effect on satisfaction of those who contacted the police other than as a victim. The sample sizes were too small to analyse the responses at the individual site level.

Table 5.2: Overall, the last time you contacted the police, were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the police handled the matter?								
		Very/fairly satisfied						
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference			
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)			
Pair matched s	ites Experimental	65	74	8	8			
	Control	63	63	0	0			

i Reports views of those that have contacted the police in last 12 months for any reason, other than being a victim of crime

# Satisfaction with stop or approach

The sample sizes were too small to determine whether or not there was a programme effect on satisfaction of those that were approached or stopped by the police.

#### Summary

Table 5.3:	Summary of re	sults for public	confidence and u	user satisfaction
------------	---------------	------------------	------------------	-------------------

	All	Fails-	Ingol		East Wickham		Burgh-
	sites	worth		Parks	and	Wharf	field
					Falconwood		
Public confidence							
& user satisfaction							
Confidence in local police	1	1	1	-	✓	-	1
Other user satisfaction	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

- Across the sites, there was a positive programme effect on public confidence in the police. The percentage of people who thought the police in their area were doing an excellent or good job increased by 15 percentage points compared to only three percentage points in the control sites. Four of the six sites experienced positive improvements compared to their control sites.
- There was no programme effect on the satisfaction of those contacting the police other than as a victim of crime. The sample sizes were too small to determine whether or not the programme had an effect on victim satisfaction or satisfaction of those who were stopped or approached.

### Social capacity

This chapter presents findings on the impact of the NRPP on social capacity, which could be described as the extent to which residents in a local area have the resources and conditions to tackle problems collectively. There was limited prior evidence to suggest that institutional activity could impact on informal social control: the capacity of a community to protect itself against criminal or anti-social behaviour. One previous Home Office evaluation of a local reassurance policing project had found some positive improvement on measures of participation in community safety activity and collective norms and values in a two site evaluation with no control site (Singer, 2004). An earlier study in the UK<sup>27</sup> had shown improvement in the involvement of neighbours in home protection and the number of respondents who thought neighbours helped each other or thought it was easy to recognise strangers (Bennett, 1991).

Theory and research have tended to present informal social control as a pre-exising condition which is more important for the creation of 'social order' than formal or organisational responses such as law enforcement (Myhill, forthcoming). Findings from a study of neighbourhoods in Chicago (Sampson *et al.*, 1997) suggested a combined measure of informal social control (whether residents were prepared to intervene in criminal or anti-social situations) community cohesion and trust, explained variation in the amount of violence when other factors were controlled. A similar result was found for high perceived anti-social behaviour using the British Crime Survey (Allen, 2004b).

#### Measurement of social capacity

The measures included in this evaluation were taken from the Home Office Citizenship survey and a previous evaluation of local policing activity (Singer, 2004), each of which drew on the Chicago study (Sampson *et al.*, 1997). The British Crime Survey has measured the extent to which neighbours look out for each other as a proxy for collective efficacy.

#### Social cohesion, efficiacy and activity

There were two measures of cohesion in the survey, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that theirs was a close, tight-knit community and whether they trusted many or few of the people in the area.

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<sup>27</sup> Bennett's study was in two sites, both of which had controls. Change was measured using a cross-sectional sample and an embedded panel, extraneous factors were controlled using regression analysis.

There was no overall programme effect on the first indicator. The only site to demonstrate a significant effect was Ingol in Lancashire. The Ingol trial site showed an eight percentage point increase in the proportion of people who agreed that they lived in a close, tight-knit community compared to a reduction of seven percentage points in the control.

			Agree		
	Ward	Before (%)	After (%)	Change (%)	Difference (%)
Pair matched sites	Experimental	42	42	0	1
	Control	51	50	-2	1
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	61	58	-3	-6
	Control	42	46	4	-0
Lancashire	Ingol	31	38	8	14 **
	Control	64	58	-7	14
Leicestershire	New Parks	39	34	-5	-1
	Control	42	39	-4	
MPS	East Wickham				
	& Falconwood	36	33	-3	-2
	Control	39	38	-1	
Surrey	Ash Wharf	39	41	2	3
	Control	44	43	-1	-
Thames Valley	Burghfield	48	47	-1	-1
	Control	73	73	-1	- 1

### Table 6.1: Do you agree or disagree that this is a close, tight-knit community?

There was a positive programme effect on feelings of trust in the community as shown in Table 6.2. The proportion of people who felt that they could trust many or some people in the area increased by three percentage points in the trial sites while reducing by two percentage points in the controls. East Wickham & Falconwood showed a significant improvement in trust in the trial site set against a decline in trust in the control resulting in a 15 percentage point difference between the sites.

		٨	/any/som	ne	
	Ward	Before (%)	After (%)	Change (%)	Difference (%)
Pair matched sites	Experimental Control	67 74	70 73	3 -2	5 *
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West Control	72 66	75 68	2 2	0
Lancashire	Ingol Control		63 77	4 0	4
Leicestershire	New Parks Control	49 56	53 54	4 -2	6
MPS	East Wickham & Falconwood Control	72 79	77 69	5 -10	15 **
Surrey	Ash Wharf Control	71 73	75 71	4 -2	6
Thames Valley	Burghfield Control	76 90	78 93	2 3	-1

Table 6.2:Would you say that you can trust many, some, few or none of the people in<br/>your area?

#### **Collective efficacy**

There were two indicators of collective efficacy measured in the survey. One measured the extent to which respondents agreed that local people would intervene if young people were causing trouble and the other asked whether the local area was a place where neighbours helped each other or went their own way.

Table 6.3 shows there was no programme effect on public perceptions of whether local people would intervene and no effect in the individual trial sites.

			Agree		
	Ward	Before (%)	After (%)	Change (%)	Difference (%)
Pair matched sites	Experimental	54	53	-1	2
	Control	58	55	-3	Z
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	64	59	-5	-6
	Control	57	59	1	-0
Lancashire	Ingol	55	57	2	1
	Control	67	69	2	
Leicestershire	New Parks	58	55	-3	-7
	Control	47	51	4	/
MPS	East Wickham & Falconwood Control	49 52	46 43	-3 -10	7
Surrey	Ash Wharf	45	47	2	7
,	Control	53	47	-6	7
Thames Valley	Burghfield	52	55	3	9
	Control	69	63	-6	7

### Table 6.3: Do you agree or disagree that if any of the young people around here are causing trouble, local people will tell them off?

Table 6.4 shows there was no programme effect on collective efficacy as measured by respondents' perceptions of whether people helped each other or went their own way, in the area where they lived. The only significant result was in Leicestershire where the control site showed greater improvement than the trial.

	Help each other						
	Ward	Before (%)	After (%)	Change (%)	Difference (%)		
Pair matched sites	Experimental Control	43 49	44 51	0 1	-1		
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West Control	50 39	58 38	8 -1	8		
Lancashire	Ingol Control	37 60	42 62	5 2	3		
Leicestershire	New Parks Control	34 27	30 34	-4 7	-]] *		
MPS	East Wickham & Falconwood Control	41 51	36 44	-5 -7	2		
Surrey	Ash Wharf Control	45 47	43 46	-2 -1	-1		
Thames Valley	Burghfield Control	52 69	52 77	1 8	-7		

## Table 6.4: Would you say you live in an area where people try to help each other, or one in which people mostly go their own way?

Involvement in voluntary or community activity

Respondents were asked about their involvement in voluntary or community activity and about participation in neighbourhood watch schemes. There was no programme effect on public involvement in community organisations, the responses overall remained static at 14 per cent in the experimental sites. None of the individual sites showed significant differences to their controls sites. Types of involvement activity were also analysed separately and there was no variation.

neighbou	rhood watch				
			Involved		
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Pair matched sites	Experimental	14	14	0	-2
	Control	10	11	2	-2
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	35	36	1	0
	Control	30	30	1	U
Lancashire	Ingol	29	31	2	3
	Control	25	24	-1	0
Leicestershire	New Parks	14	13	-1	-2
	Control	11	12	1	2
MPS	East Wickham				
	& Falconwood	23	24	1	-1
	Control	24	26	2	
Surrey	Ash Wharf	28	24	-4	-6
	Control	32	33	2	Ū
Thames Valley	Burghfield	35	35	-1	-5
	Control	48	52	4	-5

# Table 6.5: Involvement in community or voluntary organisations, including neighbourhood watch

i Excluding membership of local church, mosque or other religious group.

#### Summary

		Fails- worth	Ingol	New Parks	East Wickham and Falconwood	Ash Wharf	Burgh field
					Taiconwood		
Social capacity							
Cohesion	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Trust	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
Collective efficacy							
If young people are							
causing trouble, local people							
will tell them off	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Live in an area where people help each other				,			
Involvement in voluntary	-	-	-	<i>,</i>	-	-	-
organizations, including							
neighbourhood watch	_	_	_	_	_	-	-

#### Table 6.6: Summary of social capacity results

- There was a positive programme effect on one of the social cohesion indicators. The percentage of people saying they trusted many or some of the people in their area increased by three per cent across the trial sites and fell by two per cent in the control sites. The result for one individual site was significant compared to its control.
- There was no programme effect on other indicators of efficacy or cohesion, although one individual site showed an effect on whether respondents agreed that theirs was a close, tight-knit community. There was no programme effect on involvement in community or voluntary activity and no effect for individual sites.

### Community engagement, visibility and familiarity

This chapter presents findings on indicators of police engagement with the public and perceptions of police visibility and familiarity. Community engagement was a key mechanism of the NRPP approach, as set out in its objectives, and tackling issues prioritised for the public was connected back to the 'signal crimes' perspective, developed by Martin Innes, which suggested that public perceptions of the crime rate were more closely linked to certain signal crimes, than to crime as measured and prioritised by formal policing data and systems. Previous evidence had found promising evidence that engagement activity could reduce crime as a result of increasing police legitimacy (Sherman *et al.*, 2002).

A Home Office review of the literature regarding community engagement in policing (Myhill, forthcoming) found consistent theoretical support for its benefits, but limited evaluation of interventions. Community involvement was thought to bring highly localised problems to the attention of the police and, when tackling these in partnership, would allow communities to see the police were responsive to their concerns. Trust and confidence in the police would improve, which would improve police-community relations and reduce fear of crime. Activity in the neighbourhood would increase, leading to further reduction in actual crime rates and calls for service.

#### Measurement of engagement, visibility and familiarity

7

The evaluation measured change in public perceptions of police engagement and in visibility and familiarity measures. Visibility and familiarity have been found to be critical elements in previous studies of interventions aimed at reducing fear and increasing confidence and were key aspects of the NRPP model. Foot patrol could be a means of engagement as well as a token of control or authority. Measures of awareness of and engagement in police activity associated with the NRPP were included in the follow-up survey, after ascertaining what activities were being carried out. Only differences between the trial and control site responses at follow-up can therefore be shown and differences between the sites at baseline cannot be controlled.

#### Visibility, familiarity and PCSOs

While the NRPP was underway, a number of other central and local government initiatives were also being implemented. Most notable in this context, was the introduction of police community support officers (PCSOs). Most of the neighbourhoods in the NRPP were patrolled by PCSOs during the period being evaluated, and some of these PCSOs were performing a neighbourhood role. Forces recruited, trained and deployed PCSOs at different times, and PCSO roles varied. Other evidence suggested that some people might not be able to distinguish PCSOs from sworn police officers (Cooper *et al.*, forthcoming). In the baseline survey, respondents were asked about the visibility, accessibility and familiarity of police officers. PCSOs were present in a number of sites, and may have been included in baseline responses by those that did not distinguish between them and police officers. However, at the time of the baseline, PCSOs had only recently been recruited and deployed and would not have had the opportunity to build extensive networks and ensure they were known and regularly seen.

In the follow up survey, the questions about visibility and familiarity were reworded to make it clear that respondents should include PCSOs, as well as police officers, in their responses. PCSOs were present in all but one force at this time, but there remained an issue as to whether the public could differentiate them from sworn officers. As a result, comparisons of the baseline and follow up data, must be considered in the light of both the presence of PCSOs and the change in wording of the question.

#### Public perceptions of police engagement

Public perceptions of engagement by the police were measured through three indicators, similar to those which were subsequently introduced into the British Crime Survey as 'diagnostic' indicators for public confidence.

#### Police effort to find out local people's views

Across all the pair matched sites there was an overall programme effect on the proportion of people who felt that the police put a lot or some effort into finding out what people think. In the experimental sites there was a twelve percentage point increase compared to an increase of one percentage point in the controls.

		A lot of effort or some effort						
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference			
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)			
Pair matched sites	Experimental	72	83	12	11 ***			
	Control	74	75	1				
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	74	84	11	15 **			
	Control	73	69	-4	15			
Lancashire	Ingol	87	86	-1	-3			
	Control	78	80	2	-5			
Leicestershire	New Parks	61	76	15	3			
	Control	59	71	12	5			
MPS	East Wickham							
	& Falconwood	72	83	11	15 **			
	Control	76	72	-4	10			
Surrey	Ash Wharf	79	86	7	2			
	Control	74	79	5	Z			
Thames Valley	Burghfield	57	85	28	30 ***			
	Control	81	78	-2	30			

Table 7.1:	How much effort do the police in your local area put into finding out what
	local people think?

Three of the six sites showed significant effects. In Thames Valley the proportion of people who felt that the police put a lot or some effort into finding out what people think increased by 28 percentage points in Burghfield while the control site saw a decrease of two percentage points. Similarly the East Wickham & Falconwood and Failsworth sites saw significant effects with increases of eleven percentage points compared to four percentage point decreases in their matched controls.

#### Police willingness to listen and respond

There was an overall programme effect on the proportion of people who felt that the police were very or fairly willing to listen to people's views. In the experimental sites there was an increase of six percentage points compared to a *decrease* of two points in the controls.

	Very or fairly willing						
	Ward	Before (%)	After (%)	Change (%)	Difference (%)		
		(70)		(70)	(/0]		
Pair matched sites	Experimental	85	91	6	8 ***		
	Control	88	86	-2	U U		
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	83	91	7	11		
	Control	87	83	-4			
Lancashire	Ingol	95	93	-1	-5		
	Control	88	91	3	-5		
Leicestershire	New Parks	86	90	3	10 *		
	Control	87	81	-6	10		
MPS	East Wickham						
	& Falconwood	86	92	6	8 *		
	Control	86	84	-2	-		
Surrey	Ash Wharf	88	89	2	3		
	Control	86	85	-2	5		
Thames Valley	Burghfield	70	93	23	26 ***		
	Control	92	89	-3	20		

Table 7.2:	How willing are the	police to listen and	respond to p	eople's views?
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Three of the six sites showed significant effects. Burghfield in Thames Valley showed an increase of 23 percentage points in the proportion of people who felt the police were willing to listen while the control showed a *decrease* of three points. New Parks showed an *increase* of three percentage points while the control showed a *decrease* of six points. East Wickham & Falconwood showed an increase of six percentage points while the control showed a decrease points while the control showed a decrease points while the control showed a minerease of six percentage points while the control showed a decrease points while the control showed a decrease points while the control showed a minerease of six percentage points while the control showed a decrease points.

#### Police effectiveness at working with the community

There was an overall programme effect on the proportion of people who felt that their local police were very or fairly effective at working with the local community. In the experimental sites there was an increase of ten percentage points in those who felt the police were effective at working with the community compared to no change in the controls.

In 2003/04 the BCS reported that 57 per cent of people felt that their local police were very or fairly effective at working with the local community.<sup>28</sup> All of the sites were above the national average before the programme and all remained above the average following implementation.

	Very or fairly effective						
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference		
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
Pair matched sites	Experimental	72	81	10	9 ***		
	Control	72	72	0	7		
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	68	80	12	10 *		
	Control	65	67	2	10		
Lancashire	Ingol	83	86	3	0		
	Control	80	83	3	U		
Leicestershire	New Parks	65	76	12	9		
	Control	63	66	3	/		
MPS	East Wickham						
	& Falconwood	76	82	7	4		
	Control	66	69	3			
Surrey	Ash Wharf	77	82	5	10 *		
	Control	82	76	-6	10		
Thames Valley	Burghfield	61	81	21	24 ***		
	Control	76	72	-4	24		

### Table 7.3: How effective are the police in your local area at working with the community?

Three of the six sites showed significant effects. Thames Valley saw the greatest effect with Burghfield showing a 21 percentage point increase compared to a decrease of four percentage points in the control site. Ash Wharf in Surrey showed an increase of five percentage points while the control saw a decrease of six percentage points and Failsworth West showed a twelve percentage point increase while the control showed an increase of two percentage points.

<sup>28</sup> The BCS survey questions about the attitudes towards local police changed in the 2003/04 sweep, therefore the results are not comparable with the previous year's results.

#### Impact of engagement on awareness

One element of engagement relates to finding out public views. If the NRPP was having an effect, an increase would be expected in the number of people who were aware of how to get their views across. Another element of engagement is to provide information to the community on what is being done in the area. The NRPP would be expected to have increased the numbers of people who were aware of police plans in their area.

#### Awareness of police plans

There was an overall programme effect on the proportion of people who reported that they knew what the police planned to do in their area. In the experimental sites there was a 14 percentage point increase in those who knew what the police planned, compared to an increase of five percentage points in the controls.

	Involved							
	Ward	Before (%)	After (%)	Change (%)	Difference (%)			
Pair matched sites	Experimental	13	27	14	9 ***			
	Control	10	15	5	7			
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	36	45	9	4			
	Control	35	41	6	4			
Lancashire	Ingol	26	43	17	6			
	Control	30	41	11	0			
Leicestershire	New Parks	35	47	11	11 *			
	Control	39	39	0				
MPS	East Wickham & Falconwood Control	45 39	51 47	6 8	-2			
<b>C</b>				· ·				
Surrey	Ash Wharf Control	38 37	51 44	14 7	7 **			
Thames Valley	Burghfield	52	62	10	-2			
	Control	33	44	11	-2			

### Table 7.4: Do you know what the police plan to do in your local area?

Two of the six sites showed significant effects. Surrey saw the greatest effect with Ash Wharf showing a 14 percentage point increase compared to an increase of seven percentage points in the control site. New Parks in Leicestershire showed an eleven percentage point increase while the control site showed no change.

#### Awareness of ways to get views across

There was an overall programme effect on the proportion of people who felt that they knew how to get their views across the police in their local area. In the experimental sites there was an increase of 14 percentage points compared to an increase of seven percentage points in the controls.

			Involved			
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference	
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
Pair matched sites	Experimental	38	51	14	7 **	
	Control	37	44	7	/	
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	35	47	11	11 *	
	Control	39	39	0		
Lancashire	Ingol	52	62	10	-2	
	Control	33	44	11	-7	
Leicestershire	New Parks	26	43	17	6	
	Control	30	41	11	Ũ	
MPS	East Wickham	<i></i>				
	& Falconwood	36	45	9	4	
	Control	35	41	6		
Surrey	Ash Wharf	45	51	6	-2	
	Control	39	47	8	-	
Thames Valley	Burghfield	31	61	30	25 ***	
	Control	47	52	5	25	

### Table 7.5:Do you know how to get your views across to the police in your local<br/>area?

Two of the six trial sites showed significant effects. In Thames Valley, Burghfield showed a 30 percentage point increase in those who felt they knew how to get their views across compared to only an increase of only five percentage points in the controls. In Greater Manchester, Failsworth West showed an eleven percentage point increase while the control showed no change.

#### Awareness of how to complain

The NRPP did not specifically target activity on increasing awareness of how to complain to the police. There was no programme effect on the proportion of people who reported that they knew how to complain to the local police if necessary. None of the sites showed significant effects against this indicator.

#### Visibility and familiarity

#### Visibility

There was an overall programme effect on the proportion of people who saw the police on foot patrol in their local area once a week or more. In the experimental sites there was a 15 percentage point increase compared to an increase of four percentage points in the controls.

	Once a week or more							
	Ward	Before (%)	After (%)	Change (%)	Difference (%)			
Pair matched sites	Experimental	14	29	15	10 ***			
	Control	14	18	4	10			
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	10	30	20	15 ***			
	Control	20	24	4	15			
Lancashire	Ingol	31	35	4	-3			
	Control	17	24	7	-0			
Leicestershire	New Parks	10	23	12	9 **			
	Control	5	9	4	/			
MPS	East Wickham							
	& Falconwood	16	54	38	31 ***			
	Control	12	19	7	01			
Surrey	Ash Wharf	13	20	7	4			
	Control	21	23	3	4			
Thames Valley	Burghfield	5	11	5	4			
	Control	7	8	1	4			

Table 7.6:On average, how often do you see the police on foot patrol in your local<br/>area?

Three of the six forces showed significant effects. In East Wickham & Falconwood the proportion of people who saw foot patrol officers once a week or more increased by 38 percentage points compared to seven in their control site. Failsworth West saw a 20 percentage point increase compared to four in the control and New Parks in Leicestershire saw a twelve percentage point increase compared to four points in the control.

#### Familiarity

There was an overall programme effect on the proportion of people who reported they knew the police in their local area by name, by sight or both. In the experimental sites there was a twelve percentage point increase compared to an increase of two percentage points in the controls.

	Kr	now police k	oy sight or	name or bo	oth	
	Ward	Before	After	Change	Difference	
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
Pair matched sites	Experimental	16	27	12	10 **	
	Control	14	15	2	10	
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	11	19	8	9 *	
	Control	19	18	-1	7	
Lancashire	Ingol	25	33	8	-2	
	Control	17	27	10	2	
Leicestershire	New Parks	11	17	6	3	
	Control	8	11	3	Ũ	
MPS	East Wickham & Falconwood	16	27	12		
	Control	14	15	2	10 **	
Surrey	Ash Wharf	31	37	6		
concy	Control	39	36	-3	9 *	
Thames Valley	Burghfield	14	23	9	0 *	
	Control	38	39	1	8 *	

Table 7.7:	Do you know any of the police who work in your local area by name, sight
	or both?

Four of the six sites showed significant effects. In East Wickham & Falconwood there was a twelve percentage point increase in the proportion of people who knew their local police by name, sight or both compared to an increase of two percentage points in the control. Failsworth West showed an increase of eight percentage points while the controls showed a *decrease* of one percentage point. Both Surrey and Thames Valley also showed significant effects; Ash Wharf showed an increase of six percentage points in the proportion of people who reported knowing their local police while the control showed a decrease of three percentage points and Burghfield showed an increase of nine percentage points compared to an increase of one percentage point in the control.

#### Awareness of and participation in engagement activity

These measures were only included in the follow-up survey, after ascertaining what activities were being carried out in the NRPP. Differences could have existed between the sites at baseline.

#### Awareness of public meetings

There was a significant difference in awareness of public meetings between the trial and the control sites. Forty per cent of respondents had heard of public meetings in the trial sites compared to only 22 per cent in the controls. Four of the six sites showed significant differences. In Failsworth West 45 per cent of respondents reported knowing that the police were holding public meetings about priorities for improvement in their local area compared to 19 per cent of people in the control. In Ingol 51 per cent of trial site respondents. Similarly in Surrey there was an 18 percentage point difference between the trial and the control while in Burghfield the difference was even greater with 25 percentage points between the trial and the control sites.

	Ward	No (%)	Yes (%)	Difference (%)
Pair matched sites	Experimental Control	1,160 1,112	40 22	18 ***
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West Control	187 173	45 19	26 ***
Lancashire	Ingol Control	193 189	51 22	29 ***
Leicestershire	New Parks Control	178 175	25 19	6
MPS	East Wickham & Falconwood Control	206 183	19 14	5
Surrey	Ash Wharf Control	191 42 196 24		18 ***
Thames Valley	Burghfield Control	205 196	56 31	25 ***

 Table 7.8:
 Do you know whether the police are holding public meetings about priorities for improvement in your local area?

\* p=<0.05 \*\* p= <0.01 \*\*\* p=<0.001

#### Attendance at public meetings

There was no significant difference in attendance at public meetings between the trial and the control sites. Ingol was the only site to show a significant difference with 32 per cent of respondents reporting having attended a meeting compared to twelve per cent in the control.

	Ward	No (%)	Yes (%)	Difference (%)
Pair matched sites	Experimental	460	22	7
	Control	239	15	·
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	84	18	2
	Control	32	16	2
Lancashire	Ingol	98	32	20 ***
	Control	42	12	20
Leicestershire	New Parks	44	16	3
	Control	33	13	0
MPS	East Wickham			
	& Falconwood	39	18	6
	Control	26	12	
Surrey	Ash Wharf	80	18	3
	Control	46	15	0
Thames Valley	Burghfield	115	24	6
	Control	60	18	0

## Table 7.9: Have you attended any of these meetings about priorities for improvement in your local area in the last 12 months?

#### Door knocking

There was a significant difference in reports of door knocking by police or police community support officers between the trial and control sites. Seven per cent of respondents in the trial sites reported having experienced door knocking compared to two per cent of respondents in the control sites.

	Ward	No (%)	Yes (%)	Difference (%)
Pair matched sites	Experimental	1,158	7	.5 ***
	Control	1,122	2	5
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	190	7	4
	Control	174	3	4
Lancashire	Ingol	193	8	5
	Control	192	3	5
Leicestershire	New Parks	177	12	11 ***
	Control	175	1	11
MPS	East Wickham			
	& Falconwood	206	9	9 ***
	Control	184	0	,
Surrey	Ash Wharf	189	3	0
	Control	198	4	U
Thames Valley	Burghfield	203	4	1
	Control	199	3	1
* p=<0.05 ** p=	<0.01 *** p=<0.00	01		

Table 7.10:	Has a police officer or police community support officer knocked on your
	door to discuss your local area in the last 12 months?

Only the sites in Leicestershire and the MPS showed significant effects. In the New Parks trial site, twelve per cent of respondents reported experience of door knocking compared to one per cent of respondents in the control. Similarly, nine per cent of respondents in East Wickham & Falconwood reported experience of door knocking compared to none of the control site respondents.

#### Summary

Table 7.11: Summary of community engagement, visibility and familiarity results

		Fails- worth	Ingol	New Parks	East Wickham and Falconwood	Ash Wharf	Burgh- field
Engagement							
Police effort into finding							
out what local people think	$\checkmark$	1	-	-	$\checkmark$	-	1
Police willingness to listen							
and respond	$\checkmark$	-	-	1	1	-	1
Police effectiveness at working with local community			_	_	_		1
Awareness of police plans	v	·				·	·
in local area	1	-	-	1	-	1	-
Awareness of how to get views							
across to local police	1	1	-	-	-	-	1
Visibility and familiarity							
Police visibility	1	1	-	1	1	-	-
Police familiarity	1	1	-	-	1	1	1

- Across all the pair matched sites, there were significant positive improvements in indicators of public perceptions of police engagement and on the impact of the engagement on public awareness. Five of the six sites showed improvements on one or more of the indicators.
- There was an overall programme effect on measures of police visibility and familiarity. Across the control sites, there was a 15 percentage point increase in those saying that they saw the police on foot patrol at least once a week, compared to a four percentage point increase in the trial sites. There was the same degree of difference between improvements in controls and trials, when comparing the change in the number of people who knew the police by name, sight or both. Five of the six sites showed improvements on visibility or familiarity or both indicators.
- There was a significant difference in awareness of public meetings between respondents in trials and controls sites, with four of the six individual sites showing significant differences. Across the sites, however, there was no difference in attendance at public meetings, with only one site showing greater attendance, compared to its control. Reports of door knocking were significantly greater in the experimental sites, compared to the control sites, with two sites showing significant results.

This chapter draws together the findings presented in the previous five chapters and considers them alongside process evaluation data, to assess the consistency of the outcomes achieved with the activity in the trial sites. Analysis is then presented which explores which elements of the NRPP approach might explain the increase in public confidence, that is the perception that the police were doing a good job in the local area, where a large significant increase was found across the programme and in four of the six trial sites.

#### The impact of the NRPP overall

The NRPP programme had an overall impact, when comparing respondents in all control sites to respondents in all experimental sites on all the following indicators:

- Self-reported victimisation
- Perception of the crime rate
- Perceptions of five anti-social behaviour problems: graffiti, vandalism of phone boxes/bus shelters, vandalism of other types of property, teenagers handing around, and drunk and rowdy behaviour
- Perceptions of risk of graffiti and vandalism
- Feelings of safety walking in the local area after dark
- Worry about physical attack
- Public confidence in the police
- Police patrol visibility
- Police familiarity
- Police engagement activity
- Public awareness of police activity
- Trust in local people

In addition, although there were no measures before the programme with which to compare, there were significant differences between trials and controls on measures of awareness of and attendance at public meetings and door knocking by police employees.

The programme did not have a significant impact overall, by comparison with controls, on the following indicators:

- Perceptions of three anti-social behaviour problems: rubbish or litter, people being attacked or harassed because of ethnicity or religion, people using or dealing drugs
- Worry about being insulted or pestered, vehicle crime, burglary, robbery, sexual assault, or physical attack because of race, religion or ethnic origin
- Perceptions of risk of vehicle crime, burglary or robbery
- Satisfaction with police contact
- Perceptions of living in a close, tight knit community
- Community efficacy
- Membership of voluntary or community organisations

Clear patterns were evident across the indicators which showed positive impact compared to those which did not, consistent with the activity of the NRPP as the explanation for change. The trial sites demonstrated clear positive results, compared to controls in increased public confidence, both in terms of the police doing a good job, and in the measure of perceived change in the crime rate. Impact on recorded crime could not be measured for the programme overall, but is addressed in the discussion of impact in the sites, below.

The NRPP, in addressing 'signal crimes' and public priorities, principally targeted volume crime such as criminal damage, and anti-social behaviour, rather than crime reduction in burglary, vehicle crime or robbery. Taking sites together, perceptions of risk and problem indicators were consistent in improving for graffiti and vandalism, whilst perceptions of risk and worry indicators were consistent in not moving, for vehicle crime, burglary and robbery. There was no specific focus on physical attack because of race, religion or ethnic origin in the six sites with controls and worry about this, and perception of it as a big problem did not change significantly.

Worry about being insulted or pestered might have been expected to improve, given the significant programme effect on the victimisation measure, of which a substantial proportion was being insulted or pestered. Fear of crime is correlated with crime but lagged (British Crime Survey analysis, 2005) so change would not necessarily be expected in the same year that crime fell. Worry about physical attack may have fallen as a result of visibility and familiarity improvements.

The NRPP did not focus attention on improving police contact, for victims, those who contacted the police for other reasons, or those who were stopped or approached by the police. Indicators of satisfaction for these groups did not improve significantly when compared to controls. Finally, change in social capacity might be expected to take longer

than one year. Measures of community efficacy did not improve in the trial sites compared to the control sites, although there was a significant improvement in trust.

#### Links between outcomes and mechanisms

Community engagement was a critical strand of NRPP and the survey analysis demonstrated significant positive improvements in all the measures of public perceptions of police activity. Visibility and familiarity were critical mechanisms for NRPP and these indicators also showed significant positive improvement, when compared to the control sites.

The third key strand of NRPP, alongside community engagement and visibility and familiarity, was problem-solving in partnership with the community. Problem-solving activity needs to be highly targeted to achieve results in crime and anti-social behaviour reduction and as an activity, was not directly measured in the survey. More detailed process analysis was therefore undertaken and is presented in the section addressing impact by site, below.

Drawing on Ditton's fear of crime panel study (Ditton *et al.*, 2004) interviewers during wave 2 had access to respondents' previous responses to the question about walking alone after dark. If the respondent had changed their response, they were asked why they felt safer or less safe. The responses were recorded verbatim and coded. Of those who gave only one reason for feeling safer (n=501), one third gave an answer which suggested directly or indirectly that change could be attributed to NRPP mechanisms.<sup>29</sup> These responses were, in order of frequency:

- Increased police presence;
- Now feel more secure;
- Area has improved;
- Community support officers and wardens; and
- Fewer young people hanging around.

These findings are consistent with the NRPP as an explanation for change, and specifically provide evidence to support particular elements of the approach, increased police visibility and targeting public priorities identified through engagement such as perceived anti-social behaviour.

<sup>29</sup> The two most frequent responses were 'lived in area for longer' and 'do not leave home empty', accounting together for just under a quarter of respondents (11% and 12% respectively) who gave only one reason.

#### Impact in individual trial sites

Table 8.1 summarises outcome data from the panel surveys in the trial sites, when compared to controls, along with measures of engagement, visibility and familiarity. Three sites, Ingol, East Wickham and Falconwood and Burghfield, showed significant change on the majority of the key outcome indicators. Ingol also showed change in levels of trust, and East Wickham and Falconwood on one of the cohesion measures. East Wickham and Falconwood and Burghfield also showed positive change in engagement indicators. For the other three sites, while they demonstrated change against indicators of engagement, visibility and familiarity, the majority of the key outcome indicators were not affected.

Visibility and familiarity have been found to have a positive impact on fear of crime and perceptions of police effectiveness in previous studies (see Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004). Although Failsworth showed no change on crime and anti-social behaviour indicators, there were improvements on one of the fear of crime indicators and in public confidence alongside improvement in visibility and familiarity. New Parks saw change in one of the anti-social behaviour indicators and in feelings of safety after dark, alongside increased visibility. The positive change in familiarity in Ash Wharf, against no significant changes in outcome indicators, suggested that it might be an insufficient mechanism in isolation.

Although the pattern of improvement against the indicators was consistent with change being attributable to NRPP activity, understanding the differences between the sites in crime and anti-social behaviour reduction and in perceptions of engagement activity, required a greater level of understanding of the process issues in the sites. Given overall positive results on key outcomes, it was notable that Ingol, for example, did not achieve significant change in measures of engagement activity, compared to its control site, although responses tended to be more positive in the baseline survey in that site.

The process evaluation data allowed the research team to examine the sites' problemsolving capability and delivery, their partnership working and their approaches to community engagement to understand whether the differences between sites could be attributed to specific aspects of the NRPP model and the extent of implementation during the trial period. The process evaluation included monitoring reports and qualitative sources, including the problem-solving profiles generated by the sites, the advisory visit assessments and observations.

	Fails- worth	Ingol	New Parks	East Wickham and Falconwood	Ash Wharf	Burgh- field
Crime and anti-social behaviour reduction						
Recorded crime	-	1	-	-	-	1
Self-reported victimisation						1
Perception of crime rate	-	1	-	1	-	1
Perceptions of ASB <sup>i</sup>	-	1	1	1	-	1
Feelings of safety, worry and risk						
Perception of risk	-	1		1	-	1
Feelings of safety	-	1	1	-	-	-
Fear of crime	1	1	-	1	-	-
Public confidence						
Confidence in local police	$\checkmark$	1	-	1	-	1
Social capacity						
Cohesion	-	1	-	-	-	-
Trust	-	-	-	1	-	-
Efficacy						
Involvement in voluntary/community						
activity	-	-	-	-	-	-
Engagement						
Perceptions of police engagement i	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	1	1	1
Awareness of police plans &						
how to get views across <sup>i</sup>	1		1	-	1	1
Visibility and familiarity						
Police visibility	1		1	1	-	-
Police familiarity	1		-	1	1	1

Table 8.1:         Summary of outcomes in individual trial site	Table 8.1:	Summary	of outcomes	in individual	trial sites
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i Sites are ticked if there was a statistically significant positive change against one of two or more indicators.

#### **Problem solving capability**

Understanding a community's priority problems and finding effective responses to them, was of the key aspects of NRPP activity. Forces' problem solving capability was therefore expected to be a critical factor in determining their success. As part of the process evaluation, each site's problem solving approach was explored in detail, using material from the database structured around the seven step model. The analysis sought to establish whether there was a consistent pattern in the assessment of a site's problem solving capability and the delivery of outcomes.

Successful problem solving requires that identified problems are thoroughly researched and understood before relevant responses can be identified (Read and Tilley, 2000). Certain models have been developed to structure this activity. These include the problem analysis triangle (sometimes referred to as the crime triangle) and the SARA process, which describes 'scanning, analysis, response and assessment' as four broadly sequenced stages in dealing with problems.

The problem analysis triangle invites those looking at problems to consider three features common to crime and anti-social behaviour problems: an offender or source of complaint, a victim or target and a location. The theory is that predatory crime occurs when a likely offender and suitable target come together in time and space without a capable guardian present. Problems can be effectively tackled by altering one or more of the three crucial problem features. Analysing the three features can also help identify plausible entry points for intervention.

The SARA process is intended to capture what has to be done to engage in successful problem solving. Problems have to be identified through scanning, then interrogated in detail during analysis. On the basis of analysis, a suitable response is identified and the effectiveness of this response is in dealing with the problem is gauged through assessment.

The issue of 'juvenile nuisance' was selected as the most appropriate example problem to assess the problem solving approaches across the trial sites. Some form of juvenile nuisance was highlighted as a priority in almost every site, and the identification of 'youths' as a problem suggested the need for detailed analysis to identify causes.

Information analysed to assess problem-solving included details of community engagement activity, problem profiles for each site and summaries of the interventions employed, together with assessments made during the advisory visits. There was a particular focus on how juvenile nuisance was determined as a priority for the community (scanning), how clearly the problem was then defined (analysis), what sort of solutions were employed (response) and how the advisory team assessed their problem solving approach.

Across the trial sites there appeared to be a consistent pattern. Those sites that showed a significant positive change in public perceptions of juvenile nuisance were the same sites that appeared to have implemented problem solving well, according to the available indicators. These sites tended to share the following key characteristics in their approach to problem solving:

- Community involvement in first identifying and then defining the problem;
- Very detailed specification of the problem identifying two (if not three) of the crime triangle points; and
- Use of multiple sources of information to specify the nature of the problem

Examples A and B below show how two different sites defined their juvenile nuisance problem. These examples illustrate the importance of specific problem definition in helping sites to select appropriate and successful responses.

#### Example A

'Youths causing damage and throwing stones or eggs are most commonly reported problems. During the week most incidents occur between 3pm and 10pm, with large number between 7pm and 9pm. At weekends problems are more spread but majority of incidents still occur between 4pm and 10pm with peaks between 5pm and 8pm. The main victim of the problem is known as are the offenders. A hardcore of eight persistent offenders (aged 15-22) are known to be responsible for most incidents. Individuals from this gang are named in 15 of the 27 reported incidents. Five of the eight youths already have several previous convictions for a range of offences including criminal damage, violent crime, public order offences, theft, robbery, burglary and assault.'

In Example A, the problem is tightly defined. The community identified the issue and multiple sources, not only police data, were used to define the nature of the problem. The profile identified not only the time and location of the nuisance, but also the main victim and very specific details about the offenders, which in this instance were critical. Egg throwing and criminal damage could easily have been interpreted as low level teenage nuisance except that in this case, the offenders were a group of older teenagers and young men with previous convictions for more serious offences. The response to the problem therefore needed to be qualitatively different and in Example A, activity was specifically targeted at securing evidence against the core group of individuals in order to prosecute them. The site in Example A achieved a significant positive change in public perceptions of juvenile nuisance.

This site also had a process by which their problem-solving was integrated with the National Intelligence Model tasking process,<sup>30</sup> thereby mainstreaming reassurance activity into the work of the BCU. An example of a tasking log is given at Appendix F. Other examples were available which showed that the tasking process also involved members of the community.

<sup>30</sup> The business process for crime reduction in forces in England and Wales, see http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/operational-policing/index.html

#### Example B

'Youths gathering or loitering in groups that are seen as threatening, abusive and noisy. Youths riding cycles or skateboarding on the pavement. Youths being rude and anti-social in and around schools and on the bus system when leaving school. Youths perceived as potential street crime offenders. A perceived lack of local facilities for the local youth and diversionary opportunities. The main area on the ward where groups of youths gather is A square, B gardens, and C court. The victims are described as being from the young to the elderly, both male and female and from a range of ethnic backgrounds. The offenders are described as being 'male and female youth from a range of ethnic backgrounds'.'

In Example B the problem is less well defined. The community were not involved in identifying the problem and only police data were mentioned in the sources used to define the problem. Although the locations of the nuisance were known, as were the types of activity causing the nuisance, specific details of the offenders and the target were missing. The problem was thought to be caused by a lack of youth facilities, but there was a lack of information about the offenders to assist in formulating an appropriate response. In this example, high visibility patrols and youth diversionary tactics were employed. There were no significant changes in public perceptions of juvenile nuisance in this site.

#### Partnership working

Process evaluation data were examined to understand the degree to which successful partnership working may have contributed to the variation in delivery of outcomes across the sites. Evidence from the advisory visits was limited and provided only a basic assessment of levels of partnership working. The information suggested that four of the six sites were successfully engaging with partners and getting them involved in joint interventions to tackle community problems. These sites were Ingol, New Parks, East Wickham and Falconwood and Ash Wharf. There was limited evidence that the remaining two sites, Burghfield and Failsworth were able to secure partnership involvement in joint interventions during the implementation. This pattern of successful partnership working is not consistent with the outcomes achieved in the sites. The assessment of each site's partnership working capability may be too limited to explain variation and could benefit from further analysis.

#### Engagement

Process evaluation data were examined to try to understand the variability in the community engagement measures across the trial sites. Table 8.2 summarises the survey results against each of the community engagement indicators. The ticks show where the trial site achieved

significant positive change in public perceptions compared to the control. Table 8.3 summarises engagement activity undertaken by the police within each site.

	Fails- worth	Ingol	New Parks	East Wickham and Falconwood	Ash Wharf	Burgh field
Engagement						
Police effort to understand views	1	-	-	1	-	1
Police willingness to listen & respond		-	1	1	-	1
Police effectiveness working						
with community	1	-	-	-	1	1
Know what police plan to do	-	-	1	-	1	-
Know how to get views across	1	-	-	-	-	1
Visibility and familiarity						
Foot patrol	1	-	1	-	-	1
Know police by name or sight	1	-	-	1	1	1

#### **TII 00**

#### Table 8.3: Engagement activity in the trial sites according to process evaluation data

	•			• •		
	Fails- worth	Ingol	New Parks	East Wickham and Falconwood	Ash Wharf	Burgh- field
Dedicated media officer	1	✓ <sup>i</sup>	-	✓	-	1
'Open forum' events <sup>31</sup>	-	1	1	1	-	1
Door knocking <sup>32</sup>	-	-	1	1	1	1
Outreach worker	1	1	-	1	1	-
Public surveys <sup>33</sup>	1	-	-	$\checkmark$	1	1
Drop in centre / surgeries	1	1	1	1	1	-
Public meetings (existing)	1	1	1	1	1	-
Public meetings (new)	1	1	1	$\checkmark$	1	1

i There were delays in appointing the media officer which meant that they were not part of engagement strategy throughout implementation.

31 Large & accessible public events with open invitations e.g. street briefings.

<sup>32</sup> Door knocking is only included where it was part of a formal strategy to target every house in a specific location and identify what residents felt were the problems in that area.

<sup>33</sup> Large enough sample to be considered indicative of local opinion.

The summary of evidence suggested that more traditional police engagement activities alone, such as public meetings, whether existing or newly created, together with beat surgeries, were not sufficient to effect change in public perceptions of police engagement. Most sites that had seen significant improvement in perceptions of engagement were those that carried out activity other than meetings, designed to reach a broader section of the local community. These activities included 'open forum' events, large scale public surveys, the use of outreach workers, door knocking exercises and dedicated media officers to ensure wide press coverage of reassurance initiatives.

Burghfield, which saw significant positive shifts in all but one engagement indicator, employed all these techniques in addition to the more traditional public meetings. A series of 'Planning for Real' events were held in the ward, the first of which attracted in excess of 100 residents. During the first phase of events which were held to identify problems, community members were encouraged to use flags on a scaled model of their community to identify areas suffering from anti-social behaviour, environmental issues such as fly tipping or graffiti. The follow-up meetings, intended to prioritise the problems identified, however, attracted limited attendance.

Burghfield also ensured wide coverage of reassurance policing in the local media. The force communications officer devoted 30 per cent of her time to reassurance work and together with another part time journalist, managed to set up a joint newsletter with the parish council, secure local television coverage and ensure a series of positive articles in the local press. The indicator which did not move – knowing what the police plan to do – suggested that feedback on what the police did with the information from the engagement process might have been less effective.

Failsworth also saw positive change against the majority of the indicators. In addition to the usual public meetings and surgeries, Failsworth carried out a series of other activities to target a wider audience. These included a large scale survey, the employment of a community consultation worker and a reassurance youth worker together with a series of positive stories in the local media. One local newspaper featured a week long campaign with two page spreads discussing various aspects of local delivery.

Innovative methods were employed in East Wickham and Falconwood, where there were positive shifts against three of the engagement indicators. As well as public meetings and drop in centres, East Wickham and Falconwood also used techniques designed to reach targeted audiences. Roll calls and street briefings<sup>34</sup> were carried out in the streets of local

<sup>34</sup> Roll calls and street briefings were specific to the MPS site. They were advertised residential meetings held in the street in order to hear community concerns and identify priorities.

neighbourhoods. Areas subject to anti-social behaviour were selected by the police and leafleted before the events to advertise the specific time and place. A number of briefings were held with attendance varying between 30 and 100 residents.

Where East Wickham and Falconwood did use traditional methods, such as beat walking, they ensured that they were carefully targeted. Areas were leafleted prior to mini beat walks in order to inform residents that the police and partners would be present at a certain time of day. Residents displaying the leaflet in their window would then be visited by the ward team. This was particularly useful for those residents who would not be able to get out and attend the street briefings. As in Burghfield, there was also significant media publicity of reassurance activity. Examples included a weekly radio slot together with the use of local publications including church magazines, residents' association newsletters and local press. The neighbourhood officers would also proactively market themselves, making their phone numbers available to the public.

Ingol focused mainly on public meetings, incorporating both existing tenants and residents associations which they supplemented through the employment of a youth outreach worker and 'reassurance days'. The site also had community newsletters, which the community took full responsibility for delivering. Despite this activity there were no changes in any of the panel survey engagement indicators. One plausible explanation is that the engagement indicators for Ingol were noticeably higher than for the other trial sites at the baseline. The site also experienced delay in appointing a dedicated media or communications officer, resulting in more limited local media coverage of reassurance activities.

Measures only available in the follow-up survey (Table 8.4) provided additional support for the process evaluation findings. Ingol was the only site where there was a significant difference, compared to the control site, in the numbers of respondents who said they attended police-public meetings about priorities for improvement in the area. In addition, New Parks and East Wickham and Falconwood were the only sites where significantly more respondents than in the control sites said they had experience of door knocking, although this activity also took place in Ash Wharf and Burghfield.

engagement						
	Fails- worth	Ingol	New Parks	East Wickham and Falconwood	Ash Wharf	Burgh- field
Awareness of public meetings	1	1	-	-	1	1
Attended public meetings	-	1	-	-	-	-
Door knocked by PCSO/officer	-	-	1	1	-	-
Awareness of NRPP	1	~	1	-	-	1

## Table 8.4: Differences compared to controls in follow-up survey indicators of engagement

The assessment of the process and outcome evidence provided support for some of the lessons drawn out by the national programme team from the advisory visits. They noted that a dedicated local media or communication officer was a major asset, and commented that while beat surgeries generally attracted few community members, a patrol base on the ward was positively perceived by residents.

#### Confidence

One of the main effects of the programme was found to be an increase in public confidence in the police. Early analysis of the British Crime Survey had found links between fear of crime and confidence, but further analysis showed that once other factors were taken into account, the relationship was no longer important (see Bennett, 1994). The panel survey provided the opportunity to test how change in public confidence might be related to change in other variables.

In order to understand which factors measured in the survey might help to explain the change in public confidence, a logistic regression was carried out on the grouped responses from the experimental sites. Logistic regression is a multivariate statistical technique which can determine whether any independent variable (e.g. improved perception of police visibility) thought to be related to a dependent variable (e.g. public confidence in policing) is statistically important once possible associations with other variables have been taken into account (Clancy *et al.*, 2000).

Variables were selected for the analysis where they had improved significantly for the programme overall, had been shown in previous research to be associated with confidence and had been found to be significantly associated with increased public confidence in bivariate analysis, provided they were not highly correlated with each other.<sup>35</sup> In order to control for positive views before the NRPP, public confidence, as measured in the baseline survey, was included.

Table 8.5 shows the value of Exp ( $\beta$ ) for variables included in the model. The Exp ( $\beta$ ), or odds ratio as it is more commonly known, represents the change in relative odds of a particular event (public confidence) if we increase the value of the variable under consideration by one unit, controlling for all other independent variables in the model. If Exp ( $\beta$ ), is greater than one then the odds of having confidence in the police are increased and likewise if Exp ( $\beta$ ) is less than one, then the odds are decreased.

Table 8.5:	Logistic regression model for public confidence in the police in the trial sites
	(wave 2)

Significant variables	Exp (B)	Sig.
Confidence in the police at wave 1	5.81	* *
Improved perception of 'teenagers hanging around' as a problem	1.99	* *
Improved perception of regular foot patrol in the local area	1.78	*
Improved perception of police effort to find out what local people think	1.75	*
Being a victim of crime during previous 12 months	.519	* *
Non-significant variables		
Contacted the police other than as a victim in previous 12 months		
Stopped or searched in previous 12 months		
Improved perception of the crime rate		
Improved perception of graffiti as a problem		
Improved perception of vandalism as a problem		
Improved perception of drunk and rowdy behaviour as a problem		
Improved perception of willingness of police to listen and respond to public	:	
Improved perception of effectiveness of police in working with local community	/	
Improved perception of likelihood of being mugged or robbed		
Improved perception of likelihood of seeing graffiti		
Improved perception of likelihood of experiencing personal property dama	ge	
Improved perception of knowing the police by name, sight or both	-	
* p=<0.05 ** p=<0.01 *** p=<0.001		

i These variables account for between 20 and 27 per cent of the variance in public confidence at wave 2.

<sup>35</sup> Collinearity diagnostics were carried out. Variables had to have tolerance values >.10, VIF values <10 and coefficients <0.4 to be included in the regression.

Table 8.5 lists variables in order of their predictive power in the model. Taken together, the significant variables in the model, which could explain up to 27 per cent of the variance in public confidence,<sup>36</sup> were:

- Confidence in the police in wave 1
- Improved perception of 'teenagers hanging around'
- Improved perception of regular foot patrol in the local area
- Improved perception of police effort into finding out what local people think
- Being a victim of crime during the last twelve months

While taking into account the importance of confidence before the programme began, the analysis provided support for the mechanisms adopted in the NRPP: engagement to determine public priorities; problem-solving to address them; and becoming a visible presence in the local area. This analysis was also consistent with previous cross-sectional survey findings, which found that 27 per cent of respondents suggested an increased police presence, when asked what would convince them that crime was being dealt with more effectively by the police in their area. Six per cent suggested communication between the police and communities (Page *et al.*, 2003).

The same analysis was carried out on public confidence in the control sites. High confidence at the baseline remained significant but the Exp ( $\beta$ ), or odds ratio was twice as high as in the model for the trial site respondents. Foot patrol remained significant, but the other two significant variables were different to the model for the experimental sites: perception of the crime rate and vandalism, rather than police effort to find out what local people think and the perception of teenagers hanging around The difference in the models is consistent with the NRPP as the explanation for change, given its focus on problem-solving and community engagement.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Exploratory analysis of the British Crime Survey found that models using perception and demographic indicators explained 11 per cent of the variance found in the confidence in the local police measure. Demographic indicators explained only two per cent of variance, force area and perceptions of anti-social behaviour accounted for seven per cent, with the remaining two per cent accounted for by victimisation and other contact with the police.

<sup>37</sup> When the same analysis was carried out on the whole panel sample, the odds ratio for public confidence at baseline reduced. The significant factors were mixed and included victimisation, foot patrol, effort, perception of the crime rate and perception of teenagers hanging around.

#### Summary

- Clear patterns were evident across the indicators which showed positive impact compared to those which did not, consistent with the activity of the NRPP as the explanation for change.
- Analysis of problem-solving and community engagement process data for the individual sites was consistent with the outcomes achieved. Sites that showed a significant positive change in public perceptions of juvenile nuisance, for example, were the same sites that carried out targeted problem-solving activity, which was well-informed by detailed analysis of the problem and where partners and the community were involved.
- Analysis of the factors explaining variation in improved public confidence in the follow-up survey found further support for the mechanisms adopted in the NRPP, engagement, patrol and targeted problem-solving.

## Conclusions

#### The outcomes of the NRPP

Taken together, the evidence presented in this report provides a consistent picture which shows that positive change in key outcome indicators in the trial sites, such as crime, perceptions of anti-social behaviour, feelings of safety after dark and public confidence in the police, was attributable to the National Reassurance Policing Programme. These changes were achieved in a twelve month period, a relatively short period of time, when compared to what was found from the Chicago community policing experience. The process and outcome data, taken together, explain variation in the results in individual sites. Where there was limited focus in the NRPP approach, for example on burglary and vehicle crime, and police contact, there were no improvements in risk or worry on these crime types, and no improvement in satisfaction with the service received by victims and other users.

The limited improvements in indicators of worry about crime, may also have been connected to the lag in the reaction of respondents to falls in crime, which has been demonstrated in national trends as measured by the British Crime Survey.

There was a positive improvement in trust across the sites, but no improvement in indicators of the capacity of the community to protect itself. The willingness of neighbours to intervene, or increased voluntary activity, may be indicators which take longer to affect or are harder for police interventions to affect.

Cost-benefit calculations have not been included in this report, but could be developed drawing on the detailed results available for one site, Ingol. Revised estimates of the cost of crime have recently been produced by the Home Office, but there are no agreed estimates of costs available for anti-social behaviour, fear, confidence and feelings of safety.

#### Implications for policy

The national roll-out of neighbourhood policing, with implementation support from a national programme team, should deliver improvements in crime, public confidence, feelings of safety and perceptions of anti-social behaviour. These achievements may vary, according to local priorities and measurement at force and BCU level might not always be

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sensitive to changes at a very local level. Change in social capacity may require a longer timescale, a different approach, which draws on civil renewal ideas, from police and/or additional input from partners.

The results of the programme were consistently positive, but the added value of a neighbourhood policing approach in cost-benefit terms cannot be calculated simply. The funding provided for an increase in Police Community Support Officers could provide some of the resources needed to support dedicated local activity.

User satisfaction was not a main focus of the NRPP and did not improve as a result of the programme. Addressing the wider citizen focus agenda, including accessibility of the police in general (not only through patrol) and improving victim and user satisfaction, are also likely to be important contributors to public confidence (Nicholas and Walker, 2002). The ACPO Quality of Service Commitment, the Victims Code and the National Call Handling Standards are all initiatives which need to be taken forward and be integrated with neighbourhood policing.

#### Implications for practice

This evaluation supports an approach to community engagement which goes beyond public meetings to include, for example street briefings, door knocking and 'have a say days'. The effort put into engagement is noticed by the public. The public also notice change delivered through targeted problem-solving, which requires detailed analysis and action in partnership.

Visibility and familiarity cannot deliver shifts in public perception on their own, according to this evidence. The evidence here supports a local policing approach which incorporates three elements, engagement, problem-solving and visibility through patrol and suggests that the police may need to have an eye to building up community capacity more systematically, in order to achieve sustainable results.

The results also show that activity in parallel, to improve satisfaction with police contact through routes other than neighbourhood policing, is still required, if the police are to improve confidence across the board.

#### Implications for research

This study provides strong evidence to show that local policing activity can have a positive impact on a range of outcomes in ward level trial sites. Further evaluation is required to test whether neighbourhood policing can deliver across Basic Command Units and forces as it is rolled out nationally in accordance with government commitments. The Home Office has an evaluation in place to address this issue.

This report sets out the high level outcome findings and some process analysis to explain the outcomes. Further analysis of process issues in the sites, presented alongside outcomes, particularly around community engagement would provide more detailed material for practitioners. A report has been produced setting out case study examples of how to involve the community in problem-solving, drawing on the NRPP and other neighbourhood policing activity in forces (Forrest *et al.*, 2005).


The research did not provide a test of the 'signal crimes' perspective, developed by Martin Innes, but does suggest that a policing approach which targets public priorities can have a positive impact both on crime and on public perceptions. Further work in this area may be of interest. The limited improvements in worry and social capacity indicators suggest the need for further survey work to examine future change in the sites. There will be a third survey in selected sites to explore whether there were lagged effects and whether the results achieved were sustainable. The mechanisms which support the development of informal social control are still a fruitful subject for enquiry.

Cost-benefit analysis would also be a useful contribution to the evidence on neighbourhood policing, particularly for policy makers. Further work in this area will be of interest but limited because cost data were only available for one site and there are no agreed estimates of the cost of fear of crime or low public confidence in the police.

There are two particular areas which would be of interest to explore in the data available from the evaluation. Firstly, further analysis would be of interest, to compare what participants believe to have affected their responses on fear and safety and whether their responses are consistent with equivalent closed questions in the survey. Secondly, issues for sub-groups, in particular minority ethnic respondents have not been considered in this report. More detailed analysis of the patterns of change by sub-groups in the sample may be of interest.

## **Appendix A**

## **Timeline for the NRPP**



## Appendix B

# Experimental and control sites

Police Force Area	Ward	Population Density (People per hectare)	Ethnicity (%White)	% Managers
Greater Manchester	Failsworth West	42.0	96.6	16.7
	Control	34.2	96.7	15.5
Lancashire	Ingol	36.3	96.4	21.7
	Control	38.3	97.5	23.3
Leicestershire	New Parks	33.5	91.5	11.8
	Control	48.6	94.8	10.1
MPS	East Wickham	47.8	92.4	25.2
	Falconwood & Welling	63.1	93.7	26.0
	Control	59.6	92.4	25.1
Surrey	Ash Wharf	8.9	97.7	31.8
	Control	27.2	96.5	30.6
Thames Valley	Burghfield	3.4	97.4	46.1
	Control	2.9	97.5	44.0

#### Comparison of key statistics for trial sites and corresponding controls

	Total no. of panel interviews
Failsworth West	190
Control	175
Ingol	194
Control	192
New Parks	178
Control	176
East Wickham & Falconwood	206
Control	184
Ash Wharf	191
Control	198
Burghfield	205
Control	199

#### Panel sample sizes for trial and controls sites

### **Appendix C**

# Calculating statistical significance of effect size for the survey findings

The variable we are interested in is the one which takes the value 1 if the respondent says they are very pleased or pleased with something and 0 otherwise and there are four different situations in which this variable might be observed: – experimental before, experimental after, control before and control after.

Our model would be  $X_{GT} = 0$  with probability  $1 - p_{GT}$ 1 with probability  $p_{GT}$ 

where G takes the values E (experimental) or C (control) and T takes the values B (before) or A (after)

We want to test whether  $[(p_{EA} - p_{EB}) - (p_{CA} - p_{CB})]$  is significantly different from zero

 $VAR[(p_{EA} - p_{EB}) - (p_{CA} - p_{CB})] = VAR [(p_{EA} - p_{EB})] + VAR[(p_{CA} - p_{CB})]$  because the experimental and control group observations are independent

If we define  $Y_G$  as  $X_{GA} - X_{GB}$  (which we can do because we have panel data for both the experimental and control groups) then  $Y_G$  takes the values 0, 1 or –1

If  $n_{GRS}$  is the number of cases in group G who score R before and S after, and  $n_G$  is the number of cases in group G, for G = E, C then  $n_G = n_{G00} + n_{G11} + n_{G01} + n_{G10}$ 

By definition VAR[ $X_{GA} - X_{GB}$ ] = E[ $(X_{GA} - X_{GB})^2$ ] - E<sup>2</sup>[ $X_{GA} - X_{GB}$ ] where E[X] represents the expected value of X

$$\begin{split} X_{GA} - X_{GB} \text{ takes the value 0 with probability } (\underbrace{n_{G00} + n_{G11}}{n_G}), \text{ the value 1 with probability } \\ & \underbrace{n_{G01}}{n_G} \text{ and the value -1 with probability } \underbrace{n_{G10}}{n_G} \\ \text{Since 0}^2 = 0 \quad 1^2 = 1 \quad \text{and } (-1)^2 = 1 \\ \text{E} \left[ (X_{GA} - X_{GB})^2 \right] = 0^2 \cdot \underbrace{(n_{G00} + n_{G11})}{n_G} + 1^2 \cdot \underbrace{n_{G01}}{n_G} + (-1)^2 \cdot \underbrace{n_{G10}}{n_G} = \underbrace{n_{G01}}{n_G} + \underbrace{n_{G10}}{n_G} \quad \text{and} \end{split}$$

$$E^{2}[X_{GA} - X_{GB}] = [0.(\underline{n_{G00} + n_{G11}}) + 1.\underline{n_{G01}} + (-1).\underline{n_{G10}}]^{2} = [\underline{n_{G01}} - \underline{n_{G10}}]^{2}$$
  
So, VAR[X<sub>GA</sub> - X<sub>GB</sub>] 
$$= \underline{n_{G01}} + \underline{n_{G10}} - [\underline{n_{G01}} - \underline{n_{G10}}]^{2}$$
$$= \{p_{G01} + p_{G10} - [p_{G01} - p_{G10}]^{2}\}$$

where  $p_{G01}$  is the probability that in group G the respondent will score 0 before and 1 after and  $p_{G10}$  is the probability that in group G the respondent will score 1 before and 0 after

Since  $p_{GA}$  –  $p_{GB}$  is the mean of  $X_{GA}$  –  $X_{GB}$ 

VAR 
$$[p_{GA} - p_{GB}] = {\frac{p_{G01} + p_{G10} - [p_{G01} - p_{G10}]^2}{n_G}}$$

If the null hypothesis were true, the expected value of  $[(p_{EA}-p_{EB})-(p_{CA}-p_{CB})]$  would be zero and so

$$\frac{[(p_{EA} - p_{EB}) - (p_{CA} - p_{CB})]}{\sqrt{[\{p_{E01} + p_{E10} - [p_{E01} - p_{E10}]^2\}} + \{p_{C01} + p_{C10} - [p_{C01} - p_{C10}]^2\}]}}{n_C}$$

would be a standard normal variate (for sufficiently large n's) and provide our test statistic

We can estimate  $p_{GRS}$  by  $\frac{n_{GRS}}{n_G}$  for G = E, C R = 0, 1 and S = 0, 1

 $p_{GA}$  by  $(\underline{n_{G11} + n_{G01}})$  for G = E, C and  $\underline{n_G}$ 

 $p_{GB}$  by  $(\frac{n_{G11} + n_{G10}}{n_G})$  for G = E, C

# Appendix D Calculating statistical significance of effect size for the recorded crime analysis

Analysis was carried out in order to test whether changes in crime after NRPP implementation in the trial sites were significantly different to any changes in the control sites. In order to perform this analysis, rates of crime per 1,000 population were calculated so that any differences in the populations between trial sites and their controls were taken into account.

Statistical testing was carried out on the crime rates for each of the 12 months before and after implementation. The changes (diff a) in crime rates between the periods pre- and post-implementation for the trial and the control sites were calculated as follows:

diff a<sub>[month1...month12]</sub> = rate<sub>[month1...month12 before]</sub> - rate<sub>[month1...month12 after]</sub>

e.g. diff a<sub>[Nov]</sub> = rate<sub>[Nov 2002]</sub> - rate<sub>[Nov 2003]</sub>

Therefore, for each trial and each control site, a set of 12 values for diff a was calculated.


Diff b represents the differences in these changes in monthly crime rates between the trial and control sites and was calculated for each pair of matched sites as follows:

diff b<sub>[month1...month12]</sub> = diff a<sub>[trial month1...month12]</sub> - diff a<sub>[control month1...month12]</sub>

Under the null hypothesis (that the interventions make no difference), changes in crime rates in the trial sites would be expected to be approximately the same as changes in crime rates in the control sites, i.e. the average value of diff b would be close to zero. A two tailed one sample T test (95% level) was used to test this expectation. Where statistically significant changes are indicated in Tables x and x there is a 95 per cent probability that the observed difference between the sites had not occurred by chance.

## **Appendix E**

#### **Project governance**



# Appendix F

# Integration with NIM: tasking log

● Crim Neig	Criminal Damage/Graffiti Neighbour disputes	affiti	Large congreç Vehicle Arson	<b>Symptoms</b> Large congregation of youths drinking in public/urinating/spitting Vehicle Arson	uths drinking	in public/uri	nating/spitting
Actions	Police	Partners	Public	Assigned To	Date Assigned	Date Completed	Progress
	Targetted patrols			CBMs & PCSOs	29/04/04 Ongoing	Ongoing	
		"No Ball Games" signs		NBH	10/06/04	10/06/04 08/07/04	Complete. Signs erected at XX Court, and liaison with 1 family re: football nuisance
Test pur at local Enforcement <sup>l</sup> icenses	Test purchases at local off- licenses			Insp. XX	10/06/04	14/10/04	10/06/04 14/10/04 Complete (prosecution pending)
	Objection lodged against application for licence			Insp. XX	24/06/04	24/06/04 14/10/04 Complete	Complete
	Court hearing for 1 problem individual			CBM	02/09/04	22/12/04	02/09/04 22/12/04 Eviction successful. Complete
		Eviction proceedings commenced for 2A XX Rd.	25	Mr. XX, Council	30/09/04	14/10/04	30/09/04 14/10/04 Complete. Property vacated.

Council and Police interviewing problem residents on XX Place         PS XX/Nr. XX, 28/10/04         23/02/05         Residents of No. 9 XX Place have problem field council problem residents           Enforcement         Further action re: 1 problem individual         Mr. XX, North         11/11/04         22/12/04         Exicion successful. XP lace on 10th January 2005.           Target affenders         GRIP Panel         Mr. XX, North         11/11/04         22/12/04         Exicion successful. Intriher exiction - individual has declared self homeless.           Permanent security affenders         Gring of alleyways and sturways         CBMs/ Flas until April         25/11/04         26/01/05         09/02/05         Complete Behaviour Contract and youth referrals. GRIP Panel uilised.           Fauge parties to flace owners of laced         Garing of alleyways and sturways         Mr. XX, North Housing         26/01/05         09/02/05         Complete ai 35A XX Ace Pasitive feedback from tenar Council           Prevention         Trading Standards, and sturways         Involve installed around XS chool         Pol/06/04         19/08/04         Every officence and licensed bein writen to hisp X around XS chool         Pol/02/05         Fence installed. Iron fencing bein installed around house - complete installed around house - complete installed around house - complete installed around house - complete	Actions	Police	Partners Public	Assigned To	Date Date Assigned Completed	e	2
Int Further action re: 1 problem individual GRIP Panel offenders Permanent security presence @ empty flats until April Gating of alleyways Education of Trading Standards. Involve owners of local Extra patrols to seize licensee of alcohol in area pub Improved security around XX School			Council and Police interviewing problem residents on XX Place	(J	PS XX/Mr. XX, Preston City Council	28	3/10/04 2
Target offenders     GRIP Panel       Permanent security presence @ empty flats until April       Gating of alleyways       Education of owners of local off-licences     Involve licensee of alcohol in area       Improved security around XX School	Enforcement	-	Further action re: problem individua		Mr. XX, North British Housing		1/11/04 2
Permanent security presence @ empty flats until April Gating of alleyways and stairways Education of Trading Standards. Involve owners of local Extra patrols to seize off-licences alcohol in area pub Improved security around XX School		Target offenders	GRIP Panel		CBMs/ PCSOs		25/11/04 26/01/05 1 Police caution & 1 Acceptable Behaviour Contract and youth referrals. GRIP Panel utilised.
Gating of alleyways and stairways Education of Trading Standards. Involve owners of local Extra patrols to seize licensee of alcohol in area pub Improved security around XX School Street Wise			Permanent security presence @ empty flats until April		Mr. XX, North British Housing		26/01/05 0
Education of Trading Standards. Involve owners of local Extra patrols to seize licensee of off-licences alcohol in area pub Improved security around XX School Street Wise			Gating of alleyway and stairways	/S	PS XX/Mr XX, Council		29/04/04 0
Improved security Cllr. XX around XX School Street Wise PS XX		Education of owners of loca off-licences		Involve licensee of pub	Police/Trading Standards/ Mrs. XX, INTAG		27/05/04 1
	Prevention	Street Wise	Improved security around XX School		Cllr. XX		10/06/04 09/02/05 Fence installe

Public Assigned Date To Assigned Co Police/LFR: Insp. XX	Assigned Date Date To Assigned Comple Police/LFRS Insp. XX
Insp. XX INTAG/Yo Services/yc people	(outh
Å.	As _
	Date           mpleted           5         Oct. 04           23/11/04           ung
Progress       ted       Oct. 04     06/11/04       Joint Police/Fire Service operation       23/11/04     12/01/05       Complete.       2 premises in XX supplied to minors. Prosecutions pending.       02/12/04     Ongoing       Wednesdays 3pm to 5pm	72

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All pair matched sites	Experimental Control	62 57 56 58	7 -5 3	5 -7 I -7	7 **	42 39	38 37	-5 -2	-3		71 53	65 52	-6 -1	-5	*	43 36	38 36	-5 0	-5	*	34 26	32 32	-2 6	-8	* * *	8 7	8 8	0 1	-1		40 35	40 37	0 2	-1		32 32	29 36	-2 4	-6
Greater Manchester Lancashire Leicestershire	Failsworth West Control Ingol Control New Parks Control	65 58 65 62 70 54 52 57 57 57 68 64	4 -16 7 -1 7 -1	5-2 <sup>-</sup>	***	48 36		-9 -3 -8 1 -8 -2	-6 -9 -6	*	85 32	57 73 79 30 74 81	-6 -2	-4		57 18	43 21	-11 -8 -13 3 -1 -1	-16	* * *	44 13	26 33 37 11 33 43	-7 -2	-5			5 2	-1 -1 0 1 5 -4			37 65 63 20 56 47	64 53 25 59	-1 -9 5 4	-14	* *	37 29	40 44 26 - 37 24 34	-11 8	19
MPS Surrey Thames Valley	East Wickham & Falconwood Control Ash Wharf Control Burghfield	77 69 63 72 47 52 62 59 55 51 30 33	2 9 2 5 9 -3 1 -4	5 3 4 <u>-</u>		40 34 23	39 28	-1 -6 0	-2 6		61 53	71 58 55 40 52	-6 -13	-7		40 38 38	40 40 38	-7 0 2 -1 -2 6	3		18 21	64 49 20 24 10 33	2 3	-2		17 10 5 8 4	6 8	1 1	-10 0 -2		23 23 32 39 25 17	31 41	-1 2	-3		37 22 33	45 37 27 39 16 23	1 4 6	-2

\* p=<0.05 

		Bur	glary				Vehicl	e theft				Viole	ence				Crimina	damage		
	2003/	2004/	Change	Difference		2003/	2004/	Change	Difference	Э	2003/	2004/	Change	Difference		2003/	2004/	Change	Difference	•
	2004	2005	(%)	(%)		2004	2005	(%)	(%)		2004	2005	(%)	(%)		2004	2005	(%)	(%)	
Failsworth	194	107	-45%	-29%	* * *	177	131	-26%	-11%		146	187	28%	33%		286	218	-24%	-24%	
Control	118	99	-16%			136	116	-15%			119	113	-5%			156	157	1%		
Ingol	91	82	-10%	8%		87	47	-46%	-63%		181	224	24%	41%	*	421	334	-21%	-77%	* * *
Control	69	57	-17%			63	74	17%			69	57	-17%			109	170	56%		
New Parks	500	364	-27%	-16%		323	302	-7%	22%		690	757	10%	-13%		1080	953	-12%	-6%	
Control	212	188	-11%			198	141	-29%			273	334	22%			429	403	-6%		
East Wickham and	า																			
Falconwood	220	176	-20%	-29%		220	205	-7%	-35%		271	312	15%	9%		331	418	26%	5%	
Control	69	75	9%			85	109	28%			139	147	6%			168	203	21%		
Ash	78	44	-44%	9%		52	43	-17%	35%	*	51	65	27%	49%		160	209	31%	53%	
Control	99	47	-53%			110	52	-53%			128	100	-22%			196	153	-22%		
Burghfield	61	83	36%	-10%		117	58	-50%	-81%	* * *	42	46	10%	-73%		83	78	-6%	-55%	
Control	99	145	46%			166	216	30%			28	51	82%			51	76	49%		

#### Table 3.3<sup>19</sup>: Change in recorded crime in experimental and control sites by offence type

19 The variation in numbers of offences across the sites affects the statistical power. Some sites may have shown large reductions compared to their control sites, but the number of offences at baseline meant there were too few cases for the results to reach significance. It is not possible to be confident to the 95% level that the results were not due to chance.

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All pair matched sites Greater	Experimental Control Failsworth		24 24	-6	-1		59	47 -		-4		57	45 49	-12 -6	4		65 61	54 52		2		50	43 40	-8	1		47 43	37 37	-10	-4		15 16	12 12	-3	1		30 30		-5	-1	
Manchester	West Control	32 35	28 27	-4 -8	3		73 71	56 - 65	18 -6	-12		72 65	53 61	-19 -4	-15	*	72 70	63 66	-9 -5	-4		66 59	56 54	-9 -5	-5				-9 -4			15 22	18 18	3 -4			37 32	32 32	-4 0	-4	
Lancashire	Ingol Control	36		-9 -2	-8	*	59	44 - 30	14			52	42 31	-10	0		63		-13	-5		52 38		-8 -6			52		-10			14 9	11 9	-3	1		32	27 25	-5	-3	
Leicestershire	New Parks Control	46		-9 -2	-7		74	64 - 74	10	-8		65	57 66	-8	-3		72	66 70	-6			64	61 55	-3 -3	1		61	48	-13 -12			26 23	22 16				41 40	36	-6	1	
MPS	East Wickham & Falconwood Control		27 28		0			48 - 51		-6		58 54	46 53	-12 -1	-11	*	01	52 51	-9	-0		55 49	46 43	-8 -7				37 38	-13 -2		*	18 14			-0		28 28	26 27		0	
Surrey	Ash Wharf Control			-1 -9	9	*		35 - 43 -		0		44 53	34 47	-10 -7	-4		57 57	42 45	-14 -12	-2		36 41	29 35	-7 -7	-1			27 31		6		6 18	6 12		<ul> <li></li></ul>		24 29	18 22		1	
Thames Valley	Burghfield Control		11 13		-4			43 36 -	-8 15	7		54	43 47	-11	5		59		-8	7		31 35	23 24	-8 -10	2					-4		10 9	6 7	-3 -2			22 22	17 19	-5 -4	-1	

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All pair matched	Experimental Control	60 55	62 62	2 7	-5	*	25 21	22 24	-3 2	-5	* *	27 30	23 25	-4 -4	0		29 33	25 27	-5 -5	1		19 20	15 18	-4 -3	-2		14 13	10 10	-4 -3	-1	
Greater Manchester Lancashire	Failsworth West Control Ingol	58 63 69	58 64 71	-1 1 2	-2 0		28 36 24	25 33 20	-3 -3 -4	0 -8	*	43 41 22	41 41 20	-2 0 -2	-2 2		42 49 27	40 44 24	-2 -5 -4	3		27 22 17	26 25 12	-1 3 -5	-4 -3		16 22 13	17 16 9	1 -7 -5	8 -3	*
Leicestershire	Control New Parks Control	47 53 63	49 61 72	2 8 9	-1		10 38 34	14 35 37	4 -3 4	-7		13 36 59	9 28 43	-5 -8 -16	8		15 35 53	10 25 48	-5 -10 -6	-5		8 31 34	7 24 33	-2 -7 -1	-6		6 22 22	4 16 15	-2 -6 -6	1	
MPS	East Wickham & Falconwood Control	89 67	87 75	-2 8	-10	* *	20 21	18 23	-2 2	-4		27 33	22 32	-5 -1	-3		32 35	23 32	-9 -3	-6		19 15	13 16	-6 1	-7		19 14	13 16	-6 2	-8	*
Surrey	Ash Wharf Control	53 55	55 55	2 0	2		22 18	21 21	-1 3	-4		18 26	14 20	-4 -6	2		20 31	15 23	-5 -8	3	**	13 17	10 11	-4 -7	3		8 11	4 8	-4 -3	-1	
Thames Valley	Burghfield Control	35 36	39 57	4 21	-17	* *	17 14	13 16	-4 2	-6		23 23	20 22	-3 -1	-2		24 27	23 23	-1 -4	3		10 27	7 18	-3 -9	6		4 5	1 3	-4 -2	-2	

#### Table 4.3: Whether very or fairly likely to be victim of specific types of crime or witness to signs of crime

Figure 2.2: The seven stage model

	1 Research	2 Engage	3 Public preferences	4 Investigation and analysis	5 Public choices	6 Plan and action	7 Review
Purpose	To find out what the police already know, where they can or can't engage with the neighbourhood & why	To create the conditions for a dialogue with the neighbourhood	To find out public preferences on signal crimes & disorders and identify locations of insecurity	To define the environmental & social causal factors of problems, and the stakeholders involved	To present the results of the analysis in an understandable format so that the neighbourhood can choose priorities, define outcomes and be invited to participate in solutions	the problems, which includes, actions, owners	To assess progress against chosen outcomes and identify any remedial action
Tactics	<ul> <li>Police &amp; partner data</li> <li>Existing surveys</li> <li>Tension indicators</li> <li>Intelligence reports</li> <li>Media reports</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Direct contact</li> <li>Intermediaries</li> <li>Arbitration</li> <li>Negotiation</li> <li>Targeting of specific groups</li> <li>Confidence building measures/pre-emptive action</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Public perception survey</li> <li>Environmental visual audit</li> <li>Neighbourhood questionnaire</li> <li>Neighbourhood meeting</li> <li>Signal crimes research</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Police investigation</li> <li>Covert/overt observation</li> <li>Partner investigation</li> <li>Stakeholder map</li> <li>GIS mapping</li> <li>National Intelligence Model (NIM) products</li> <li>POP/SARA</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Neighbourhood meeting</li> <li>Prioritisation &amp; outcome menu (agree a list)</li> <li>Stakeholder groups</li> <li>Public announcement of problem &amp; intended outcomes</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Control and reassurance plan</li> <li>Tasking and co-ordinating group Meeting (TCG)</li> <li>Force TCG</li> <li>Community incident action group</li> <li>Public protection committee</li> <li>Environmental protection committee</li> <li>Special prosecutions group</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Neighbourhood meeting</li> <li>Environmental visual audit</li> <li>Neighbourhood questionnaire</li> <li>Stakeholder group</li> </ul>
Performance	Police must be able to collect and interpret available crime, disorder and social data to identify hot spot areas and have that routinely available to frontline staff	Police must be able to overcome any barriers to engagement so that open dialogue can take place with neighbourhood residents	Police must be able to identify at postcode level or below, environmental and social disorders, and be able to aggregate them as public preferences for action	Police must be able to thoroughly investigate the preferences for action to find out and illustrate: • causal factors • key stakeholders • buildings/land owners • vulnerable groups • potential offenders • Characteristics of problem locations	Police must be able to present the results of the analysis and investigation to the neighbourhood, involve them in choosing priorities, deciding outcomes, designing solutions to problems and deciding on their own involvement	that specifies SMART	Police must be able to involve the neighbourhood in assessing progress against outcomes and designing any remedial measures in collaboration with local partners to deliver those outcomes