



**TRANSPORT & GENERAL WORKERS' UNION**

&

**TRADE UNION RESEARCH UNIT**

**UNIVERSITY OF CARDIFF**



SN 3174

## SURVEY OF FORMER REGISTERED DOCK WORKERS

This questionnaire will take about twenty minutes to complete. The questions are divided into 5 sections covering different subject areas. Most of the questions require you to tick on the line  beside the appropriate answer. Some questions require you to tick more than one answer from a set of possible answers. These are clearly marked **TICK ONE OR MORE**. Other questions require you to tick only one answer from a set of possible answers. These are clearly marked **ONE**. A few questions require you to write the answers in your own words.

### SECTION 1. EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO ABOLITION OF NDLS

Number

- 1 1 In which port did you work in July 1989?
- |                                      |                                  |                                    |                                     |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> London      | <input type="checkbox"/> Newport | <input type="checkbox"/> Hull      | <input type="checkbox"/> Forth      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bristol     | <input type="checkbox"/> Barry   | <input type="checkbox"/> Liverpool | <input type="checkbox"/> Tees       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Southampton | <input type="checkbox"/> Cardiff | <input type="checkbox"/> Clyde     | <input type="checkbox"/> Hartlepool |
- 1 2 How long had you been a registered docker? \_\_\_ years
- 1 3 How were you recruited to this job?
- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> employer approached you directly | <input type="checkbox"/> through the job centre                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> you approached employer directly | <input type="checkbox"/> through friend/relative who was a docker |
| <input type="checkbox"/> through the union                |   |
- 1 4 Did you serve an apprenticeship in the port industry?  yes  no
- 1 5 What was your main occupation as a registered dockworker?
- |  |                                     |                                |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> crane driver  | <input type="checkbox"/> lighterman | <input type="checkbox"/> other |
| <input type="checkbox"/> cargo handler | <input type="checkbox"/> checker    |                                |
- 1 6 What was your medical classification?
- |                            |                            |                            |                                |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> A | <input type="checkbox"/> B | <input type="checkbox"/> C | <input type="checkbox"/> other |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
- 1 7 How many employers had you worked for as a registered docker? \_\_\_ employers ( after 1967)
- 1 8 Who was your last employer?
- |                              |                              |                              |                              |                                |                               |                              |   |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> ABP | <input type="checkbox"/> PLA | <input type="checkbox"/> BPA | <input type="checkbox"/> CPA | <input type="checkbox"/> MD&HC | <input type="checkbox"/> THPA | <input type="checkbox"/> FPA | <input type="checkbox"/> other independent co |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---|
- 1 9 How long had you worked for this employer? \_\_\_\_\_ years
- 1 10 What cargo did you mainly work on in this job? (ONE)
- |                                    |   |   |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> general   | <input type="checkbox"/> roll on roll off traffic | <input type="checkbox"/> bulk             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> container | <input type="checkbox"/> forest products          | <input type="checkbox"/> perishable cargo |
- 1 11 What was your average weekly wage?
- |                                     |                                    |                                    |                                    |                                    |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> under £200 | <input type="checkbox"/> £200-£249 | <input type="checkbox"/> £250-£299 | <input type="checkbox"/> £300-£350 | <input type="checkbox"/> over £350 |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
- 1 12 Which union did you belong to?
- |                                |                              |                                      |                                   |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> T&GWU | <input type="checkbox"/> GMB | <input type="checkbox"/> other union | <input type="checkbox"/> no union |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
- 1 13 Did you hold a union position? (e.g. shop steward/branch official/delegate)
- |                              |                             |   |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> yes | <input type="checkbox"/> no | <input type="checkbox"/> not applicable |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
- 1 14 Were you a health and safety representative?  yes  no  not applicable

- 1 15 Did you serve an apprenticeship outside the industry before becoming a registered docker?  yes  no
- 1 16 What jobs had you done before becoming a docker? **TICK ONE OR MORE**  
 labouring  skilled trade  storeman  clerical  HM forces  
 production line  driver  merchant navy  other non-manual  other
- 1 17 Had you considered taking redundancy from the Docks industry before July 1989?  yes  no

## **SECTION 2: PERSONAL DETAILS**

- 2 1 How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_ years
- 2 2 Do you live with your family?  yes  no
- 2 3 Do any members of your household work?  yes  no  not applicable
- 2 4 Have you always lived in this town/city?  yes  no
- 2 5 What is your current state of health?  good  average  bad  very bad
- 2 6 If you suffer a disability, is it related to your work as a registered dockworker?  
 yes  no  not applicable
- 2 7 Are you currently a member of a Trade Union?  yes  no
- 2 8 Are you currently a member of the T&GWU?  yes  no  not applicable
- 2 9 Do you hold a union position?  yes  no  not applicable
- 2 10 Have you experienced any of the following *as a result* of the changes in your life brought about by the restructuring in the ports industry? **PLEASE TICK ONE OR MORE**
- |   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> isolation                      | <input type="checkbox"/> frustration              | <input type="checkbox"/> taken up new interests  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> financial hardship             | <input type="checkbox"/> loneliness               | <input type="checkbox"/> enjoy your leisure time |
| <input type="checkbox"/> feel unsettled                 | <input type="checkbox"/> boredom                  | <input type="checkbox"/> health improved         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> anxiety about money            | <input type="checkbox"/> loss of self-confidence  |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> anxiety about work             | <input type="checkbox"/> discontentment           |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> stress on family relationships | <input type="checkbox"/> despondency              |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> depression                     | <input type="checkbox"/> miss social life of work |  |

## **SECTION 3. REDUNDANCY**

- 3 1 Did you have an opportunity to talk to management about your future in the ports industry prior to any redundancies following the abolition of the NDLS?  yes  no
- 3 2 Do you consider the redundancies from your employer to be  
 compulsory  forced voluntary  voluntary  uncertain
- 3 3 How much were you offered to become redundant? **Please answer even if you did not accept the offer**  
 less than £10,000  £10,000-£20,000  £20,001-£30,000  
 £30,001-£40,000  more than £40,000  no offer of redundancy
- 3 4 Were you offered employment by your employer as part of the restructuring and redundancy package?  
 yes, directly (eg on new terms and conditions)  
 yes, indirectly (eg to use redundancy pay to set up stevedoring company)  
 no

**If you became redundant please answer PART A**

**If you did not become redundant please answer PART B**

### **PART A**

- 3 5 When were you officially made redundant? \_\_\_\_\_ month \_\_\_\_\_ year

- 3 6 How were you formally notified of your redundancy?  
 in writing from management       verbally from management       through the trade union
- 3 7 Did you feel obliged to take redundancy?       yes       no
- 3 8 Have you or are you pursuing legal action in respect of your redundancy?       yes       no
- 3 9 What is the nature of this legal action?       unfair dismissal       arrears of pay       other       not applicable
- 3 10 Which **ONE** of the following do you consider to be the main reason you became redundant?  
 no choice compulsory  
 level of redundancy compensation gave you the opportunity to take early retirement  
 level of redundancy compensation gave you the opportunity to seek employment outside the ports industry  
 level of redundancy compensation gave you the opportunity to become self employed outside the ports industry  
 accepted redundancy in order to set up stevedoring company  
 you considered employment conditions after the abolition of the NDLS to be unacceptable  
 Other please specify

Now answer SECTION 4 and SECTION 5

**PART B**

- 3 12 Which **ONE** of the following was the main reason you did not accept redundancy?  
 poor job prospects locally outside docks industry  
 like the work and wanted to stay  
 not offered redundancy
- 3 13 How do your current terms and conditions of employment compare to your job prior to abolition?
- |                        |                                 |                               |                                |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| wages                  | <input type="checkbox"/> better | <input type="checkbox"/> same | <input type="checkbox"/> worse |
| hours                  | <input type="checkbox"/> better | <input type="checkbox"/> same | <input type="checkbox"/> worse |
| security of employment | <input type="checkbox"/> better | <input type="checkbox"/> same | <input type="checkbox"/> worse |
| pension                | <input type="checkbox"/> better | <input type="checkbox"/> same | <input type="checkbox"/> worse |
| union influence        | <input type="checkbox"/> better | <input type="checkbox"/> same | <input type="checkbox"/> worse |
| training               | <input type="checkbox"/> better | <input type="checkbox"/> same | <input type="checkbox"/> worse |
| safety                 | <input type="checkbox"/> better | <input type="checkbox"/> same | <input type="checkbox"/> worse |

**Non-Redundants have completed this questionnaire Thank you for filling in the Questionnaire Please return it to the Regional Offices of the T&GWU in the stamped addressed envelope provided**

**Those who have received redundancy pay please complete Sections 4 and 5**

**SECTION 4. POST REDUNDANCY LABOUR MOBILITY**

- 4 1 Which **ONE** of the following regarding your future employment did you consider at the time of your redundancy?  
 moving away to find work       self-employment outside the ports industry  
 work locally       re-employment in the ports industry  
 retraining/further education       did not consider future employment  
 early retirement
- 4 2 Which of the following have you experienced since your redundancy? **PLEASE TICK ONE OR MORE**  
 early retirement       self-employment outside the ports industry  
 non work due to sickness       re-employment in the ports industry on a full-time basis  
 employment outside the ports industry       re-employment in the ports industry on a casual basis  
 unemployment       re-employment in the ports industry on a temporary basis  
 training/further education
- 4 3 How many months have you been unemployed altogether since your redundancy?       months
- 4 4 How many separate periods of unemployment have you experienced?       periods
- 4 5 Are you currently unemployed?       yes       no

- 4 6 Which **ONE** of the following is the main reason that makes/made it difficult for you to get work?  
 only a few vacancies locally                       employers won't take on dockers  
 many redundant dockers looking for work                       too old  
 firms not looking for your skills                       not applicable, found work easily
- 4 7 If you retrained which **ONE** of the following best explains why you have retrained?  
 enhanced job prospects with a new skill                       better than unemployment  
 advised by Job Centre                       not applicable
- 4 8 If you have not retrained which **ONE** of the following best explains why you have not?  
 you had a job to go to                       you are too old  
 you can't get on a course                       you retired early  
 it costs too much                       you have no information about retraining  
 the skills they teach are irrelevant to you                       not applicable  
 you have a skill
- 4 9 How many jobs have you had since your redundancy from the ports industry?     jobs
- 4 10 What type of work have you done? **PLEASE TICK ONE OR MORE**  
 labouring                       shop                       clerical                       security                       driving  
 production line                       community                       dock work                       cleaning                       other
- 4 11 Have you been made redundant from any of these jobs?     yes     no
- 4 12 How do the wages and conditions compare with your previous job in the ports industry?  
wages                       better                       same                       worse  
hours                       better                       same                       worse  
security of employment                       better                       same                       worse  
pension                       better                       same                       worse  
union influence                       better                       same                       worse
- 4 13 If you have set up your own business what do you do?
- 4 14 If you have retired did you look for work before you retired?     yes     no     not applicable
- 4 15 Which **ONE** of the following was the main reason you retired early?  
 ill health/disability                       poor job prospects                       redundancy compensation  
 age                       wanted to retire                       not applicable

## **SECTION 5. ABOUT LOOKING FOR JOBS**

- 5 1 Have you been looking for jobs since your redundancy?     yes     no
- 5 2 If you have not looked for jobs since your redundancy which **ONE** of the following explains why not?  
 you have been continuously employed  
 you went straight on to further education/training  
 there is no point, there are no suitable jobs  
 you don't want a job  
 you have retired  
 you became self-employed  
 you are disabled  
 not applicable
- 5 3 Which of the following methods have you used in seeking employment? **PLEASE TICK ONE OR MORE**  
 Job Centre  
 looking in the local papers  
 visiting or writing to local firms on the off chance  
 visiting or writing to local firms in response to an advertised vacancy  
 asking friends/relatives  
 union channels  
 not applicable

Thank you for filling in the Questionnaire Please return it to the Regional Offices of the T&GWU in the stamped addressed envelope provided

MAIL

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	809	100.0	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	0	Missing cases	809		

PORT QU 1.1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
London	1	356	44.0	44.0	44.0
Bristol	2	136	16.8	16.8	60.8
Southampton	3	170	21.0	21.0	81.8
Hull	7	81	10.0	10.0	91.8
Tees and Hartlepool	11	66	8.2	8.2	100.0
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

SERVICE1 yrs reg dockers QU 1.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1	1	.1	.1	.1
	2	1	.1	.1	.3
	3	1	.1	.1	.4
	4	2	.2	.3	.6
	5	1	.1	.1	.8
	9	1	.1	.1	.9
	10	6	.7	.8	1.7
	11	9	1.1	1.2	2.8
	12	14	1.7	1.8	4.6
	13	30	3.7	3.8	8.5
	14	25	3.1	3.2	11.7
	15	23	2.8	2.9	14.6
	16	18	2.2	2.3	16.9
	17	30	3.7	3.8	20.8
	18	67	8.3	8.6	29.4
	19	25	3.1	3.2	32.6
	20	68	8.4	8.7	41.3
	21	20	2.5	2.6	43.8
	22	16	2.0	2.1	45.9
	23	16	2.0	2.1	47.9
	24	34	4.2	4.4	52.3
	25	54	6.7	6.9	59.2
	26	37	4.6	4.7	64.0
	27	36	4.4	4.6	68.6
	28	36	4.4	4.6	73.2
	29	34	4.2	4.4	77.6
	30	40	4.9	5.1	82.7
	31	13	1.6	1.7	84.4
	32	20	2.5	2.6	86.9
	33	13	1.6	1.7	88.6
	34	22	2.7	2.8	91.4
	35	19	2.3	2.4	93.8
	36	14	1.7	1.8	95.6
	37	5	.6	.6	96.3
	38	7	.9	.9	97.2
	39	9	1.1	1.2	98.3
	40	6	.7	.8	99.1
	41	4	.5	.5	99.6
	42	1	.1	.1	99.7
	43	1	.1	.1	99.9
	46	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	29	3.6	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 780 Missing cases 29

RECPORT how recruited to doccks QU 1.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
employer direct	1	21	2.6	2.6	2.6
employee direct	2	135	16.7	17.0	19.6
union	3	99	12.2	12.4	32.0
job centre	4	7	.9	.9	32.9
friend-relative dock	5	533	65.9	67.0	99.9
	6	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	13	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 796 Missing cases 13

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APPPORT apprenticeship in port QU 1.4

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	630	77.9	79.6	79.6
yes	1	161	19.9	20.4	100.0
	.	18	2.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 791 Missing cases 18

OCC main occupation reg docker QU 1.5

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
crane	1	101	12.5	12.5	12.5
cargo handler	2	547	67.6	67.9	80.4
lighterman	3	16	2.0	2.0	82.4
checker	4	86	10.6	10.7	93.1
other	5	56	6.9	6.9	100.0
.	.	3	.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 806 Missing cases 3

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MEDICAL QU 1.6

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
A	1	740	91.5	93.8	93.8
B	2	28	3.5	3.5	97.3
C	3	17	2.1	2.2	99.5
other	4	4	.5	.5	100.0
.	.	20	2.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 789 Missing cases 20

PJOBS no. previous employers reg docker QU 1.7

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	5	.6	.7	.7
	1	239	29.5	32.7	33.3
	2	264	32.6	36.1	69.4
	3	132	16.3	18.0	87.4
	4	61	7.5	8.3	95.8
	5	22	2.7	3.0	98.8
	6	6	.7	.8	99.6
	7	2	.2	.3	99.9
	8	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	73	9.0	Missing	
	9	4	.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 732 Missing cases 77

PEMP last employer QU 1.8

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ABP	1	206	25.5	25.9	25.9
PLA	2	302	37.3	38.0	63.9
BPA	3	165	20.4	20.8	84.7
THPA	6	30	3.7	3.8	88.4
FPA	7	7	.9	.9	89.3
other indep co.	8	85	10.5	10.7	100.0
	.	14	1.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 795 Missing cases 14

SERVICE2 yrs last employer QU 1.9

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1	9	1.1	1.2	1.2
	2	21	2.6	2.9	4.2
	3	20	2.5	2.8	6.9
	4	14	1.7	1.9	8.9
	5	12	1.5	1.7	10.5
	6	21	2.6	2.9	13.5
	7	14	1.7	1.9	15.4
	8	20	2.5	2.8	18.2
	9	22	2.7	3.1	21.2
	10	63	7.8	8.7	30.0
	11	15	1.9	2.1	32.0
	12	44	5.4	6.1	38.1
	13	35	4.3	4.9	43.0
	14	43	5.3	6.0	49.0
	15	46	5.7	6.4	55.3
	16	38	4.7	5.3	60.6
	17	33	4.1	4.6	65.2
	18	43	5.3	6.0	71.2
	19	15	1.9	2.1	73.2
	20	40	4.9	5.5	78.8
	21	12	1.5	1.7	80.4
	22	18	2.2	2.5	82.9
	23	12	1.5	1.7	84.6
	24	6	.7	.8	85.4
	25	13	1.6	1.8	87.2
	26	9	1.1	1.2	88.5
	27	11	1.4	1.5	90.0
	28	9	1.1	1.2	91.3
	29	11	1.4	1.5	92.8
	30	12	1.5	1.7	94.5
	31	3	.4	.4	94.9
	32	4	.5	.6	95.4
	33	1	.1	.1	95.6
	34	3	.4	.4	96.0
	35	10	1.2	1.4	97.4
	36	4	.5	.6	97.9
	37	1	.1	.1	98.1
	38	4	.5	.6	98.6
	39	3	.4	.4	99.0
	40	3	.4	.4	99.4
	41	1	.1	.1	99.6
	42	2	.2	.3	99.9
	45	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	88	10.9	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

SERVICE2 yrs last employer QU 1.9

Valid cases 721 Missing cases 88

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CARGO QU 1.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
general	1	507	62.7	63.0	63.0
container	2	125	15.5	15.5	78.5
roro	3	58	7.2	7.2	85.7
forest	4	59	7.3	7.3	93.0
bulk	5	54	6.7	6.7	99.8
perish	6	2	.2	.2	100.0
	.	4	.5	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 805 Missing cases 4

-----  
WAGE av. weekly wage reg docker QU 1.11

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
under 200	1	101	12.5	12.9	12.9
200-249	2	234	28.9	29.9	42.8
250-299	3	177	21.9	22.6	65.5
300-350	4	137	16.9	17.5	83.0
over 350	5	133	16.4	17.0	100.0
	.	27	3.3	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 782 Missing cases 27

UNION union reg docker QU 1.12

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
T&GWU	1	799	98.8	99.5	99.5
other	3	4	.5	.5	100.0
	.	6	.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	803	Missing cases	6		

POSITION union position QU 1.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	687	84.9	85.4	85.4
yes	1	109	13.5	13.6	99.0
not applicable	2	8	1.0	1.0	100.0
	.	5	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	804	Missing cases	5		

HANDS health and safety rep QU 1.14

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	729	90.1	91.1	91.1
yes	1	64	7.9	8.0	99.1
not applicable	2	7	.9	.9	100.0
	.	9	1.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	800	Missing cases	9		

APP apprenticeship outside port QU 1.15

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	652	80.6	83.5	83.5
yes	1	129	15.9	16.5	100.0
	.	28	3.5	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 781 Missing cases 28

POCC1 labouring QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	483	59.7	59.7	59.7
yes	1	326	40.3	40.3	100.0
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

POCC2 production line QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	734	90.7	90.7	90.7
yes	1	75	9.3	9.3	100.0
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

POCC3 skilled trade QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	656	81.1	81.1	81.1
yes	1	153	18.9	18.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

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POCC4 driver QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	686	84.8	84.8	84.8
yes	1	123	15.2	15.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

-----  
POCC5 storeman QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	752	93.0	93.0	93.0
yes	1	57	7.0	7.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

POCC6 merchant navy QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	693	85.7	85.7	85.7
yes	1	116	14.3	14.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

-----

POCC7 clerical QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	701	86.7	86.7	86.7
yes	1	108	13.3	13.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

-----

POCC8 other non-manual QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	769	95.1	95.1	95.1
yes	1	40	4.9	4.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

POCC9 HM forces QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	651	80.5	80.5	80.5
yes	1	158	19.5	19.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

-----

POCC10 other QU 1.16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	700	86.5	86.5	86.5
yes	1	109	13.5	13.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

-----

RED89 considered red before 89 QU 1.17

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	573	70.8	86.0	86.0
yes	1	93	11.5	14.0	100.0
	.	143	17.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 666 Missing cases 143

AGE QU 2.1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	26	1	.1	.1	.1
	28	1	.1	.1	.2
	29	1	.1	.1	.4
	30	1	.1	.1	.5
	32	2	.2	.2	.7
	33	1	.1	.1	.9
	34	1	.1	.1	1.0
	35	6	.7	.7	1.7
	36	2	.2	.2	2.0
	37	10	1.2	1.2	3.2
	38	14	1.7	1.7	5.0
	39	13	1.6	1.6	6.6
	40	13	1.6	1.6	8.2
	41	15	1.9	1.9	10.1
	42	31	3.8	3.9	14.0
	43	17	2.1	2.1	16.1
	44	39	4.8	4.9	20.9
	45	43	5.3	5.4	26.3
	46	43	5.3	5.4	31.7
	47	34	4.2	4.2	35.9
	48	34	4.2	4.2	40.1
	49	33	4.1	4.1	44.3
	50	46	5.7	5.7	50.0
	51	32	4.0	4.0	54.0
	52	30	3.7	3.7	57.7
	53	41	5.1	5.1	62.8
	54	42	5.2	5.2	68.1
	55	33	4.1	4.1	72.2
	56	44	5.4	5.5	77.7
	57	27	3.3	3.4	81.0
	58	26	3.2	3.2	84.3
	59	19	2.3	2.4	86.7
	60	29	3.6	3.6	90.3
	61	17	2.1	2.1	92.4
	62	20	2.5	2.5	94.9
	63	23	2.8	2.9	97.8
	64	8	1.0	1.0	98.8
	65	2	.2	.2	99.0
	66	1	.1	.1	99.1
	67	1	.1	.1	99.3
	68	3	.4	.4	99.6
	69	2	.2	.2	99.9
	71	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	7	.9	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

AGE QU 2.1

Valid cases 802 Missing cases 7

-----  
FAMILY QU 2.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	76	9.4	9.5	9.5
yes	1	722	89.2	90.5	100.0
	.	11	1.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 798 Missing cases 11

-----  
HOUSEWK family member employed QU 2.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	240	29.7	30.0	30.0
yes	1	527	65.1	66.0	96.0
not applicable	2	32	4.0	4.0	100.0
	.	10	1.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 799 Missing cases 10

MIG lived elsewhere QU 2.4

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	186	23.0	23.1	23.1
yes	1	619	76.5	76.9	100.0
.	.	4	.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 805 Missing cases 4

-----

HEALTH1 current health QU 2.5

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
good	1	527	65.1	65.5	65.5
average	2	199	24.6	24.7	90.2
bad	3	62	7.7	7.7	97.9
very bad	4	17	2.1	2.1	100.0
.	.	4	.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 805 Missing cases 4

-----

HEALTH2 dock related disability QU 2.6

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	360	44.5	47.4	47.4
yes	1	162	20.0	21.3	68.8
not applicable	2	237	29.3	31.2	100.0
.	.	50	6.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 759 Missing cases 50

TUNOW current TU member QU 2.7

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	225	27.8	28.2	28.2
yes	1	573	70.8	71.8	100.0
.	.	11	1.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 798 Missing cases 11

-----

TGWUNOW currently TGWU QU 2.8

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	260	32.1	32.4	32.4
yes	1	530	65.5	66.1	98.5
not applicable	2	12	1.5	1.5	100.0
.	.	7	.9	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 802 Missing cases 7

-----

POSNOW current TU position QU 2.9

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	697	86.2	87.7	87.7
yes	1	39	4.8	4.9	92.6
not applicable	2	59	7.3	7.4	100.0
.	.	14	1.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 795 Missing cases 14

ISOLAT QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	699	86.4	86.4	86.4
yes	1	110	13.6	13.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

FINANC QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	709	87.6	87.6	87.6
yes	1	100	12.4	12.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

UNSETT QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	441	54.5	54.5	54.5
yes	1	368	45.5	45.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

MONEY QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	616	76.1	76.1	76.1
yes	1	193	23.9	23.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

-----

WORK QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	496	61.3	61.3	61.3
yes	1	313	38.7	38.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

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FAMILY1 QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	621	76.8	76.8	76.8
yes	1	188	23.2	23.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

DEPRESS QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	653	80.7	80.7	80.7
yes	1	156	19.3	19.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

FRUSTRAT QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	552	68.2	68.2	68.2
yes	1	257	31.8	31.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

LONE QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	749	92.6	92.6	92.6
yes	1	60	7.4	7.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

BOREDOM QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	666	82.3	82.3	82.3
yes	1	143	17.7	17.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

CONFID QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	707	87.4	87.4	87.4
yes	1	102	12.6	12.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

DISCONT QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	571	70.6	70.6	70.6
yes	1	238	29.4	29.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

DESPOND QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	685	84.7	84.7	84.7
yes	1	124	15.3	15.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

SOCIAL QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	365	45.1	45.1	45.1
yes	1	444	54.9	54.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

INTEREST QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	711	87.9	87.9	87.9
yes	1	98	12.1	12.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

LEISURE QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	651	80.5	80.5	80.5
yes	1	158	19.5	19.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

HEALTH3 QU 2.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	763	94.3	94.3	94.3
yes	1	46	5.7	5.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

COUNSEL counselling from managment before redund

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	650	80.3	82.9	82.9
yes	1	134	16.6	17.1	100.0
	.	25	3.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 784 Missing cases 25

REDTYPE QU 3.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
compulsory	1	151	18.7	19.4	19.4
forced voluntary	2	417	51.5	53.6	73.0
voluntary	3	162	20.0	20.8	93.8
uncertain	4	48	5.9	6.2	100.0
.	.	31	3.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 778 Missing cases 31

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REDOFF compensation offer QU 3.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
less than 10,000	1	6	.7	.8	.8
30,001-40,000	2	644	79.6	81.8	82.6
10,000-20,000	3	13	1.6	1.7	84.2
more than 40,000	4	9	1.1	1.1	85.4
20,001-30,000	5	74	9.1	9.4	94.8
no red offer	6	41	5.1	5.2	100.0
.	.	22	2.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 787 Missing cases 22

REDEMP      employment offered QU 3.4

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes directly	1	243	30.0	31.5	31.5
yes indirectly	2	61	7.5	7.9	39.4
no	3	467	57.7	60.6	100.0
	.	38	4.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases      771      Missing cases      38

DATERED date made redundant QU 3.5

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	186	1	.1	.2	.2
	188	2	.2	.4	.6
	189	2	.2	.4	1.0
	190	10	1.2	1.9	2.9
	191	15	1.9	2.9	5.7
	280	1	.1	.2	5.9
	288	3	.4	.6	6.5
	289	1	.1	.2	6.7
	290	2	.2	.4	7.1
	291	4	.5	.8	7.8
	388	5	.6	1.0	8.8
	389	8	1.0	1.5	10.3
	390	5	.6	1.0	11.3
	487	1	.1	.2	11.5
	488	6	.7	1.1	12.6
	489	8	1.0	1.5	14.1
	490	33	4.1	6.3	20.4
	491	2	.2	.4	20.8
	590	4	.5	.8	21.6
	592	1	.1	.2	21.8
	682	1	.1	.2	21.9
	683	1	.1	.2	22.1
	687	2	.2	.4	22.5
	689	8	1.0	1.5	24.0
	690	5	.6	1.0	25.0
	786	1	.1	.2	25.2
	789	167	20.6	31.9	57.1
	790	3	.4	.6	57.6
	791	1	.1	.2	57.8
	792	3	.4	.6	58.4
	884	1	.1	.2	58.6
	888	2	.2	.4	59.0
	889	10	1.2	1.9	60.9
	890	26	3.2	5.0	65.8
	891	1	.1	.2	66.0
	987	1	.1	.2	66.2
	989	14	1.7	2.7	68.9
	990	33	4.1	6.3	75.2
	991	1	.1	.2	75.4
	1089	10	1.2	1.9	77.3
	1090	55	6.8	10.5	87.8
	1091	1	.1	.2	88.0
	1187	1	.1	.2	88.2
	1189	6	.7	1.1	89.3
	1190	5	.6	1.0	90.3
	1289	8	1.0	1.5	91.8

DATERED date made redundant QU 3.5

1290	35	4.3	6.7	98.5
1291	6	.7	1.1	99.6
1292	1	.1	.2	99.8
1909	1	.1	.2	100.0
.	283	35.0	Missing	
9999	2	.2	Missing	
	-----	-----	-----	
Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 524 Missing cases 285

CASENO case number

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1	1	.1	.1	.1
	2	1	.1	.1	.2
	3	1	.1	.1	.4
	4	1	.1	.1	.5
	5	1	.1	.1	.6
	6	1	.1	.1	.7
	7	1	.1	.1	.9
	8	1	.1	.1	1.0
	9	1	.1	.1	1.1
	10	1	.1	.1	1.2
	11	1	.1	.1	1.4
	12	1	.1	.1	1.5
	13	1	.1	.1	1.6
	14	1	.1	.1	1.7
	15	1	.1	.1	1.9
	16	1	.1	.1	2.0
	17	1	.1	.1	2.1
	18	1	.1	.1	2.2
	19	1	.1	.1	2.3
	20	1	.1	.1	2.5
	21	1	.1	.1	2.6
	22	1	.1	.1	2.7
	23	1	.1	.1	2.8
	24	1	.1	.1	3.0
	25	1	.1	.1	3.1
	26	1	.1	.1	3.2
	27	1	.1	.1	3.3
	28	1	.1	.1	3.5
	29	1	.1	.1	3.6
	30	1	.1	.1	3.7
	31	1	.1	.1	3.8
	32	1	.1	.1	4.0
	33	1	.1	.1	4.1
	34	1	.1	.1	4.2
	35	1	.1	.1	4.3
	36	1	.1	.1	4.4
	37	1	.1	.1	4.6
	38	1	.1	.1	4.7
	39	1	.1	.1	4.8
	40	1	.1	.1	4.9
	41	1	.1	.1	5.1
	42	1	.1	.1	5.2
	43	1	.1	.1	5.3
	44	1	.1	.1	5.4
	45	1	.1	.1	5.6
	46	1	.1	.1	5.7

CASENO	case number				
	47	1	.1	.1	5.8
	48	1	.1	.1	5.9
	49	1	.1	.1	6.1
	50	1	.1	.1	6.2
	51	1	.1	.1	6.3
	52	1	.1	.1	6.4
	53	1	.1	.1	6.6
	54	1	.1	.1	6.7
	55	1	.1	.1	6.8
	56	1	.1	.1	6.9
	57	1	.1	.1	7.0
	58	1	.1	.1	7.2
	59	1	.1	.1	7.3
	60	1	.1	.1	7.4
	61	1	.1	.1	7.5
	62	1	.1	.1	7.7
	72	1	.1	.1	7.8
	73	1	.1	.1	7.9
	74	1	.1	.1	8.0
	75	1	.1	.1	8.2
	76	1	.1	.1	8.3
	77	1	.1	.1	8.4
	78	1	.1	.1	8.5
	79	1	.1	.1	8.7
	80	1	.1	.1	8.8
	81	1	.1	.1	8.9
	82	1	.1	.1	9.0
	83	1	.1	.1	9.1
	84	1	.1	.1	9.3
	85	1	.1	.1	9.4
	86	1	.1	.1	9.5
	87	1	.1	.1	9.6
	88	1	.1	.1	9.8
	89	1	.1	.1	9.9
	90	1	.1	.1	10.0
	91	1	.1	.1	10.1
	92	1	.1	.1	10.3
	93	1	.1	.1	10.4
	94	1	.1	.1	10.5
	95	1	.1	.1	10.6
	96	1	.1	.1	10.8
	97	1	.1	.1	10.9
	98	1	.1	.1	11.0
	99	1	.1	.1	11.1
	100	1	.1	.1	11.2
	101	1	.1	.1	11.4
	102	1	.1	.1	11.5
	103	1	.1	.1	11.6
	104	1	.1	.1	11.7
	105	1	.1	.1	11.9

CASENO      case number

106	1	.1	.1	12.0
107	1	.1	.1	12.1
108	1	.1	.1	12.2
109	1	.1	.1	12.4
110	1	.1	.1	12.5
111	1	.1	.1	12.6
112	1	.1	.1	12.7
113	1	.1	.1	12.9
114	1	.1	.1	13.0
115	1	.1	.1	13.1
116	1	.1	.1	13.2
117	1	.1	.1	13.3
118	1	.1	.1	13.5
119	1	.1	.1	13.6
120	1	.1	.1	13.7
121	1	.1	.1	13.8
122	1	.1	.1	14.0
123	1	.1	.1	14.1
124	1	.1	.1	14.2
125	1	.1	.1	14.3
126	1	.1	.1	14.5
127	1	.1	.1	14.6
128	1	.1	.1	14.7
129	1	.1	.1	14.8
130	1	.1	.1	15.0
131	1	.1	.1	15.1
132	1	.1	.1	15.2
133	1	.1	.1	15.3
134	1	.1	.1	15.5
135	1	.1	.1	15.6
136	1	.1	.1	15.7
137	1	.1	.1	15.8
138	1	.1	.1	15.9
139	1	.1	.1	16.1
140	1	.1	.1	16.2
141	1	.1	.1	16.3
142	1	.1	.1	16.4
143	1	.1	.1	16.6
144	1	.1	.1	16.7
145	1	.1	.1	16.8
146	1	.1	.1	16.9
147	1	.1	.1	17.1
148	1	.1	.1	17.2
149	1	.1	.1	17.3
150	1	.1	.1	17.4
151	1	.1	.1	17.6
152	1	.1	.1	17.7
153	1	.1	.1	17.8
154	1	.1	.1	17.9
155	1	.1	.1	18.0

CASENO	case number				
	156	1	.1	.1	18.2
	157	1	.1	.1	18.3
	158	1	.1	.1	18.4
	159	1	.1	.1	18.5
	160	1	.1	.1	18.7
	161	1	.1	.1	18.8
	162	1	.1	.1	18.9
	163	1	.1	.1	19.0
	164	1	.1	.1	19.2
	165	1	.1	.1	19.3
	166	1	.1	.1	19.4
	167	1	.1	.1	19.5
	168	1	.1	.1	19.7
	169	1	.1	.1	19.8
	170	1	.1	.1	19.9
	171	1	.1	.1	20.0
	172	1	.1	.1	20.1
	173	1	.1	.1	20.3
	174	1	.1	.1	20.4
	175	1	.1	.1	20.5
	176	1	.1	.1	20.6
	177	1	.1	.1	20.8
	178	1	.1	.1	20.9
	179	1	.1	.1	21.0
	180	1	.1	.1	21.1
	181	1	.1	.1	21.3
	182	1	.1	.1	21.4
	183	1	.1	.1	21.5
	184	1	.1	.1	21.6
	185	1	.1	.1	21.8
	186	1	.1	.1	21.9
	187	1	.1	.1	22.0
	188	1	.1	.1	22.1
	189	1	.1	.1	22.2
	190	1	.1	.1	22.4
	191	1	.1	.1	22.5
	192	1	.1	.1	22.6
	193	1	.1	.1	22.7
	194	1	.1	.1	22.9
	195	1	.1	.1	23.0
	197	1	.1	.1	23.1
	198	1	.1	.1	23.2
	199	1	.1	.1	23.4
	200	1	.1	.1	23.5
	201	1	.1	.1	23.6
	202	1	.1	.1	23.7
	203	1	.1	.1	23.9
	204	1	.1	.1	24.0
	205	1	.1	.1	24.1
	206	1	.1	.1	24.2

CASENO	case number				
	207	1	.1	.1	24.4
	208	1	.1	.1	24.5
	209	1	.1	.1	24.6
	210	1	.1	.1	24.7
	211	1	.1	.1	24.8
	212	1	.1	.1	25.0
	213	1	.1	.1	25.1
	214	1	.1	.1	25.2
	215	1	.1	.1	25.3
	216	1	.1	.1	25.5
	217	1	.1	.1	25.6
	218	1	.1	.1	25.7
	219	1	.1	.1	25.8
	220	1	.1	.1	26.0
	221	1	.1	.1	26.1
	222	1	.1	.1	26.2
	223	1	.1	.1	26.3
	224	1	.1	.1	26.5
	225	1	.1	.1	26.6
	226	1	.1	.1	26.7
	227	1	.1	.1	26.8
	228	1	.1	.1	26.9
	229	1	.1	.1	27.1
	230	1	.1	.1	27.2
	231	1	.1	.1	27.3
	232	1	.1	.1	27.4
	233	1	.1	.1	27.6
	234	1	.1	.1	27.7
	235	1	.1	.1	27.8
	236	1	.1	.1	27.9
	237	1	.1	.1	28.1
	238	1	.1	.1	28.2
	239	1	.1	.1	28.3
	240	1	.1	.1	28.4
	241	1	.1	.1	28.6
	242	1	.1	.1	28.7
	243	1	.1	.1	28.8
	244	1	.1	.1	28.9
	245	1	.1	.1	29.0
	246	1	.1	.1	29.2
	247	1	.1	.1	29.3
	248	1	.1	.1	29.4
	249	1	.1	.1	29.5
	250	1	.1	.1	29.7
	251	1	.1	.1	29.8
	252	1	.1	.1	29.9
	253	1	.1	.1	30.0
	254	1	.1	.1	30.2
	255	1	.1	.1	30.3
	256	1	.1	.1	30.4

CASENO	case number				
	257	1	.1	.1	30.5
	258	1	.1	.1	30.7
	259	1	.1	.1	30.8
	260	1	.1	.1	30.9
	261	1	.1	.1	31.0
	262	1	.1	.1	31.1
	263	1	.1	.1	31.3
	264	1	.1	.1	31.4
	265	1	.1	.1	31.5
	266	1	.1	.1	31.6
	267	1	.1	.1	31.8
	268	1	.1	.1	31.9
	269	1	.1	.1	32.0
	270	1	.1	.1	32.1
	271	1	.1	.1	32.3
	272	1	.1	.1	32.4
	273	1	.1	.1	32.5
	274	1	.1	.1	32.6
	275	1	.1	.1	32.8
	276	1	.1	.1	32.9
	277	1	.1	.1	33.0
	278	1	.1	.1	33.1
	279	1	.1	.1	33.3
	280	1	.1	.1	33.4
	281	1	.1	.1	33.5
	282	1	.1	.1	33.6
	283	1	.1	.1	33.7
	284	1	.1	.1	33.9
	285	1	.1	.1	34.0
	286	1	.1	.1	34.1
	287	1	.1	.1	34.2
	288	1	.1	.1	34.4
	289	1	.1	.1	34.5
	290	1	.1	.1	34.6
	291	1	.1	.1	34.7
	292	1	.1	.1	34.9
	293	1	.1	.1	35.0
	294	1	.1	.1	35.1
	295	1	.1	.1	35.2
	296	1	.1	.1	35.4
	297	1	.1	.1	35.5
	298	1	.1	.1	35.6
	299	1	.1	.1	35.7
	300	1	.1	.1	35.8
	301	1	.1	.1	36.0
	302	1	.1	.1	36.1
	303	1	.1	.1	36.2
	304	1	.1	.1	36.3
	305	1	.1	.1	36.5
	306	1	.1	.1	36.6

CASENO	case number				
	307	1	.1	.1	36.7
	308	1	.1	.1	36.8
	309	1	.1	.1	37.0
	310	1	.1	.1	37.1
	311	1	.1	.1	37.2
	312	1	.1	.1	37.3
	313	1	.1	.1	37.5
	314	1	.1	.1	37.6
	315	1	.1	.1	37.7
	316	1	.1	.1	37.8
	317	1	.1	.1	37.9
	318	1	.1	.1	38.1
	319	1	.1	.1	38.2
	320	1	.1	.1	38.3
	321	1	.1	.1	38.4
	322	1	.1	.1	38.6
	323	1	.1	.1	38.7
	324	1	.1	.1	38.8
	325	1	.1	.1	38.9
	326	1	.1	.1	39.1
	327	1	.1	.1	39.2
	328	1	.1	.1	39.3
	329	1	.1	.1	39.4
	330	1	.1	.1	39.6
	331	1	.1	.1	39.7
	332	1	.1	.1	39.8
	333	1	.1	.1	39.9
	334	1	.1	.1	40.0
	335	1	.1	.1	40.2
	336	1	.1	.1	40.3
	337	1	.1	.1	40.4
	338	1	.1	.1	40.5
	339	1	.1	.1	40.7
	340	1	.1	.1	40.8
	341	1	.1	.1	40.9
	342	1	.1	.1	41.0
	343	1	.1	.1	41.2
	344	1	.1	.1	41.3
	345	1	.1	.1	41.4
	346	1	.1	.1	41.5
	347	1	.1	.1	41.7
	348	1	.1	.1	41.8
	349	1	.1	.1	41.9
	350	1	.1	.1	42.0
	351	1	.1	.1	42.2
	352	1	.1	.1	42.3
	353	1	.1	.1	42.4
	354	1	.1	.1	42.5
	355	1	.1	.1	42.6
	356	1	.1	.1	42.8

CASENO	case number			
	357	1	.1	.1
	358	1	.1	.1
	359	1	.1	.1
	360	1	.1	.1
	361	1	.1	.1
	362	1	.1	.1
	363	1	.1	.1
	364	1	.1	.1
	365	1	.1	.1
	366	1	.1	.1
	367	1	.1	.1
	368	1	.1	.1
	369	1	.1	.1
	370	1	.1	.1
	371	1	.1	.1
	372	1	.1	.1
	373	1	.1	.1
	374	1	.1	.1
	375	1	.1	.1
	376	1	.1	.1
	377	1	.1	.1
	378	1	.1	.1
	379	1	.1	.1
	380	1	.1	.1
	381	1	.1	.1
	382	1	.1	.1
	383	1	.1	.1
	384	1	.1	.1
	385	1	.1	.1
	386	1	.1	.1
	387	1	.1	.1
	388	1	.1	.1
	389	1	.1	.1
	390	1	.1	.1
	391	1	.1	.1
	392	1	.1	.1
	393	1	.1	.1
	394	1	.1	.1
	395	1	.1	.1
	396	1	.1	.1
	397	1	.1	.1
	398	1	.1	.1
	399	1	.1	.1
	400	1	.1	.1
	401	1	.1	.1
	402	1	.1	.1
	403	1	.1	.1
	404	1	.1	.1
	405	1	.1	.1
	406	1	.1	.1

CASENO	case number				
	407	1	.1	.1	49.1
	408	1	.1	.1	49.2
	409	1	.1	.1	49.3
	410	1	.1	.1	49.4
	411	1	.1	.1	49.6
	412	1	.1	.1	49.7
	413	1	.1	.1	49.8
	414	1	.1	.1	49.9
	415	1	.1	.1	50.1
	416	1	.1	.1	50.2
	417	1	.1	.1	50.3
	418	1	.1	.1	50.4
	419	1	.1	.1	50.6
	420	1	.1	.1	50.7
	421	1	.1	.1	50.8
	422	1	.1	.1	50.9
	423	1	.1	.1	51.1
	424	1	.1	.1	51.2
	425	1	.1	.1	51.3
	426	1	.1	.1	51.4
	427	1	.1	.1	51.5
	428	1	.1	.1	51.7
	429	1	.1	.1	51.8
	430	1	.1	.1	51.9
	431	1	.1	.1	52.0
	432	1	.1	.1	52.2
	433	1	.1	.1	52.3
	434	1	.1	.1	52.4
	435	1	.1	.1	52.5
	436	1	.1	.1	52.7
	437	1	.1	.1	52.8
	438	1	.1	.1	52.9
	439	1	.1	.1	53.0
	440	1	.1	.1	53.2
	441	1	.1	.1	53.3
	442	1	.1	.1	53.4
	443	1	.1	.1	53.5
	444	1	.1	.1	53.6
	445	1	.1	.1	53.8
	446	1	.1	.1	53.9
	447	1	.1	.1	54.0
	448	1	.1	.1	54.1
	449	1	.1	.1	54.3
	450	1	.1	.1	54.4
	451	1	.1	.1	54.5
	452	1	.1	.1	54.6
	453	1	.1	.1	54.8
	454	1	.1	.1	54.9
	455	1	.1	.1	55.0
	456	1	.1	.1	55.1

CASENO      case number

457	1	.1	.1	55.3
458	1	.1	.1	55.4
459	1	.1	.1	55.5
460	1	.1	.1	55.6
461	1	.1	.1	55.7
462	1	.1	.1	55.9
463	1	.1	.1	56.0
464	1	.1	.1	56.1
465	1	.1	.1	56.2
466	1	.1	.1	56.4
467	1	.1	.1	56.5
468	1	.1	.1	56.6
469	1	.1	.1	56.7
470	1	.1	.1	56.9
471	1	.1	.1	57.0
472	1	.1	.1	57.1
473	1	.1	.1	57.2
474	1	.1	.1	57.4
475	1	.1	.1	57.5
476	1	.1	.1	57.6
477	1	.1	.1	57.7
478	1	.1	.1	57.8
479	1	.1	.1	58.0
480	1	.1	.1	58.1
481	1	.1	.1	58.2
482	1	.1	.1	58.3
483	1	.1	.1	58.5
484	1	.1	.1	58.6
485	1	.1	.1	58.7
486	1	.1	.1	58.8
487	1	.1	.1	59.0
488	1	.1	.1	59.1
489	1	.1	.1	59.2
490	1	.1	.1	59.3
491	1	.1	.1	59.5
492	1	.1	.1	59.6
493	1	.1	.1	59.7
494	1	.1	.1	59.8
495	1	.1	.1	60.0
496	1	.1	.1	60.1
497	1	.1	.1	60.2
498	1	.1	.1	60.3
499	1	.1	.1	60.4
500	1	.1	.1	60.6
501	1	.1	.1	60.7
502	1	.1	.1	60.8
503	1	.1	.1	60.9
504	1	.1	.1	61.1
505	1	.1	.1	61.2
506	1	.1	.1	61.3

CASENO	case number				
	507	1	.1	.1	61.4
	508	1	.1	.1	61.6
	509	1	.1	.1	61.7
	510	1	.1	.1	61.8
	511	1	.1	.1	61.9
	512	1	.1	.1	62.1
	513	1	.1	.1	62.2
	514	1	.1	.1	62.3
	515	1	.1	.1	62.4
	516	1	.1	.1	62.5
	517	1	.1	.1	62.7
	518	1	.1	.1	62.8
	519	1	.1	.1	62.9
	520	1	.1	.1	63.0
	521	1	.1	.1	63.2
	522	1	.1	.1	63.3
	523	1	.1	.1	63.4
	524	1	.1	.1	63.5
	525	1	.1	.1	63.7
	526	1	.1	.1	63.8
	527	1	.1	.1	63.9
	528	1	.1	.1	64.0
	529	1	.1	.1	64.2
	530	1	.1	.1	64.3
	531	1	.1	.1	64.4
	532	1	.1	.1	64.5
	533	1	.1	.1	64.6
	534	1	.1	.1	64.8
	535	1	.1	.1	64.9
	536	1	.1	.1	65.0
	537	1	.1	.1	65.1
	538	1	.1	.1	65.3
	539	1	.1	.1	65.4
	540	1	.1	.1	65.5
	541	1	.1	.1	65.6
	542	1	.1	.1	65.8
	543	1	.1	.1	65.9
	544	1	.1	.1	66.0
	545	1	.1	.1	66.1
	546	1	.1	.1	66.3
	547	1	.1	.1	66.4
	548	1	.1	.1	66.5
	549	1	.1	.1	66.6
	550	1	.1	.1	66.7
	551	1	.1	.1	66.9
	552	1	.1	.1	67.0
	553	1	.1	.1	67.1
	554	1	.1	.1	67.2
	555	1	.1	.1	67.4
	556	1	.1	.1	67.5

CASENO	case number				
	557	1	.1	.1	67.6
	558	1	.1	.1	67.7
	559	1	.1	.1	67.9
	560	1	.1	.1	68.0
	561	1	.1	.1	68.1
	562	1	.1	.1	68.2
	563	1	.1	.1	68.4
	564	1	.1	.1	68.5
	565	1	.1	.1	68.6
	566	1	.1	.1	68.7
	596	1	.1	.1	68.9
	597	1	.1	.1	69.0
	598	1	.1	.1	69.1
	599	1	.1	.1	69.2
	600	1	.1	.1	69.3
	601	1	.1	.1	69.5
	602	1	.1	.1	69.6
	603	1	.1	.1	69.7
	604	1	.1	.1	69.8
	605	1	.1	.1	70.0
	606	1	.1	.1	70.1
	607	1	.1	.1	70.2
	608	1	.1	.1	70.3
	609	1	.1	.1	70.5
	610	1	.1	.1	70.6
	611	1	.1	.1	70.7
	612	1	.1	.1	70.8
	613	1	.1	.1	71.0
	614	1	.1	.1	71.1
	615	1	.1	.1	71.2
	616	1	.1	.1	71.3
	617	1	.1	.1	71.4
	618	1	.1	.1	71.6
	619	1	.1	.1	71.7
	620	1	.1	.1	71.8
	621	1	.1	.1	71.9
	622	1	.1	.1	72.1
	623	1	.1	.1	72.2
	624	1	.1	.1	72.3
	625	1	.1	.1	72.4
	626	1	.1	.1	72.6
	627	1	.1	.1	72.7
	628	1	.1	.1	72.8
	629	1	.1	.1	72.9
	630	1	.1	.1	73.1
	631	1	.1	.1	73.2
	632	1	.1	.1	73.3
	633	1	.1	.1	73.4
	634	1	.1	.1	73.5
	635	1	.1	.1	73.7

CASENO      case number

636	1	.1	.1	73.8
637	1	.1	.1	73.9
638	1	.1	.1	74.0
639	1	.1	.1	74.2
640	1	.1	.1	74.3
641	1	.1	.1	74.4
642	1	.1	.1	74.5
652	1	.1	.1	74.7
653	1	.1	.1	74.8
654	1	.1	.1	74.9
655	1	.1	.1	75.0
656	1	.1	.1	75.2
657	1	.1	.1	75.3
658	1	.1	.1	75.4
659	1	.1	.1	75.5
660	1	.1	.1	75.6
661	1	.1	.1	75.8
662	1	.1	.1	75.9
663	1	.1	.1	76.0
664	1	.1	.1	76.1
665	1	.1	.1	76.3
666	1	.1	.1	76.4
667	1	.1	.1	76.5
668	1	.1	.1	76.6
669	1	.1	.1	76.8
670	1	.1	.1	76.9
671	1	.1	.1	77.0
672	1	.1	.1	77.1
673	1	.1	.1	77.3
674	1	.1	.1	77.4
675	1	.1	.1	77.5
676	1	.1	.1	77.6
677	1	.1	.1	77.8
678	1	.1	.1	77.9
679	1	.1	.1	78.0
680	1	.1	.1	78.1
681	1	.1	.1	78.2
682	1	.1	.1	78.4
683	1	.1	.1	78.5
684	1	.1	.1	78.6
685	1	.1	.1	78.7
686	1	.1	.1	78.9
687	1	.1	.1	79.0
688	1	.1	.1	79.1
689	1	.1	.1	79.2
690	1	.1	.1	79.4
691	1	.1	.1	79.5
693	1	.1	.1	79.6
694	1	.1	.1	79.7
696	1	.1	.1	79.9

CASENO      case number

697	1	.1	.1	80.0
698	1	.1	.1	80.1
699	1	.1	.1	80.2
700	1	.1	.1	80.3
701	1	.1	.1	80.5
702	1	.1	.1	80.6
704	1	.1	.1	80.7
705	1	.1	.1	80.8
706	1	.1	.1	81.0
707	1	.1	.1	81.1
708	1	.1	.1	81.2
709	1	.1	.1	81.3
710	1	.1	.1	81.5
711	1	.1	.1	81.6
712	1	.1	.1	81.7
713	1	.1	.1	81.8
714	1	.1	.1	82.0
715	1	.1	.1	82.1
716	1	.1	.1	82.2
717	1	.1	.1	82.3
718	1	.1	.1	82.4
719	1	.1	.1	82.6
720	1	.1	.1	82.7
721	1	.1	.1	82.8
722	1	.1	.1	82.9
723	1	.1	.1	83.1
724	1	.1	.1	83.2
725	1	.1	.1	83.3
726	1	.1	.1	83.4
727	1	.1	.1	83.6
729	1	.1	.1	83.7
730	1	.1	.1	83.8
731	1	.1	.1	83.9
734	1	.1	.1	84.1
735	1	.1	.1	84.2
736	1	.1	.1	84.3
737	1	.1	.1	84.4
738	1	.1	.1	84.5
739	1	.1	.1	84.7
740	1	.1	.1	84.8
741	1	.1	.1	84.9
742	1	.1	.1	85.0
743	1	.1	.1	85.2
744	1	.1	.1	85.3
745	1	.1	.1	85.4
746	1	.1	.1	85.5
747	1	.1	.1	85.7
748	1	.1	.1	85.8
749	1	.1	.1	85.9
750	1	.1	.1	86.0

CASENO      case number

751	1	.1	.1	86.2
753	2	.2	.2	86.4
754	1	.1	.1	86.5
755	1	.1	.1	86.7
756	1	.1	.1	86.8
757	1	.1	.1	86.9
758	1	.1	.1	87.0
759	1	.1	.1	87.1
760	1	.1	.1	87.3
761	1	.1	.1	87.4
762	1	.1	.1	87.5
763	1	.1	.1	87.6
764	1	.1	.1	87.8
765	1	.1	.1	87.9
766	1	.1	.1	88.0
767	1	.1	.1	88.1
768	1	.1	.1	88.3
769	1	.1	.1	88.4
770	1	.1	.1	88.5
771	1	.1	.1	88.6
772	1	.1	.1	88.8
773	1	.1	.1	88.9
774	1	.1	.1	89.0
775	1	.1	.1	89.1
776	1	.1	.1	89.2
777	1	.1	.1	89.4
778	1	.1	.1	89.5
779	1	.1	.1	89.6
780	1	.1	.1	89.7
781	1	.1	.1	89.9
782	1	.1	.1	90.0
783	1	.1	.1	90.1
784	1	.1	.1	90.2
785	1	.1	.1	90.4
786	1	.1	.1	90.5
787	1	.1	.1	90.6
788	1	.1	.1	90.7
789	1	.1	.1	90.9
790	1	.1	.1	91.0
791	1	.1	.1	91.1
792	1	.1	.1	91.2
793	1	.1	.1	91.3
794	1	.1	.1	91.5
795	1	.1	.1	91.6
796	1	.1	.1	91.7
797	1	.1	.1	91.8
798	1	.1	.1	92.0
799	1	.1	.1	92.1
800	1	.1	.1	92.2
801	1	.1	.1	92.3

CASENO      case number

802	1	.1	.1	92.5
803	1	.1	.1	92.6
804	1	.1	.1	92.7
805	1	.1	.1	92.8
806	1	.1	.1	93.0
807	1	.1	.1	93.1
808	1	.1	.1	93.2
809	1	.1	.1	93.3
810	1	.1	.1	93.4
811	1	.1	.1	93.6
812	1	.1	.1	93.7
813	1	.1	.1	93.8
814	1	.1	.1	93.9
815	1	.1	.1	94.1
816	1	.1	.1	94.2
817	1	.1	.1	94.3
818	1	.1	.1	94.4
819	1	.1	.1	94.6
820	1	.1	.1	94.7
821	1	.1	.1	94.8
822	1	.1	.1	94.9
823	1	.1	.1	95.1
824	1	.1	.1	95.2
825	1	.1	.1	95.3
826	1	.1	.1	95.4
827	1	.1	.1	95.6
828	1	.1	.1	95.7
829	1	.1	.1	95.8
830	1	.1	.1	95.9
831	1	.1	.1	96.0
832	1	.1	.1	96.2
833	1	.1	.1	96.3
834	1	.1	.1	96.4
835	1	.1	.1	96.5
836	1	.1	.1	96.7
837	1	.1	.1	96.8
838	1	.1	.1	96.9
839	1	.1	.1	97.0
840	1	.1	.1	97.2
841	1	.1	.1	97.3
842	1	.1	.1	97.4
843	1	.1	.1	97.5
844	1	.1	.1	97.7
845	1	.1	.1	97.8
846	1	.1	.1	97.9
847	1	.1	.1	98.0
848	1	.1	.1	98.1
849	1	.1	.1	98.3
850	1	.1	.1	98.4
851	1	.1	.1	98.5

CASENO case number

904	1	.1	.1	98.6
905	1	.1	.1	98.8
906	1	.1	.1	98.9
907	1	.1	.1	99.0
908	1	.1	.1	99.1
1000	1	.1	.1	99.3
1001	1	.1	.1	99.4
1002	1	.1	.1	99.5
1005	1	.1	.1	99.6
1006	1	.1	.1	99.8
1007	1	.1	.1	99.9
1009	1	.1	.1	100.0
-----				
Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

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REDNOT how notified of redundancy QU 3.6

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
writing management	1	440	54.4	78.6	78.6
verbally management	2	80	9.9	14.3	92.9
union	3	40	4.9	7.1	100.0
.	.	249	30.8	Missing	
-----					
Total		809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 560 Missing cases 249

-----

OBLIGE redundancy obliged QU 3.7

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	119	14.7	20.8	20.8
yes	1	453	56.0	79.2	100.0
.	.	237	29.3	Missing	
-----					
Total		809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 572 Missing cases 237

LEGAL pursuing legal action QU 3.8

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	459	56.7	80.4	80.4
yes	1	112	13.8	19.6	100.0
	.	238	29.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 571 Missing cases 238

-----

ACTION action type QU 3.9

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
unfair dismissal	1	50	6.2	13.1	13.1
arrear of pay	2	69	8.5	18.1	31.2
other	3	6	.7	1.6	32.7
not applicable	4	257	31.8	67.3	100.0
	.	427	52.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 382 Missing cases 427

REASRED why redundant QU 3.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no choice	1	179	22.1	31.3	31.3
comp early-retiremen	2	58	7.2	10.1	41.4
comp employment	3	55	6.8	9.6	51.0
comp self-employment	4	8	1.0	1.4	52.4
stevedoring co.	5	22	2.7	3.8	56.3
unacceptable conditi	6	219	27.1	38.3	94.6
other	7	31	3.8	5.4	100.0
.	.	237	29.3	Missing	
Total		809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 572 Missing cases 237

NORED why not redundant QU 3.12

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	598	73.9	73.9	73.9
poor job prospects	1	84	10.4	10.4	84.3
like work	2	79	9.8	9.8	94.1
no offer of red	3	48	5.9	5.9	100.0
Total		809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

WAGE1 wage docks job QU 3.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	76	9.4	9.4	9.4
same	2	636	78.6	78.6	88.0
worse	3	97	12.0	12.0	100.0
Total		809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

HOURS1 hours docks job QU 3.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	5	.6	.6	.6
same	2	614	75.9	75.9	76.5
worse	3	190	23.5	23.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

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SEC1 security docks job QU 3.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	10	1.2	1.2	1.2
same	2	624	77.1	77.1	78.4
worse	3	175	21.6	21.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

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PEN1 pension docks job QU 3.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	65	8.0	8.0	8.0
same	2	724	89.5	89.5	97.5
worse	3	20	2.5	2.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

UNION1 union influence docks job QU 3.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	2	.2	.2	.2
same	2	618	76.4	76.4	76.6
worse	3	189	23.4	23.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

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TRAIN1 training docks job QU 3.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	37	4.6	4.6	4.6
same	2	702	86.8	86.8	91.3
worse	3	70	8.7	8.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

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SAFE1 health and safety docks job QU 3.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	22	2.7	2.7	2.7
same	2	667	82.4	82.4	85.2
worse	3	120	14.8	14.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

CONMOBIL planned mobility QU 4.1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
migration	1	19	2.3	3.4	3.4
local work	2	236	29.2	41.8	45.1
training	3	28	3.5	5.0	50.1
early-retirement	4	74	9.1	13.1	63.2
self-employment	5	40	4.9	7.1	70.3
re-employment in doc	6	107	13.2	18.9	89.2
no consider	7	61	7.5	10.8	100.0
.	.	244	30.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 565 Missing cases 244

MOBIL1 early-retirement QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	518	64.0	86.0	86.0
yes	1	84	10.4	14.0	100.0
.	.	207	25.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 602 Missing cases 207

MOBIL2 sickness QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	506	62.5	84.2	84.2
yes	1	95	11.7	15.8	100.0
.	.	208	25.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 601 Missing cases 208

MOBIL3 employment outside docks QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	365	45.1	60.8	60.8
yes	1	235	29.0	39.2	100.0
	.	209	25.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 600 Missing cases 209

MOBIL4 unemployment QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	385	47.6	64.0	64.0
yes	1	217	26.8	36.0	100.0
	.	207	25.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 602 Missing cases 207

MOBIL5 training QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	568	70.2	95.0	95.0
yes	1	30	3.7	5.0	100.0
	.	211	26.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 598 Missing cases 211

MOBIL6 self-employment outside docks QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	550	68.0	91.7	91.7
yes	1	50	6.2	8.3	100.0
	.	209	25.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 600 Missing cases 209

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MOBIL7 full time re-employment QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	535	66.1	88.9	88.9
yes	1	67	8.3	11.1	100.0
	.	207	25.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 602 Missing cases 207

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MOBIL8 casual re-employment QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	581	71.8	97.2	97.2
yes	1	17	2.1	2.8	100.0
	.	211	26.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 598 Missing cases 211

MOBIL9 temporary re-employment QU 4.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	587	72.6	98.2	98.2
yes	1	11	1.4	1.8	100.0
	.	211	26.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 598 Missing cases 211

MONTHUNE months unemployment QU 4.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	32	4.0	7.1	7.1
	1	11	1.4	2.4	9.5
	2	24	3.0	5.3	14.8
	3	23	2.8	5.1	19.9
	4	19	2.3	4.2	24.1
	5	13	1.6	2.9	26.9
	6	29	3.6	6.4	33.3
	7	11	1.4	2.4	35.8
	8	12	1.5	2.6	38.4
	9	8	1.0	1.8	40.2
	10	7	.9	1.5	41.7
	11	4	.5	.9	42.6
	12	16	2.0	3.5	46.1
	13	3	.4	.7	46.8
	14	1	.1	.2	47.0
	15	12	1.5	2.6	49.7
	16	8	1.0	1.8	51.4
	17	4	.5	.9	52.3
	18	30	3.7	6.6	58.9
	19	11	1.4	2.4	61.4
	20	12	1.5	2.6	64.0
	21	2	.2	.4	64.5
	22	11	1.4	2.4	66.9
	23	10	1.2	2.2	69.1
	24	18	2.2	4.0	73.1
	26	7	.9	1.5	74.6
	27	4	.5	.9	75.5
	28	4	.5	.9	76.4
	30	7	.9	1.5	77.9
	31	3	.4	.7	78.6
	32	2	.2	.4	79.0
	33	4	.5	.9	79.9
	34	3	.4	.7	80.6
	35	5	.6	1.1	81.7
	36	70	8.7	15.5	97.1
	37	3	.4	.7	97.8
	40	1	.1	.2	98.0
	42	2	.2	.4	98.5
	48	2	.2	.4	98.9
	51	1	.1	.2	99.1
	52	3	.4	.7	99.8
	53	1	.1	.2	100.0
	.	356	44.0	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	453	Missing cases	356		

NSPELLS no spells unemployment QU 4.4

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	40	4.9	9.2	9.2
	1	290	35.8	66.8	76.0
	2	65	8.0	15.0	91.0
	3	22	2.7	5.1	96.1
	4	9	1.1	2.1	98.2
	5	1	.1	.2	98.4
	6	1	.1	.2	98.6
	7	4	.5	.9	99.5
	8	2	.2	.5	100.0
	.	372	46.0	Missing	
	9	3	.4	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 434 Missing cases 375

UNEMPL currently unemployed QU 4.5

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	274	33.9	49.9	49.9
yes	1	275	34.0	50.1	100.0
	.	260	32.1	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 549 Missing cases 260

NOWORK why no work QU 4.6

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
few local vacs	1	133	16.4	26.2	26.2
many red dockers	2	16	2.0	3.2	29.4
wrong skills	3	38	4.7	7.5	36.9
stigmatization	4	115	14.2	22.7	59.6
too old	5	125	15.5	24.7	84.2
not applicable	6	80	9.9	15.8	100.0
.	.	302	37.3	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 507 Missing cases 302

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TRAIN why trained QU 4.7

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
enhance job prospect	1	39	4.8	9.4	9.4
advice from jc	2	6	.7	1.4	10.8
better unemployment	3	60	7.4	14.4	25.2
not applicable	4	311	38.4	74.8	100.0
.	.	393	48.6	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 416 Missing cases 393

NOTRAIN why not trained QU 4.8

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
job	1	70	8.7	14.4	14.4
cant get on course	2	13	1.6	2.7	17.1
too costly	3	8	1.0	1.6	18.8
irrelevant skills	4	24	3.0	4.9	23.7
skilled	5	32	4.0	6.6	30.3
too old	6	114	14.1	23.5	53.8
retired	7	32	4.0	6.6	60.4
no info	8	42	5.2	8.7	69.1
not applicable	9	150	18.5	30.9	100.0
.	.	324	40.0	Missing	
Total		809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 485 Missing cases 324

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POSTJOBS no. jobs post-red QU 4.9

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	266	32.9	43.5	43.5
	1	232	28.7	37.9	81.4
	2	58	7.2	9.5	90.8
	3	34	4.2	5.6	96.4
	4	11	1.4	1.8	98.2
	5	2	.2	.3	98.5
	6	2	.2	.3	98.9
	7	4	.5	.7	99.5
	30	1	.1	.2	99.7
	61	1	.1	.2	99.8
	98	1	.1	.2	100.0
.	.	197	24.4	Missing	
Total		809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 612 Missing cases 197

OCC1          labouring QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	512	63.3	85.2	85.2
yes	1	89	11.0	14.8	100.0
	.	208	25.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases          601          Missing cases          208

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OCC2          production line QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	575	71.1	96.2	96.2
yes	1	23	2.8	3.8	100.0
	.	211	26.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases          598          Missing cases          211

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OCC3          shop QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	585	72.3	97.8	97.8
yes	1	13	1.6	2.2	100.0
	.	211	26.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases          598          Missing cases          211

OCC4 community QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	588	72.7	98.3	98.3
yes	1	10	1.2	1.7	100.0
	.	211	26.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	598	Missing cases	211		

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OCC5 clerical QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	551	68.1	92.1	92.1
yes	1	47	5.8	7.9	100.0
	.	211	26.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	598	Missing cases	211		

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OCC6 dock QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	503	62.2	83.6	83.6
yes	1	99	12.2	16.4	100.0
	.	207	25.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	602	Missing cases	207		

OCC7 security QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	576	71.2	96.2	96.2
yes	1	23	2.8	3.8	100.0
	.	210	26.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	599	Missing cases	210		

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OCC8 cleaning QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	557	68.9	93.1	93.1
yes	1	41	5.1	6.9	100.0
	.	211	26.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	598	Missing cases	211		

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OCC9 driving QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	493	60.9	82.2	82.2
yes	1	107	13.2	17.8	100.0
	.	209	25.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	600	Missing cases	209		

OCC10 other QU 4.10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	482	59.6	80.3	80.3
yes	1	118	14.6	19.7	100.0
	.	209	25.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 600 Missing cases 209

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REDJOB red from job QU 4.11

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	291	36.0	82.4	82.4
yes	1	62	7.7	17.6	100.0
	.	456	56.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 353 Missing cases 456

-----

WAGE2 wage post-red job QU 4.12

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	41	5.1	10.2	10.2
same	2	32	4.0	7.9	18.1
worse	3	330	40.8	81.9	100.0
	.	406	50.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 403 Missing cases 406

HOURS2 hours post-red job QU 4.12

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	70	8.7	17.5	17.5
same	2	68	8.4	17.0	34.5
worse	3	262	32.4	65.5	100.0
	.	409	50.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 400 Missing cases 409

-----

SEC2 security post-red job QU 4.12

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	55	6.8	13.8	13.8
same	2	62	7.7	15.5	29.3
worse	3	283	35.0	70.8	100.0
	.	409	50.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 400 Missing cases 409

-----

PEN2 pension post-red job QU 4.12

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	56	6.9	13.9	13.9
same	2	133	16.4	33.1	47.0
worse	3	213	26.3	53.0	100.0
	.	407	50.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 402 Missing cases 407

UNION2 union influence post-red job QU 4.12

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
better	1	20	2.5	5.0	5.0
same	2	61	7.5	15.3	20.3
worse	3	318	39.3	79.7	100.0
	.	410	50.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 399 Missing cases 410

-----

SELF self-employment QU 4.13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	1	.1	2.2	2.2
yes	1	45	5.6	97.8	100.0
	.	763	94.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 46 Missing cases 763

-----

RETJS job search before retired QU 4.14

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	50	6.2	12.7	12.7
yes	1	31	3.8	7.9	20.6
not applicable	2	312	38.6	79.4	100.0
	.	416	51.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 393 Missing cases 416

REASRET why retired QU 4.15

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
disability	1	61	7.5	14.6	14.6
age	2	11	1.4	2.6	17.3
poor job prospects	3	28	3.5	6.7	24.0
wanted to	4	13	1.6	3.1	27.1
red compensation	5	58	7.2	13.9	41.0
not applicable	6	246	30.4	59.0	100.0
.	.	392	48.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 417 Missing cases 392

-----

JS job search QU 5.1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	177	21.9	35.0	35.0
yes	1	328	40.5	65.0	100.0
.	.	304	37.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 505 Missing cases 304

NOJS reason no job search QU 5.2

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
employed	1	101	12.5	26.7	26.7
fe/training	2	4	.5	1.1	27.8
no point	3	26	3.2	6.9	34.7
dont want job	4	2	.2	.5	35.2
retired	5	32	4.0	8.5	43.7
self-employed	6	25	3.1	6.6	50.3
disabled	7	55	6.8	14.6	64.8
not applicable	8	133	16.4	35.2	100.0
.	.	431	53.3	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 378 Missing cases 431

JC job centre QU 5.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	323	39.9	53.0	53.0
yes	1	286	35.4	47.0	100.0
.	.	200	24.7	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 609 Missing cases 200

PAPER newspaper QU 5.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	293	36.2	48.3	48.3
yes	1	313	38.7	51.7	100.0
.	.	203	25.1	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 606 Missing cases 203

VWOC visit or write firm on off chance QU 5.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	441	54.5	73.1	73.1
yes	1	162	20.0	26.9	100.0
	.	206	25.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 603 Missing cases 206

-----

VWVAC visit or write advertised vacancy QU 5.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	410	50.7	68.1	68.1
yes	1	192	23.7	31.9	100.0
	.	207	25.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 602 Missing cases 207

-----

FRIENDS friends & relatives QU 5.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	394	48.7	65.2	65.2
yes	1	210	26.0	34.8	100.0
	.	205	25.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 604 Missing cases 205

UNIONJS through union QU 5.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	582	71.9	97.2	97.2
yes	1	17	2.1	2.8	100.0
	.	210	26.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	599	Missing cases	210		

-----

NAJS job search not applicable QU 5.3

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	0	478	59.1	79.8	79.8
yes	1	121	15.0	20.2	100.0
	.	210	26.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	599	Missing cases	210		

-----

RED redundancy outcome

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
remaining	.00	211	26.1	26.1	26.1
redundant	1.00	598	73.9	73.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

SERVICER service range

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<15	1.00	91	11.2	11.7	11.7
15-19	2.00	163	20.1	20.9	32.6
20-24	3.00	154	19.0	19.7	52.3
25-29	4.00	197	24.4	25.3	77.6
30-34	5.00	108	13.3	13.8	91.4
>=35	6.00	67	8.3	8.6	100.0
.	.	29	3.6	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 780 Missing cases 29

-----

AGER age range

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<39	1.00	53	6.6	6.6	6.6
40-44	2.00	115	14.2	14.3	20.9
45-49	3.00	187	23.1	23.3	44.3
50-54	4.00	191	23.6	23.8	68.1
55-59	5.00	149	18.4	18.6	86.7
>=60	6.00	107	13.2	13.3	100.0
.	.	7	.9	Missing	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 802 Missing cases 7

WT            sample weights

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.45	37	4.6	4.6	4.6
	.55	25	3.1	3.1	7.7
	.62	262	32.4	32.4	40.0
	.79	6	.7	.7	40.8
	.84	130	16.1	16.1	56.9
	.88	94	11.6	11.6	68.5
	.92	121	15.0	15.0	83.4
	1.01	49	6.1	6.1	89.5
	2.88	41	5.1	5.1	94.6
	3.20	44	5.4	5.4	100.0
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

WTPOP population weights

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.36	19	2.3	2.3	2.3
	.44	7	.9	.9	3.2
	.49	12	1.5	1.5	4.7
	.56	6	.7	.7	5.4
	.57	75	9.3	9.3	14.7
	.60	17	2.1	2.1	16.8
	.61	92	11.4	11.4	28.2
	.63	1	.1	.1	28.3
	.66	95	11.7	11.7	40.0
	.69	1	.1	.1	40.2
	.71	30	3.7	3.7	43.9
	.77	28	3.5	3.5	47.3
	.81	16	2.0	2.0	49.3
	.82	93	11.5	11.5	60.8
	.85	37	4.6	4.6	65.4
	.87	4	.5	.5	65.9
	.88	9	1.1	1.1	67.0
	.90	27	3.3	3.3	70.3
	.97	57	7.0	7.0	77.4
	.97	46	5.7	5.7	83.1
	.99	1	.1	.1	83.2
	1.11	18	2.2	2.2	85.4
	1.12	31	3.8	3.8	89.2
	1.27	2	.2	.2	89.5
	2.65	8	1.0	1.0	90.5
	2.83	25	3.1	3.1	93.6
	2.95	10	1.2	1.2	94.8
	3.04	8	1.0	1.0	95.8
	3.15	8	1.0	1.0	96.8
	3.38	26	3.2	3.2	100.0
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	809	Missing cases	0		

ACTIVE active in lm

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
inactive	.00	111	13.7	13.7	13.7
active	1.00	698	86.3	86.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

-----  
DWORKER inactive discouraged worker

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
early retired	.00	781	96.5	96.5	96.5
discouraged	1.00	28	3.5	3.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

-----  
REDOCKS reemployed in docks

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	.00	712	88.0	88.0	88.0
yes	1.00	97	12.0	12.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

COOP coop stevedore

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	.00	758	93.7	93.7	93.7
yes	1.00	51	6.3	6.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

-----

EMPLOY external employ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no	.00	496	61.3	61.3	61.3
yes	1.00	313	38.7	38.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

-----

NOJOB no post-red jobs

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
post-red employment	.00	706	87.3	87.3	87.3
nojobs	1.00	103	12.7	12.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

TRAINEE post-red training

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
no training	.00	704	87.0	87.0	87.0
training	1.00	105	13.0	13.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

-----

CU contin unemployed

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
employment	.00	719	88.9	88.9	88.9
contin unempl	1.00	90	11.1	11.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	809	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 809 Missing cases 0

**The Price of Deregulating Britain's Ports:  
The Socio-Economic Costs of the Dock Labour  
Compensation Scheme**

**Peter Turnbull<sup>\*</sup>, Vicki Wass<sup>\*</sup>  
and Syd Weston<sup>\*\*</sup>**

**July 1993**

**(c) Cardiff Business School**

**\* University of Wales College of Cardiff**

**\*\* University of Sunderland**

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The survey reported here would not have been possible without the co-operation of the many ex-registered dockers who took time to fill out the questionnaire and those who talked to us on the wharves, union offices, dockers' clubs and even their own homes. We are also indebted to the National Secretary of Docks, Waterways & Fishing Group, local officials and lay representatives of the Transport & General Workers' Union who complied membership lists and in many ports handled the administration of the survey.

The research was funded by the Economic & Social Research Council (Grant: R-000-23-3784, Redundancy and Re-Employment in the Docks).

## **Abbreviations**

ABP	Associated British Ports
CPA	Committee of Public Accounts
DLCS	Dock Labour Compensation Scheme
NAPE	National Association of Port Employers
NDLB	National Dock Labour Board
NDLS	National Dock Labour Scheme
MDHC	Mersey Docks & Harbour Company
MEBO	Management Employee Buy-Out
PLA	Port of London Authority
P&O	Peninsular & Oriental
RDW	Registered Dock Worker
SCT	Southampton Container Terminal
T&GWU	Transport & General Workers' Union

## **Key Findings**

- \* According to the government, abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme would lead to the creation of over 4,000 jobs in the ports. Instead, port employment has declined by over 11,000 between 1989 and 1992.
- \* The mass redundancy of around 7,200 ex-registered dockers proved to be nearly five times the number anticipated by the government.
- \* Severance costs to the taxpayer have been £132 million, more than five times the initial estimate made by the government.
- \* For the first time, selective, compulsory redundancy has operated in the docks and has been used by employers to systematically dismiss former trade union activists, older dockers and all medically restricted men.
- \* Over 80 per cent of all redundant dockers felt they had no choice but to accept redundancy.
- \* Those who remain in the industry have witnessed a marked deterioration in terms and conditions of employment, in particular extended hours of work.
- \* Working dockers now face greater risk of injury and accidents as a result of inadequate health and safety provisions.
- \* £27.5 million of taxpayers' money has been paid to dockers who have been re-employed in the industry on the same or similar work, contrary to the assurances of the Department of Transport.
- \* The Dock Labour Compensation Scheme has produced a re-casualisation of the docks and facilitated a wider casualisation and the perpetuation of poverty wages in the surrounding dockland labour market.
- \* Almost one in twenty redundant dockers who have been looking for work have been continuously unemployed, at an estimated annual cost to the taxpayer of over £9 million.
- \* The total cost to the government of the abolition of the Scheme and the financing of the Dock Labour Compensation Scheme is estimated to be £235 million.

# THE PRICE OF DEREGULATING BRITAIN'S PORTS: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE DOCK LABOUR COMPENSATION SCHEME

## **I. Introduction**

In July 1989 the Conservative government led by Mrs Thatcher abolished the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS), originally established in 1947 under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946. Within a week of abolition Britain's port employers had dismissed 1,200 former registered dock workers, some 13 per cent of the total. By way of recompense for the loss of their job, payments of up to £35,000 were available to dock workers with 15 years service under the Dock Labour Compensation Scheme (DLCS), jointly financed (on a 50:50 basis) by the government and the employer. The DLCS was to run for 3 years, although payments fell to £20,000 after 18 months. By July 1992, when the Compensation Scheme expired, around 7,200 former registered dockers had been made redundant, more than two and a half times the maximum number predicted by the National Association of Port Employers (NAPE) and three and a half times the lower estimate made by NAPE (CPA, 1991:5). Moreover, the employers had predicted, and the government reiterated, the *net* creation of over 4,100 new jobs in the ports as a result of increased activity and almost 49,000 new jobs as a result of dockland redevelopment (WEFA, 1988; and Department of Employment, 1989:26). Instead, total employment in the industry fell by over 11,000 (26 per cent) between 1989-92 (Department of Transport, 1992:63).

In July 1991 the Committee of Public Accounts (CPA) considered the effectiveness of the abolition of the NDLS and expressed considerable concern over the costs of the Compensation Scheme (which was way in excess of initial estimates), control over payments (or more precisely inadequate control over payments), and the effectiveness of the Compensation Scheme (simply put, was the money well spent?) (CPA, 1991:v-ix). In particular, the Committee expressed concern about the re-employment of redundant dockers on what appeared to be the same or similar work, the apparent attempt by some employers to avoid their compensation liabilities by going into liquidation (wherein the government paid the full 100 per cent of the severance costs), and the legality of many of these redundancies. The Committee was restricted in its evaluation, however, by the absence of systematic data, and expressed 'surprise that the Department [of Transport] had not previously started to collect the necessary data for a thorough review of the effectiveness of the abolition of the Dock Labour Scheme' (CPA, 1991:vi). Such a review has since been commissioned by the Department of Transport and Employment Department, and as the CPA noted, 'we assume that this review will also seek to quantify the wider economic *benefits* envisaged by the Treasury' (1991:ix, emphasis added).<sup>1</sup> But what about the *costs* of abolition? The one-off

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<sup>1</sup>. This report was completed by early 1993 but had not been published by the Department of Transport by July 1993.

severance costs to the Treasury can be readily calculated, but what about the on-going cost of unemployment and other benefits paid out to the dockers made redundant? And what of the costs to the individual in terms of loss of income, accidents, illness, stress, *inter alia*, both for those made redundant and those still employed in the industry? In sum, what has been the full socio-economic cost of the abolition of the Scheme and the DLCS?

In order to evaluate these wider social costs a survey was undertaken of over 800 dockers during July-August 1992, supplemented by in-depth interviews with both redundant and working dockers in more than ten ports around the country. The survey sought to identify the characteristics of those made redundant, to explore the process of redundancy and the subsequent work and non-work experiences of former registered dockers (both inside and outside the industry) and to evaluate the costs (and not just the benefits) of deregulation. The survey is part of a broader study of deregulation in the ports funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (see Turnbull, 1991 and 1993; and Turnbull and Weston, 1991, 1992 and 1993a, b and c), and clearly has wider implications for policy debates on the deregulation of employment throughout British industry.

The government anticipated that the abolition of the Scheme would lead to a national figure of 15 per cent redundancies, which translated into a net reduction of around 1,500 dockers (with severance payments of £35,000 a man, half of which would be paid by the government, this put the cost of repealing the Scheme at around £25m for the taxpayer) (CPA, 1991:7). Incredibly, the Department of Transport assumed that employers' behaviour under the DLCS, which for the first time allowed compulsory redundancy, would be no different to that under the voluntary severance arrangements of the past (Sir Alan Bailey, Permanent Under Secretary at the Department of Transport, evidence to CPA, 1991:2). However, the difference between the final figure of around 7,200 and the predicted 1,500 redundancies, as we have argued elsewhere (Turnbull and Weston, 1991:22), was not simply attributable to the opportunity afforded to employers to declare compulsory redundancies, but rather *the opportunity presented to employers to fundamentally reorganise the work process*. In the absence of any legal definition of 'dock work', the loading and unloading of cargo in Britain's Scheme ports was no longer exclusively reserved for one category of worker, the registered docker. It was this crucial point that the Department of Transport failed to consider, and it is this which has led to mass redundancy on an unprecedented scale and to a deterioration in working conditions for those still working in the industry. The final cost of severance payments met by the government under the DLCS is estimated to be almost £132 million.

Given the scale of redundancies in the docks since July 1989, it is hardly surprising that the financial costs of the DLCS have already exceeded government estimates, even without any social costs being taken into consideration. The latter have proven to be substantial, not just in financial terms but also the socio-economic impact on the individuals affected. Those who remain in the industry, for example, now work longer hours, are more likely to suffer from accidents, injury or illness, and are far less secure in their jobs than under the NDLS. Over a third of those made redundant are no longer

working, while a significant number have been re-employed in the industry, often on a temporary or casual basis. Casualism is now widespread throughout the ports, throwing into question the central premise behind the abolition of the Scheme, which the government described as,

an obstacle that has now outlived the circumstances of its birth. It is a damaging anachronism at odds with the Government's policies of deregulation and competition that are proving so effective in other areas of the economy. *It is irrelevant for employment conditions and the prospects of workers in Scheme ports. It is no longer needed to deal with the former problem of casual working* (Department of Employment, 1989:32, emphasis added).

Without the Scheme, the government argued that the general legal framework which now applies to employment in Britain would prove 'sufficient on its own to protect the rights of dock workers' (*ibid*:13), but this too must be questioned. For example, the majority of dockers made redundant under the DLCS felt they had been forced to leave the industry, in contrast to all previous redundancies in the industry which had always been arranged on a voluntary basis, and many of these redundancies were subsequently found to have been unfair in a series of Industrial Tribunal cases. But where dockers have sought re-engagement they have been ignored; and where they have sought trade union protection they have been denied.

This report is the first systematic attempt to evaluate the costs of the DLCS. Analysis is focused on both the aggregate costs to the Treasury and the economy as a whole, and the individual or personal costs for dockers both in and out of work. First, however, it is necessary to outline (Section II) the background to the restructuring of the industry by considering previous redundancy arrangements in the industry (as these have always fallen outside national statutory arrangements). Section III then considers the case for repeal of the NDLS (as this implicitly or explicitly states the expected benefits of deregulation), while Section IV assesses the systematic (ab)use of redundancy payments by the employers. This Section illustrates that the DLCS was used principally to defeat the Transport & General Workers' Union (T&GWU) in the 1989 national dock strike, rather than to compensate dockers for the loss of 'job property rights'. As a result, the majority of redundancies under the DLCS were compulsory or 'forced voluntary', as Section V demonstrates. The experience of dockers still working in the industry, invariably under terms and conditions imposed by management after the strike and subsequent reforms to cut costs still further, is the subject of Section VI. The experience of redundant dockers is evaluated in Section VII. Finally, the overall costs of the DLCS are evaluated in the concluding Section.

## **II. Redundancy in the Docks**


In the early 1960s, when the employers and the unions represented in the docks began talks about the possible decasualisation of labour (i.e. a change from a casual to a permanent system of employment), the employers pledged that there would be no redundancies as a result of permanent employment (see Turnbull *et al.*, 1992:47). The Committee of Inquiry established under Lord Devlin to examine the questions of decasualisation and modernisation reiterated this pledge, arguing that 'the economies are not likely to be so severe as to outpace the natural wastage in the industry' (1965:90). The employers' conviction that they would not require manpower reductions in excess of natural wastage, coupled with the problem of calculating length of service with any one employer (as 75 per cent of all dockers were employed on a casual basis under the 1947 Scheme), meant that dockers were one of the few occupational groups excluded from the Redundancy Payments Act 1965.

This oversight on the part of the employers, with hindsight, seems incredible, especially as the potential impact of new technology (in particular containerisation) had not gone unnoticed at the time. Just four months before decasualisation in September 1967, for example, a report for the (then nationalised) British Transport Docks Board forecast a reduction in labour on general cargo operations of some 90 per cent if the traffic was containerised (McKinsey & Co., 1967:68). This has indeed proven to be the case, as Figure 1 illustrates. Employment plummeted from around 60,000 in 1967 to only 32,000 by the end of 1975. By 1980 the total register of dock workers was just 23,000, and by 1989 there were less than 10,000. The first voluntary severance scheme was announced in London (for dockers aged 65-68 years) in October 1967, just one month after decasualisation. Less than two years later the first National Voluntary Severance Scheme was announced, offering maximum payments of £1,500.

### **Figure 1. Employment on the Docks 1947-1989**

register of dock workers was just 23,000, and by 1989 there were less than 10,000. The first voluntary severance scheme was announced in London (for dockers aged 65-68 years) in October 1967, just one month after decasualisation. Less than two years later the first National Voluntary Severance Scheme was announced, offering maximum payments of £1,500.

**Figure 1. Employment on the Docks 1947-1989**



For the employers, the problem was never *how* to reduce the labour force, but how to reduce it *quickly enough*. Under the regulations of the NDLS and the structure of joint control (50:50 representation for employers and unions) on the National and Local Dock Labour Boards, the employers had to obtain agreement from the unions to reduce the registered strength of the labour force. The unions, however, had refused to sanction redundancies on several occasions (see Turnbull *et al.*, 1992:83). The most notable occasion was in 1949, when an attempt by the London Dock Labour Board to dismiss thirty three old and 'ineffective' dockers led to a mass walk-out and the loss of 49,000 working days. Some of the ineffectives were over 70 years old and had attended work on only a handful of occasions, but the dockers demanded doctors for the men, not dismissal. The significance of this dispute was that it proved to be the first and last time that the unions consented to compulsory redundancy on non-disciplinary grounds.

The practice of only voluntary redundancy was formalised in the early 1970s under the Aldington-Jones Agreements of 1972 and 1974. Henceforth, employers could only declare redundancies on a voluntary basis. Under the terms of the 1972 Agreement, if an employer went out of business then any workers who did not want to accept voluntary severance would be re-employed by other operators in the port. This was the source of the dockers' infamous 'job-for-life', although it must be noted that this was an *industrial* and not a statutory agreement, and the notion of a job-for-life was somewhat at odds with the persistent decline of employment in the industry (as illustrated in Figure 1). In fact, voluntary redundancy proved to be a highly effective method of reducing employment, with 2,500 redundancies per annum between 1970-79 and 1,750 per annum between 1980-88. Of greater significance, however, was the decline in natural wastage, from over 4,000 men per annum in the 1960s to only 465 per annum in the 1970s and a meagre 109 per annum between 1980-88. In order to attract volunteers for redundancy, payments were raised from £2,000 in the early 1970s to over £8,000 by the end of the decade. By the early 1980s, redundancy payments had doubled to over £20,000 and by the end of the decade stood at £35,000 for the ports of Liverpool and London, as Table 1 indicates.

**Table 1. Voluntary Severance Payments, 1969-87**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Maximum Payment (£)</u>	<u>Coverage</u>
1969 (June)	1,500	
1972 (March)	2,500	
1975 (February)	5,250	
1977 (March)	7,000	
1978 (November)	8,500	Port of London only
1979 (January)	8,500	
1980 (August)	10,500	
1981 (March to April)	16,000	Maximum supplement of £5,000 in addition to £10,500 paid at Liverpool and London
1981 (September to October)	16,000	National supplement now available in all ports
1982 (April to May)	22,500	National Special Voluntary Severance Scheme (NSVSS)
1982 (June)	16,000	
1983 (March to June)	22,500	NSVSS
1983 (September)	22,500	Liverpool and London only
1984 (June, September, December -85 1984 to March 1985)	22,500	Special National Scheme
1985	25,000	National Employers' Release Arrangement
1986 (September 1986 to June -87 1987)	35,000	Liverpool and London only

Source: National Association of Port Employers

While severance became ever more expensive (and was increasingly financed by the government), the level of surplus labour (i.e. dockers available for work but unemployed and therefore paid attendance and/or fall-back money) increased quite markedly as a result of on-going technological change. Although the number of men surplus to requirements fluctuated markedly from one day to the next, and consequently on a week-by-week and month-by-month basis, the annual surplus labour rate increased significantly from 7 per cent in the 1960s to 9 per cent in the 1970s and 14 per cent in the 1980s. Surplus labour exceeded 10 per cent in every year between 1978-86, and the problem was far worse in particular ports (as much as a third of the workforce in Manchester were surplus in 1981, and over 25 per cent in the Wash ports, Tyne and Wear, several South Coast ports, Bristol and Severn, and the Cumbrian ports). By early 1989 the employers had paid a total of £125m (at current prices) in severance pay to registered dockers, and the government itself had contributed a total of £470m (at current prices) to fund the National Voluntary Severance Scheme and the National Employers' Release Arrangement. A further £350m in financial assistance had been made available to the ports of Liverpool and London over the years to help them through their respective financial crises (Department of Employment, 1989:18). The high cost of

severance, and the persistence of surplus labour, were two of the key arguments made by the employers in their campaign to abolish the NDLS.

### **III. Clear the Decks - The Case for the Abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme**

This was the title of a pamphlet produced in 1988 by David Davis MP, Conservative Member of Parliament for Boothferry and a leading campaigner for the abolition of the Scheme. According to Davis,

Each Scheme port stands as a fossil amidst an economic wasteland of its own creation ... the Scheme encourages practices of unimaginable wastefulness; undermines effective management; destroys discipline; stultifies technological development and by a combination of high costs and low reliability, drives away business. These abuses are paid for directly by the dock's customers, and indirectly by the people living in the hinterlands of the port who cannot find employment. A Scheme designed to enhance efficiency has in fact destroyed competitively; a Scheme designed to guarantee supply of labour, has crippled capacity and created unemployment. Unfortunately, good intentions have created a legislative monster (1988:11).

This passage encapsulates the criticisms of the Scheme made by the National Association of Port Employers (NAPE) in a paper produced in the same year (NAPE, 1988), which was then incorporated almost verbatim the government's own White Paper, *Employment in the Ports: The Dock Labour Scheme* (Department of Employment, 1989). In addition to criticisms arising from the costs of surplus labour and severance payments, six broad issues were identified:

- (1) *Attitudes and Motivation* - the Scheme created 'two classes' of worker in the ports, the registered docker with his 'special privileges' and the rest. This, the employers argued, created envy and resentment on the part of non-registered men and a lack of discipline and motivation on the part of registered dockers. The statutory line of demarcation which protected registered dockers made it 'virtually impossible for a registered employer to instil any sense of community of purpose', a problem compounded by the fact that dockers displayed more loyalty towards the Board than their direct employer. 'Defending the Scheme ranks of higher importance than contributing to the success of his employer's business' (NAPE, 1988:1; and Department of Employment, 1989:2).
- (2) *Discipline and Joint Control* - uncooperative and, as far as some employers were concerned, negative attitudes were bolstered by the system of joint control. Serious offences went unpunished and minor offences became trivialised because the Union was in a position to exercise 'power without responsibility' on both the National and Local Boards (NAPE, 1988:6; and Department of Employment, 1989:14).

- (3) *Employment and Joint Control* - the Scheme deprived the registered employer of the ability to control establishment size, since the Union could veto proposals made by employers to reduce the work force at the Local Board. As a result, voluntary redundancy had become the only effective method to sever labour, but escalating redundancy payments and persistent surplus labour had made this process untenable (NAPE, 1988:2; and Department of Employment, 1989:14-15).
- (4) *Unbalanced and Ageing Workforce* - the net effect of persistent surplus labour and almost continuous voluntary severance schemes had been to prevent the employers shaping their registered work force satisfactorily to reflect the needs of the business. One result of this had been an increase in both the average age and the age profile of the registered work force. This had been particularly marked in the 1980s, with an increase in the average age from 44.4 years in 1980 to 47.1 years in 1988, with the proportion of the workforce below 35 years falling from 17.8 per cent to 6.5 per cent and those over 50 years increasing from 33.5 per cent to 42.5 per cent. In addition, the employers argued, specialist workers had often been released in equal proportion to unskilled dockers. The employers attributed this to the insistence of the Union at the Local Board level that all dockers should be offered voluntary severance, thereby subjugating manpower planning considerations to their own policies and priorities (NAPE, 1988:3; and Department of Employment, 1989:19).
- (5) *Disincentive to Recruitment, Investment, and Dockland Redevelopment* - employers were reluctant *per se* to recruit new labour given that all new entrants would have a 'job for life' and other statutory protections afforded by the Scheme. Employers seeking to recruit for seasonal purposes were also discouraged, as rather than recruit 'new blood' they must first accept workers transferred from other employers with a surplus in the same local area. If employers did recruit externally they were often forced to take dockers' sons or other relatives in preference to 'real outsiders'. Even worse, the employers argued, nepotism perpetuated the 'traditional attitudes and restrictive working arrangements' of the dockers (NAPE, 1988:4; and Department of Employment, 1989:19). The wider effect was to discourage investment and expansion by registered employers, and more importantly to inhibit the redevelopment of dockland areas. Potential investors were dissuaded from setting up businesses within the port area, many of which were in run down inner-city areas where jobs are desperately needed, for fear of entanglement with the Scheme and the prospect of having to employ registered dockers (NAPE, 1988:6; and Department of Employment, 1989:14).
- (6) *Statutory Monopoly on 'Dock Work' and Restrictive Practices* - finally, the reservation of certain types of work for only registered dockers was not only a disincentive to expansion or redevelopment in Britain's ports but also encouraged and protected restrictive work practices designed to defend the dockers' monopoly. The registered

employer was therefore in a 'position of unparalleled weakness: he knows that he cannot sustain his business without the registered dockers, but the registered dockers can and will sustain their employment regardless of his fate' (NAPE, 1988:5). The result was the persistence of so-called 'Spanish practices' such as 'bobbing' and 'welting' (where only half the gang actually works at any given time) and 'standby agreements' or 'ghosting' (where registered dockers were paid to watch non-registered workers perform specialist cargo handling tasks) (NAPE, 1988:5-6; and Department of Employment, 1989:20-1).

Many of these points were challenged by the T&GWU, in particular the effects of severance arrangements in the industry (for a discussion, see Turnbull *et al.*, 1992:100-3). The T&GWU consistently argued that the money spent by the government funding severance schemes over the years would have been better directed at investment in the infrastructure of Britain's ports rather than paying for the run-down of the industry. As for the problem of an unbalanced workforce the Union blamed this on the employers' haphazard redundancy programmes aimed simply at securing the maximum number of volunteers. As the Union argued in its 1984 biennial report, 'the severance of men on an *ad hoc* basis as and when finance becomes available, whether by loan or grant from Government sources, indicates a complete lack of future planning with regard to the manpower requirements of the industry' (T&GWU, 1984:60).

This highlights a more general problem with the process of redundancy in Britain. When the Redundancy Payments Act was introduced in 1965 it was seen as part of a programme to modernise Britain, a lubricant to facilitate the mobility of labour from declining industries to Harold Wilson's 'white hot' technological industries. According to Parker and his colleagues, the Act was 'part of an overall manpower policy aimed at securing a greater acceptance by workers of the need for economic and technological change, and at mitigating the social and economic consequences of such changes for those workers involved' (1971:3). The duality of the Act was therefore explicit from the outset, namely to promote labour mobility and to compensate workers for the loss of 'job property rights'. However, whereas redundancy was a *means* of promoting mobility in a phase of economic and technological 'adjustment' during the 1960s, it was a principal *outcome* of economic recession and rationalisation during the 1980s. As a result, redundancy now tends 'to fall more upon those who, in social terms, suffer most in consequence and who, in economic terms, are least mobile and adaptable' (Daniel, 1985:85; see also Turnbull, 1988:206-10).

In the docks, reform came at the end of a decade in which employment had more than halved, but nobody could have predicted the decimation of employment that was to follow the abolition of the Scheme. Deregulation facilitated the complete restructuring of port operations, expedited by the comprehensive defeat of the T&GWU, and as such proved to be a watershed for the industry. As for the management of redundancy, abolition of the Scheme, for the first time, allowed employers to specifically *select* dockers for *compulsory* redundancy. As significantly, the government had decided to pay

severance to all dockers made redundant 'without any cash limits on these payments' (Sir Alan Bailey, CPA, 1991:4). Mrs Thatcher in fact argued for maximum redundancy payments of £50,000 to ensure take up, as she was reluctant to enter into a prolonged dispute with the dockers. This would suggest that not only were severance payments used to facilitate the restructuring of the industry on the employers terms, but to defeat and ensure the demise of yet another of the 'big battalions' of the union movement. Thus, given that the abolition of the Dock Labour Scheme was decided 'without cost being the primary consideration' (CPA, 1991:vii), redundancy payments have been put to a very different use to that originally intended in 1965.

#### **IV. Striking Out the Scheme**

By the late 1980s the employers were convinced, and had convinced the government, that they could defeat the dockers in the event of a national dock strike in defence of the NDLS. As David Davis MP pointed out in his 1988 pamphlet, a national dock strike would be *incomplete*, since it was unlikely to include all Scheme ports (as had proved to be the case in the 'national' strikes of 1984) and unlikely to cover all Scheme port employees (such as non-registered maintenance workers); *ineffective*, as ports outside the Scheme such as Felixstowe and Dover handled 30 per cent by weight (and 50 per cent by value) of all UK traffic, while supplies of key commodities could be met from stockpiles; *poorly supported*, as many (older) dockers would no doubt opt for severance payments; and ultimately *short-lived*, as many smaller ports would quickly crumble while even the more militant ports such as London, Liverpool, Tees and Hull would only be able to sustain a strike for up to six weeks (Davis, 1988:37-8). If all else failed, noted Davis, redundancy payments could be used to break the strike:

it may be open to the Government and/or the port employers to limit such lucrative terms to those who are at work by a certain date. This method, used to bring the coal strike to an end, would be very effective in 'the all or nothing' strategy that might be followed if there is a national dock strike (*ibid*:40).

Such tactics were used in port after port during the 1989 strike, most notably at the Port of Tilbury where all the shop stewards were among a group of more than one hundred dockers declared compulsory redundant by management (see Turnbull *et al.*, 1992:141-74). The remainder were forced to return to work under new terms and conditions, including an end to union recognition in the port (which management now cite as a 'significant advantage' in the port's promotional material). The experience of the dockers at Tilbury was perhaps extreme, but not uncommon. For example, 19 per cent of former Scheme port employers no longer recognise a trade union for manual grades and even fewer for staff grades (48 per cent) (Turnbull & Weston, 1991:27). The nineteen shop stewards at Tilbury took their case to an Industrial Tribunal, claiming unfair dismissal and unlawful victimisation for union activities. Similar cases have been reported across the length and breadth of the country (in fact, one in twenty of all redundants in our sample had made a claim against their employer for unfair dismissal) (see also Southwood, 1992). It is worth staying with the case of Tilbury, therefore, because this port illustrates in very stark relief many of the issues arising from the deregulation of the industry and the provisions of the DLCS, including the scale and legality of many redundancies, the return of Dickensian forms of employment, the abuse of managerial prerogative, the appropriation of taxpayers' money, and the trauma wrought on dockers' working and non-working lives.

Strategic planning for the abolition of the Dock Labour Scheme began at Tilbury as early as November 1988, if not earlier, and the approximate timing of the government's announcement was well-known. This was revealed in documents produced at the Industrial Tribunal, but could be assumed from the presence of a senior civil servant, Graham Hewitt, who was seconded to the Port of Tilbury from 1 January 1989 (Turnbull *et al.*, 1992: 235-6). In February, Tilbury management considered the options open to them as set out in a paper produced by Peter Farrow, the Personnel Director, which suggested that, in the wake of a strike, management could 'issue a letter stating the new terms under which an individual would be allowed to return to work' (Payne *et al.* v. PLA, 1991:78). This should be done only 'when economic factors are beginning to take effect ... and the men see the prospects of a "miners" style defeat facing them' (*ibid*:79). The new conditions would be 'imposed' and not negotiated, and an ultimatum would be issued to:

include a specified date for a return to work. Those who attend by that date are deemed to have accepted the terms and anyone who does not attend is deemed to have ended his employment (*ibid*:80).

As part of this strategy, a further possibility noted by Tilbury management was that:

we should not accept everyone back. Assuming that the repeal legislation allowed us the option, *we would presumably like to exclude shop stewards and all medically restricted men* (*ibid*:81, emphasis added).

As the Industrial Tribunal later concluded, what management envisaged 'was a purge of all shop stewards at Tilbury to ensure that in the future there would be no organised resistance to the new regime' (*ibid*:128).

The new regime was to include, among other things, total flexibility, compulsory overtime, working 'any five days in seven', and what management call a 'shift buy-back system', which means that if an employee is rostered for work but none is available then the worker is sent home but still 'owes' the company half a shift (put differently, the employee is only paid for half a shift). The port was initially reorganised into six separate operating companies, each with its own Staff Consultative Council operating on a quality circle basis, with teamworking replacing the old gang working system. This is an attempt to substitute, or more accurately suppress, union organisation. As one docker complained, 'information only goes one way - down. Communication comes down from management but nothing goes back up through the Councils' (interview notes). Despite, or possibly because of this, more employees at Tilbury learn about what the port is doing through the grapevine than through management (according to a survey of the workforce undertaken by New Bridge Street Consultants). The T&GWU has tried to regain recognition and even organised a ballot in which, on a 70 per cent turnout, 99 per cent voted in favour of recognition. But management continue to exclude the Union and under current employment law the T&GWU has no statutory remedy. Those dockers who remain in employment at the port are strongly discouraged from

any union involvement or activity. As one worker put it, attending a union branch meeting 'feels like being one of the early Christians', intimating that such meetings are now subject to secrecy and carry the prospect of persecution (interview notes).

Commenting on trade union influence in the port, one docker suggested that 'the circle really has turned 360 degrees' (interview notes). One of the most striking findings of a previous survey in the industry was just how limited are the remaining rights to collective bargaining in the former Scheme ports (Southwood, 1992:40). The demise of union influence is perhaps best illustrated in the case of dismissal, which under the Scheme was regulated jointly by the Union but is now at the complete discretion of management. Even a reinstatement recommendation issued by the Industrial Tribunal for twelve of the Tilbury shop stewards, coming over two years after their dismissal, went unheeded.<sup>2</sup> Following an appeal against the decision by the Port of London Authority (PLA), one of the sacked shop stewards commented that 'most industrial disputes have an end, but not the 1989 national dock strike. At present [June 1992] we can see no end in sight' (interview notes). Management was ordered to pay 40 per cent of the Union's costs (which amounted to over £1 million) as 40 per cent of the management's case was deemed to be 'trivial and vexatious', with neither the managing director nor the personnel manager having been truthful in their evidence to the Tribunal (Payne *et al.* v. PLA, 1991:11). The employer's legal costs (estimated to be well over £3m) were met by the Port of London Authority rather than Tilbury management, despite the fact that the Port of Tilbury, a separate operating division of the PLA, was clearly the responsible party (the direct cost to the taxpayer of what was the longest ever Industrial Tribunal was estimated to be £376,000) (*Lloyd's List*, 16 July 1992). While the Industrial Tribunal ran its torpid course towards what was an inevitable, but ultimately unsatisfactory conclusion (as it does not have the power to enforce reinstatement), the very same managers who unfairly dismissed the shop stewards and lied to the Tribunal were allowed to buy the port under the government's trust port privatisation programme. Furthermore, the PLA reported a £20.7m loss on the sale.

Despite all the 'undesirable', and 'unfit', dockers having been weeded out by management, further redundancies followed the return to work, including many dockers who found the new terms and conditions unacceptable (in particular the requirement to work overtime) and those 'whose continued employment would be inconsistent with a flourishing Staff Consultative system' (John McNab, Chief Executive, paper to the Tilbury Management Board, October 1989, reported in Payne *et al.* v. PLA, 1991:180). For those made redundant, the payment of £35,000 was insufficient compensation for the loss of their livelihood. Indeed, for many dockers, working in the docks was more than 'just a job':

It's not a question of money. I'd worked in the docks since I was 21. It's all about comradeship, being involved, having mates. Redundancy cuts you off from all this, makes you isolated (interview notes).

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<sup>2</sup> Seven of the shop stewards were awarded almost £34,000 each in compensation. Following this award the PLA made out of court settlements to the many other union activists who had been unfairly dismissed, with payments ranging from £8,500 to £33,000. These payments, in total, cost the PLA over £1,028,000

This is a particular problem for dockers, as 'nobody lives around the docks any more, everybody is dispersed. There's no community to go back to, not like the mines. Work was everything' (interview notes). As another ex-docker interjected, 'the only time I see my mates now is in the dole office' (interview notes).

Not surprisingly, many of these men have found it difficult to find alternative employment, a problem many attributed to high levels of unemployment, their age, the stigma of being a docker, or a combination of all three. Of the shop stewards unfairly dismissed by management only three have found alternative employment (with an undertaker, the electricity board and social services), in each case as a result of contacts with family or friends. As one shop steward explained, 'You apply for jobs, but as soon as they find out you were a docker they don't want to know. If you were union activists like us, you've got no chance. We're all on the Economic League blacklist anyway' (interview notes). Despite being dismissed, however, some dockers found their way back into the industry, but only on a casual or temporary basis. Some had worked for BLM, an agency set up by three ex-superintendents (Brian, Len and Mick) to supply casual labour to operators along the Thames. With extensive contacts among the ex-registered dockers, this agency is well placed to supply labour at very short notice. As one docker pointed out,

In the Thames area the employers are running a mini-scheme, using all the ex-registered lads thrown out of the industry since 1989. But they no longer pay a levy or comply to any regulations. All the men get is an hourly rate when they go to work, nothing else (interview notes).

This situation was likened by many ex-registered dockers and Union officials to the days before the 1947 Scheme or even the Second World War. Under the new conditions,

Men are no longer outside the dock gate, waiting for a brass tally or a tap on the shoulder from a foreman, they're at the end of the phone, waiting for it to ring. It's no different - you just can't see it any more (interview notes).

It seemed that all ex-registered dockers, then, whether employed or unemployed, were in some way disillusioned or disaffected with the effects of deregulation in Britain's docks. Those still working in the ports had invariably been forced back on terms and conditions dictated by management (under the threat of dismissal and the loss of all entitlement to severance pay). Those made redundant expressed feelings of loss and experienced considerable difficulty finding re-employment. For many, casual employment in the docks was the only option available to them, which contravened both their own principles and the promises of the employers and the government prior to the abolition of the Scheme that there would be no return to casualism. Our survey results illustrate quite unequivocally the negative effects, and socio-economic

costs, of deregulation on both the remaining and redundant ex-registered dockers. These two groups are analysed in turn, but first the management of redundancy in the docks is assessed.

## **V. Compulsory or Voluntary? The Management of Redundancies**

The notion of 'voluntary' redundancy, or the idea of workers 'accepting' severance offers, suggests that employees have made a positive choice to leave their employment. This was certainly the impression given in the docks, where payments of up to £35,000 were available and there appeared to be a stampede to take the money (at several ports, including Aberdeen, Ardrossan, Ayr, Barrow, Dundee, Falmouth, Great Yarmouth, Hartlepool, Hunterston, Par, and Sunderland there was a 100 per cent redundancy almost as soon as the Scheme was abolished). Registered dockers, it seemed, had escaped the 'real world' of deregulation where they would no longer be able to 'bob', 'welt' or 'ghost'. In reality, however, the redundancy scheme contained elements of compulsion even where dockers had selected themselves for redundancy. The provisions for redundancy in Britain under the Redundancy Payments Act (1965), the Employment Protection Act (1975), the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act (1978), and the considerable body of case law that has accumulated over the years, effectively allows for *selective dismissal* of those employees management define as either 'ineffective' or whose skills, capabilities or even personal characteristics are no longer compatible with new working practices, new technology, or new market opportunities (see Turnbull, 1988:210). This can even apply under so-called 'voluntary' redundancy programmes, where payments can be restricted to target groups or job classifications and where management invariably retain the right to refuse an application. Thus, even where employees select themselves for redundancy, 'there are often elements which make them less than wholly voluntary' (Daniel and Stilgoe, 1978:18). The simple dichotomy of 'voluntary' or 'compulsory' redundancy must therefore be replaced by the concept of a *redundancy continuum* (Turnbull, 1988:207).

In the docks, there was evidence of compulsory redundancy (management selected), voluntary redundancy (worker selected), and 'forced voluntary' redundancy (worker selected under pressure from management). Nearly three-quarters of the sample (both those actually made redundant and those still working in the ports) perceived the redundancy programme to be either compulsory or 'forced voluntary'. Of those declared redundant, 81 per cent had felt 'obliged' to take redundancy. Many had no choice (a third were compulsory redundant), such as the South Wales docker who declared, 'We didn't want redundancy, we just wanted our jobs' (interview notes). At some ports, 'voluntary' redundancies were, for all intents and purposes, compulsory. At Cardiff, for example, the dockers received a letter on 3 July 1989 (the date of abolition) informing them that redundancies would be necessary and inviting men to take the £35,000. This was followed by a letter dated 6 July 1989 from the port manager giving formal notice of redundancy. It read:

With further reference to my letter dated 3rd July 1989, I can now confirm that in accordance with the Dock Work (Compensation Payments Scheme) Regulations 1989, it has been decided to significantly reduce the strength of the former register. In order to comply with the above, it is necessary for me to give you formal notice of redundancy

from 7th July 1989. In accordance with the provisions of the Scheme, you are also entitled to an appropriate payment in lieu of notice.

Associated British Ports (ABP), the owners of the port, described this letter as a 'legal instrument' to inform those who wanted to take redundancy payments, but the dockers at Cardiff were *not* informed of their legal rights and were given no advice *not* to take redundancy. A T&GWU spokesperson in Cardiff claimed at the time to be 'stunned'. The letter gives no explanation, but as I understand it the men no longer have jobs' (*Western Mail*, 8 July 1989). The situation was later summed up by Chris Ackerman, one of the port's registered dockers:

The bosses told us we could leave today and get a redundancy payment or get sacked tomorrow. They held a gun to our head and pulled the trigger ... I just can't believe they've done it. They've just wiped us out in one fell swoop (*Cardiff Gem*, 15 July 1989).

All but two of the port's 160 dockers took severance, even though only seventy redundancies were required.<sup>3</sup> At a subsequent Industrial Tribunal it was found that the letter of 6 July amounted to compulsory dismissal, and those who signed on or after this date were awarded compensation in an out of court settlement. As one of the dockers later reflected, 'I suppose you could say I had a choice, but it was Hobson's choice' (interview notes).

Many dockers were offered a 'choice' of remaining in work on new terms and conditions or redundancy, but invariably felt unable to accept, or in many cases unable to fulfil the new terms and conditions on offer. As a manager at Glasgow acknowledged, 'at the time, the dockers couldn't stomach the changes proposed at the end of the strike, so they took the money' (interview notes). This view was echoed by many dockers at ports around the country:

Twelve months earlier men had been offered £35,000 and didn't take it. It was the conditions on offer after the strike, not the money, that made all the difference (Liverpool docker, interview notes).

If we'd been given a proper choice I'd have stayed. I saw my future in the industry till I was 60, then I'd go out on a good pension (Hull docker, interview notes).

The majority who took the money didn't want to take it. Nobody had any plans to leave the industry. Once you got a job on the docks, that was it, you were there for the duration, until you retired (Bristol docker, interview notes).

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<sup>3</sup>. One of those who remained was on sick and would receive a larger payment if he stayed.

Everybody felt that those left till last would be hit the hardest, so we all got out (Bristol docker, interview notes).

The amount of money was irrelevant really. For me it didn't matter if it was £10,000, £20,000 or £30,000. The choice was something or nothing, because there was nothing for me in the docks after the strike (Tees docker, interview notes).

You could eat humble pie if the agreement hadn't been too bad. We were prepared to do that. But when we looked at the agreement, we just couldn't do it. There was no way I could keep my nose clean working under an agreement like that (Tees docker, interview notes).

Arguably, the erosion of trade union influence in Britain's ports has been of equal, if not greater significance in the restructuring of the industry than the abolition of NDLS. (see Turnbull, 1993; and Turnbull and Weston, 1991 and 1993a and c). With the dockers out on strike and generous redundancy terms on offer, dockers were forced back to work on terms *imposed* by management, rather than jointly negotiated between the parties. As a result of the redundancy selection process, union activists (defined as those holding a union position such as shop steward) were over-represented among those who lost their jobs (and were 14 per cent more likely to be declared compulsory redundant). Put differently, the risk of losing one's job was much higher for a trade union activist than other dockers. In our survey, 20 per cent of all redundants had previously held a union position at some time when employed as a registered docker under the NDLS, compared with 6 per cent of those who remained following the repeal of the Scheme. More than other dockers, union activists found it difficult, if not impossible, to accept the new terms imposed by management (invariably as a matter of principle or pride, if not both). But they were also more likely to be *selected* for redundancy. At one port, dockers who wanted to take voluntary severance had to inform the personnel officer, but then wait two weeks for confirmation (in order to allow management time to make their selection). One shop steward described how he too was informed that he would have to wait, but the personnel manager made a phone call as he left the office. 'Before I reached the bottom of the stairs the personnel manager opened his door and shouted, "Wait! The man from Del Monte says YES!"' (interview notes). Although similar numbers of union activists and other dockers have pursued legal action as a result of their redundancy, union activists were more likely to have claimed unfair dismissal.

The other characteristics of those made redundant under the DLCS was their generally poor health, their older age, and their longer service in the industry. As one personnel manager at a major North East port put it, the company's policy was to dismiss all the 'glass backs ... we selected all the "can't works", the "won't works", and all those who rode on the industry' (interview notes). By this he meant all the sick, injured, disabled or medically restricted men, and all the older workers. It was traditional practice among dock gangs to 'carry' older workers, allocating work among the gang to give older men the easier jobs. Tally clerks in particular were likely to be older or medically restricted men. But these 'dockers with

pencils', as many managers derided them, were simply 'riding on the industry' (interview notes). Of those made redundant, 14 per cent reported poor (below average) health, compared to only 2 per cent of those who remained in the industry. If we look at these figures in a different way, we find that while 12 per cent of the sample had below average health, 96 per cent of this group had been made redundant. At Tilbury, all the (medically restricted) 'B' men were declared compulsory redundant, as was the case in many other ports. As a Bristol docker put it, 'Anybody with a limp was on their way' (interview notes).

A similar pattern emerges with age. The average age of those made redundant was 52 years, compared to an average age of 48 years for those who remain in employment. While these figures do not appear to be too dissimilar, the age distribution of redundants and remainers is (statistically) significantly different (41 per cent of redundants were aged 55 years or over compared to only 19 per cent of remaining dockers). A docker from Greenock summed up the situation:

You have to look at two figures - £35,000 on the one hand and 50 years old on the other. Put these together and men are almost obliged to go, especially when you look at the new conditions which were totally unacceptable to most dockers. For the older men they were bloody impossible (interview notes).

This view was confirmed by a Southampton docker who pointed out that 'its a young man's game now' (interview notes). Closely related to the question of age was that of length of service. Again, the differences in average length of service between redundants and remainers is marginal, but the distributions are significantly different (over 48 per cent of redundants had 25 years or more service compared to 39 per cent for remainers). Surprisingly, 16 per cent of redundants had less than 15 years service and therefore did not qualify for the maximum redundancy payment. Of this group, over 92 per cent said they felt obliged to take redundancy, either because redundancy was in fact compulsory or the new conditions on offer were unacceptable. Of greater import, perhaps, was the over-representation of union activists among dockers with less than 15 years service.

From these data it follows that those who remain in the industry are more likely to be younger, fitter, and less inclined towards union activism. For those who had a choice (and 18 per cent were not offered the choice of redundancy), their reasons for staying were as much negative as positive. Half remained because they liked dock work, as a Southampton docker made clear: 'I like what I'm doing, I still like the job. I just don't like the hours I'm doing it!' (interview notes). This view was echoed by a South Wales docker who suggested that, 'They'd have to drag me off the docks screaming and kicking. Its a way of life being a docker - you don't give it up easily' (interview notes). But the other half stayed on because job prospects outside the industry were (rightly) believed to be poor. As a docker at Bristol elaborated,

The men who stayed are really glad they did. There's nothing for them outside the docks. If I said they went to church every Sunday to light a candle, you'd get some idea about how glad they are that they stayed. The lads I know who've taken the money all say the same thing - 'Don't leave the docks' (interview notes).

Among the dockers at Liverpool there were other considerations as well. Faced with the choice of signing a new contract or accepting £35,000 severance, one docker described how he made his choice:

In this short space of time I had to make my mind up, whether to sign the contract or accept £35,000. Standing inside that office a number of thoughts passed through my mind. If I signed the contract I would be allowing the Mersey Docks & Harbour Company to disregard my human dignity - without any form of discussion or negotiation they had the power to impose their will upon me. For a few seconds I felt dispirited, but then I remembered all the previous struggles which I had participated in, particularly the last one which was vividly passing through my mind. By accepting £35,000 I would be conceding defeat to these scoundrels. I signed the contract and walked out, back to the Control [the old hiring hall]. Looking around the Control at all the former registered dockers, I realised the true meaning of comradeship. It gave me personal satisfaction to say that we are all brothers. All of these men, under the same obnoxious conditions as myself, had signed contracts (transcript from Liverpool docker).

## **VI. Staying the Course - Working in the Deregulated Docks**

The experience of working dockers since July 1989, for the vast majority, has been largely negative. At Tilbury, one docker complained that, 'No matter how cleverly the changes may be disguised or dressed up, they all amount to cost cutting, attacking the pay and conditions of the workers' (interview notes). The port of Sheerness is a similar case in point. With the port in private hands following a Management Employee Buy-Out (MEBO) in March 1992, new contracts were put to the workforce in November 1992 as a result of 'unprecedented price competition' (*Lloyd's List*, 25 November 1992). When the port was sold, one of the stated objectives of Medway Ports Ltd, the MEBO, was to protect 'current terms and conditions of existing employees and the honouring of existing service contracts and pension arrangements', but under the new contracts former registered dockers, now shareholders, stood to lose £2,000 per annum. Consequently, they decided to hold a ballot on industrial action. The now familiar pattern of events unfolded: management threatened that if the dockers went on strike they would declare themselves 'voluntarily redundant'; in December 1992, 250 dockers duly made themselves redundant; management recruited new labour to replace the dockers; and those made redundant are now called upon as casual workers during periods of peak demand. The Chief Executive of Medway Ports Ltd, Peter Vincent, denied this was a return to the 'bad old days', suggesting that, 'It is all very professional now. It is not a question of standing at the gate and picking up the

men. They are employed by contract agencies' (*Lloyd's List*, 19 February 1993). The language of the 'new casualism' may be different, but the terms of employment are not too dissimilar from pre-1967 if not pre-1947.

With the introduction of more flexible working patterns, an extended range of tasks and responsibilities, reduced manning and the like (see Turnbull and Weston, 1991), and as a result of longer hours, a lack of job security, and an erosion of safety standards at work, all compounded by the decline of trade union influence, many dockers who remain in the industry have experienced an intensification of work and work related stress. This can be illustrated by the experience of dockers at Southampton Container Terminal (SCT) (which is jointly owned by ABP and P&O), where the men work 12 hour shifts to provide a 24 hour service. Under the Scheme, four teams worked a shift pattern of two days, two nights, four off, with a workforce of around 400. Following abolition the workforce was cut back to less than 300 working in three teams (and moving more container boxes) on a new rota of two days, two nights, two off. As a result,

The job is definitely more stressful now. We work longer hours, we go to work more often, and we spend longer periods driving than we used to. Your only contact is through a radio, and you're 80 feet up in the air. Its a very stressful job, especially when you do it for 8 hours solid. Management are getting their pound of flesh alright (interview notes).

Dockers have always chased the hook, that's the nature of the work. Its hard work. But nowadays its different. You definitely need a younger man, we're driving at such a rate (interview notes).

The work rota was proving to be particularly onerous, as several dockers complained:

I suffer from shift lag. You don't get over the work periods anymore. I go home and fall asleep in the arm chair at 8 o'clock - I've never done that before. On my days off I spend the first day catching up on sleep, so I only have one day off, and then you've got jobs to do. Then I'm back in work. I'm getting old very quickly in this job (interview notes).

After a day's work you go home bloody shattered. We all suffer from on-going fatigue - you just don't get a chance to recover (interview notes).

One result of work related stress and fatigue has been a marked increase in accidents and illness among dock workers, which is a problem not just confined to Southampton. At Tees, dockers on general cargo claim 'to be like zombies at times. We can double [work two consecutive shifts] for weeks, seven days a week, then we have nothing for days. It can

be very dangerous working on steel when you're tired, and the hours play havoc with your system' (interview notes). National data on accidents and illness are no longer available for the industry, but across ABP ports as a whole the accident rate (measured per 1,000 employees) increased by almost 33 per cent between 1989-91 and is now double the rate of the early 1980s. At Hull, another ABP port, accidents almost doubled between 1989-90, and an accident in May 1992 involving flasks of uranium hexafluoride led to a full scale 'nuclear alert' (Topham, 1992). A docker who subsequently refused to handle this cargo, after the emergency services had declared the 'all clear', was summarily dismissed.

Competition among container ports is particularly intense at present with the recent entry of Thamesport (Isle of Grain) into the market fanning the flames created by abolition of the Scheme. It was the possible switch of Hapag-Lloyd from Southampton to Thamesport that sparked the latest proposals for cost reduction at SCT in an attempt to save a further £4 million per annum (to offset the 25 per cent reduction offered to Hapag-Lloyd to retain the business). Management want a further reduction in manning (to either 216 or 162), 'hot seat handovers' on machinery (e.g. cranes and straddle carriers), a wage freeze until December 1994, a cut in holidays, the end of set meal breaks, the sub-contracting of gatehouse jobs, container lashing and some driving jobs, and the introduction of a 'core and pool' system whereby pool men will phone in at 6am to confirm orders for the day shift (7.30am to 7.30pm) and at 5pm for the night shift (7.30pm to 7.30am). Around a third of the workforce are now likely to establish a labour agency (or co-operative, possibly with Southampton Cargo Handling) to supply labour to SCT. These are more likely to be the older men (over 50 years) who will be able to take severance payments of up to £40,000 and draw their pension from the registered dock workers' pension fund (arguably, only older men can afford to accept severance as wages with the agency/co-operative will be much lower). One docker at the port complained that, with the latest changes, 'we're industrially punch drunk' (interview notes), while another added that, 'For the first time in my life I wish I was over fifty so I could take the money' (interview notes). If the men refuse the new terms the threat, as usual, is instant dismissal, and there is an employment agency, Drake International, ready and waiting to supply labour. One of the conditions for receiving training by Drake, some of which has been done at Tilbury (where ABP and P&O also have an interest), is that recruits must be prepared to cross picket lines. Between forty and eighty workers are 'standing by' (on a retainer of £175 per week) if the current negotiations at SCT fail or the dockers go on strike.

Table 2 compares the experience of work of registered dockers who remain in the industry pre- and post-abolition of the Dock Labour Scheme, confirming the reports from Tilbury, Sheerness, Southampton, Tees and Hull. Hours of work in the industry, for example, are now longer than considered appropriate by employers in 1920 in their evidence to the Shaw Inquiry (see Topham, 1992:21-2). Ten hour shifts, with the possibility of (compulsory) overtime, are not uncommon, as at Limbs in Hull where a core workforce of thirty five are supplemented by up to 120 contract (casual) workers. Other dockers in the port of Hull regularly work from 8am to 9pm, and 20 hour shifts have been recorded. Clearly, such extended working hours would not have been permitted by the Union in the days of the NDLS. It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that 82 per cent of those who remain in the industry consider union influence to have deteriorated since 1989. As a docker from one of

the Wash ports argued, 'The Union needs a register of dockers to be able to contact, convince and then mobilise the men. At present the Union couldn't mobilise action in this port or any other' (interview notes). Also related to the decline of union influence is concern over health and safety, as under the Health and Safety Act only trade union appointed members sit on health and safety committees. *Ipsa facto*, health and safety committees no longer exist in many ports (for a discussion see Topham, 1992).

**Table 2. Comparison of Employment Conditions Before and After Abolition for Remaining Dockers**

	<u>Improved</u>	<u>Unchanged</u>	<u>Deteriorated</u>
wages	35.7	27.0	37.3
hours	0.8	13.9	85.3
job security	4.5	20.5	70.5
pension	31.0	62.8	6.3
union influence	0.6	17.2	82.2
training provision	17.5	56.6	25.9
safety standards	9.6	36.9	53.5

Number of remaining dockers = 171

Given that there is over-capacity of port facilities in the UK and 'price stupid competition' (Derek Harrington, Managing Director of Felixstowe, *Lloyd's List*, 21 October, 1992), this has created considerable uncertainty for remaining dockers. Competition, for dockers, translates into anxiety about losing their job, feeling unsettled in their work, frustrated and discontented, as reported in Table 3. In turn, this has caused stress on family relationships. As one docker complained, 'My social life has gone out of the window, it's non-existent. Everybody's too tired for any social life' (interview notes). Another added that his wife now constantly 'nags me to take the money. She says she can't stand me working down the docks any more' (interview notes).

**Table 3. Impact of Abolition on the Personal Life of Remaining Dockers**

<u>Experience</u>	<u>% of remaining dockers</u>
financial hardship	10.4
anxiety about money	17.2
anxiety about work	47.4
feel unsettled	58.7
isolation	16.4
depression	22.4
despondency	42.2
discontentment	40.2
frustration	42.2
stress on family relationships	32.8

N=171

The data reported in Tables 2 and 3 indicate quite clearly that working dockers are the primary victims of a vicious cost-cutting spiral that now characterises cargo operations and employment relations in Britain's ports. Deregulation has greatly intensified competition in the industry and focused the attention of both port operators and shipping companies on the cost of cargo handling operations. As labour constitutes by far the largest single component of operating costs (typically 60-70 per cent, even on container operations), it is unsurprising that employers have intensified the work process and that, as a result, dockers' experience of the changes in work practices has been extensively negative. Even before the current proposals for further redundancies and reorganisation at SCT were announced, for example, dockers claimed that 'if they offered redundancy now [September 1992] a lot of men would take it' (interview notes). The reaction of many dockers to the new contracts, according to one shop steward, is 'sack me, I'm the laziest!' (interview notes). It would appear, then, that on the basis of the evidence presented thus far it was a 'great escape' for those made redundant under the DLCS. However, the experience of certain groups of redundant dockers suggests otherwise.

### **VII. The Great Escape? The Experience of Redundant Dockers In and Out of Work**

Among the ex-registered dockers made redundant under the DLCS, a distinction can be made between 'inactives' and 'actives'. The former are no longer seeking work in the labour market, while the latter are actively looking for a job.

However, the distinction between the two groups is not always clear cut. Many of the dockers classified as inactive in our sample, for example, are still below the retirement age, and would look for work if job prospects improved. It proved difficult to distinguish these 'discouraged workers' from the genuinely inactive (who we categorised as all those who reported either retirement or sickness as the reason they became redundant and who had not actively sought work on a regular basis since being made redundant). In all, 23 per cent of all redundants were inactive, of whom 18 per cent had initially sought alternative employment before deciding to 'retire'. This, then, is a lower limit of the 'discouraged worker effect', although the true total may well be significantly higher.

Not surprisingly, the 'inactives' tend to be older dockers: 75 per cent were aged 55 years or over. Again in line with expectations, the current health of the inactives was generally poor (45 per cent claimed to be in poor health), and the majority (70 per cent) attributed their poor health to having worked in the docks. Around 45 per cent of the inactives in fact decided to retire early because of ill-health, although not all had 'volunteered' for redundancy (60 per cent of all inactives believed their redundancy to be 'forced' or compulsory). Many dockers were able to 'retire' early under clause 7.2(b) of the registered dockers pension fund, which allows retirement between the age of 50-55 years on a reduced pension. In April 1991, the employers agreed to enhance the value of pension contributions made before 1978 which made 'early retirement' a more attractive option (especially as severance payments fell to £20,000 in January 1991). The survey results suggest that if anybody made the 'great escape' from the docks following deregulation, it was the inactives who used their redundancy compensation to retire early, although many still miss the job. A former clerk at Hull dismissed with all the other Hull dockers in August 1990 summed up his situation:

I'm all right financially, with the redundancy pay and my pension. I'm 61 years old now, so I'm on a good pension. I've paid off the mortgage, and I saved money when I worked in the docks - bought myself a cottage in Guernsey which I use for holidays and I rent it out for the rest of the year. So I suppose I'm all right, really. All my mates said it was about time I retired, but I still miss the job (interview notes).

Another docker (aged 59) interjected: 'It's not much fun being a "pensioner" - you can't live on memories' (interview notes). On the whole, dockers who had 'retired' were less likely than other redundants to report financial hardship, discontentment, despondency, feeling unsettled or frustration. Moreover, they were more likely to take up new interests and enjoy their leisure time more. In common with most other dockers, however, they expressed comparable feelings of loneliness, boredom, and a sense of loss without the social life of work in the docks.

It is a common experience among manual workers previously employed in 'traditional' industries such as coal (Wass, 1988) and steel (Harris, 1988; and Walker *et al.*, 1984) to miss the job following redundancy. The only previous

study of redundant dockers reported similar findings, concluding that 'numbers of people and amounts of money are not everything. To people who have given 30 or 40 years to the industry, the docks is not a job, but for many it is their whole life' (West, 1974:39). Or rather, for dockers made redundant in both the early 1970s and late 1980s and early 1990s, the dock *was* their whole life. West (1974:39) quotes dockers who 'would go back tomorrow if I could', or who are 'crying [their] eyes out for giving up the greatest game in the world'. Among redundant dockers we talked to, many expressed regrets about leaving the industry:

I didn't want to leave, and I wish now I hadn't taken the money. I miss the job, I miss my mates (interview notes).

It was a good life, working in the docks. I'm too young to retire, but I'm too old to get a job outside the industry. Looking back, I shouldn't have taken redundancy (interview notes).

The difference in the 1990s, however, is that any regrets about leaving the industry are usually tempered with misgivings about going back to the docks in the present climate, as a Tees docker elaborated:

Nobody wanted to leave, but when you look at what's going on now, most of us are glad we took the money. Most ex-dockers I see all say the same thing - 'I'm glad I'm not in there!' It's not the same anymore (interview notes).

Despite being made redundant, a great many dockers have found their way back into the industry, either working for their old employer, their old employer operating under a different name, or even working for their own company. Some are employed on a full-time basis, but a great many are now employed on a casual or temporary basis. This raises a number of issues, most notably the government's contention that an employment or registration scheme is no longer necessary to prevent casualisation. Our data suggest otherwise. In addition, questions must be asked about the legality of many redundancies, either where the employer has (legally) disappeared through liquidation only to reappear (operationally) like a phoenix from the ashes, or where the *worker*, rather than the *job*, has been made redundant and a new worker, or even the redundant worker, has resumed the job under a different contract. In the former instance it is widely recognised that many of the new companies that have emerged since July 1989 'boast a new name but suspiciously similar management teams' (*Port Development International*, September 1989). Over 1,000 dockers have been made redundant through insolvency cases, at a cost of almost £32 million to the taxpayer, and only £350,000 has been recovered from the assets of these companies (CPA, 1991:10 and 15). The Department of Transport has checked each and every case and assured the Committee of Public Accounts that they were genuine insolvencies. But this has not prevented the managers involved setting up new companies, or even buying trust ports under the government's privatisation programme (as was the case at Tees and Hartlepool).

Whether redundancies are genuine or not is more difficult to substantiate, as all that is required is that the work is 'substantially different' from that previously undertaken by registered dockers. This is certainly debatable, as most of the changes to working practices since the abolition of the Scheme involve multi-*task* rather than multi-*skilled* work (see Turnbull & Weston, 1991 and 1993c), and there was nothing in the Scheme that prevented dockers sweeping up or cleaning equipment. Given that the Department of Transport had failed to ask the dockers or their replacements what work they were undertaking, and instead relied on information from the employers (CPA, 1991:10-11), it is hardly surprising that the Department could not verify whether, or how many, redundancies under the DLCS were in fact genuine. Nor could the Department say how many ex-registered dockers had been re-employed in the industry. Our data allow such an assessment.

Of the active dockers among the redundants in 29 per cent had been re-employed in the ports. If this figure is scaled up to the national level, then of the 7,200 dockers made redundant under the DLCS between July 1989 and July 1992, over 1,500 have been re-employed in the industry (this figure is consistent with that calculated from an earlier survey of port employers undertaken by two of the authors) (Turnbull and Weston, 1991:25). In other words, in the region of £27.5 million of taxpayers' money has been used to sack registered dockers, only for them to be re-employed in the industry. This has already raised concern with the Committee of Public Accounts, which concluded that,

We believe that Parliament when approving the [Dock Labour Compensation] scheme did not envisage that dockers paid off under the compensation arrangements could then be re-employed by other operators on the same or similar work (CPA, 1991:viii).

This again illustrates a total misunderstanding of the nature and workings of the dockland labour market and a certain naïvety with respect to the assumed behaviour of port employers.

Over half of the actives (53 per cent) who were re-employed in the ports now work for their own company, usually in some form of worker co-operative. In a study of five co-operatives at the ports of Barry, Greenock, Newport, Southampton and Tees, which between them employ over 350 registered dockers, it was found that the new companies were generally set-up at the behest of management, or more precisely the port authority. Basically, an employment contract was replaced by a commercial contract, such that

a principal characteristic of the waterfront co-operatives has been an attempt by management to sustain, or in some instances to regain, control over the labour process. In effect, inadequate *labour* control has been replaced by a (more effective) system of *commercial* control (Turnbull and Weston, 1993a:117).

Put differently, co-operatives are acceptable to the port authority because they enhance the commercial viability and market position of the port owners, and in some cases give them greater control over the labour process (since the loss of a commercial contract is a very potent threat to hold over the subcontractor/co-operative). Thus, dock worker co-operatives owe more to the problems of labour control than to the promotion of worker autonomy or industrial democracy (*ibid*:131). Given that the dockers now exercise some control over their *immediate* work (the loading and unloading of cargo), they may well perform a wider range of tasks (at Barry, for example, former registered dockers also undertake routine maintenance work). But the majority of dockers in these worker co-operatives are simply performing their previous job under new contractual arrangements, which is clearly contrary to the assurances made by the Department of Transport that redundant dockers have not been re-employed on the same work.

All the dockers re-employed in a co-operative in our survey were still members of the T&GWU, but not all those re-employed in the ports having been made redundant are union members. However, those re-employed in the ports were much more likely to be union members (92 per cent belong to a union) than other redundant actives (60 per cent of whom had retained their union membership). Of greater significance was the fact that of those who were re-employed in the ports, 26 per cent had held a trade union position (compared with 20 per cent who did not go back to the docks). The greater propensity for union activists to return to the docks can no doubt be attributed, in part, to individual choice and job attachment. In addition, however, and arguably of greater significance, is the *absence* of choice. The 'stigma' of being a docker, combined with their relatively high average age, makes it very difficult for any redundant docker to find alternative employment. For union activists it is almost impossible. Informal job enquiries or interviews are cut short when the interviewee's past is made know, as one docker explained: 'When they ask what work you used to do, and you say dock work, the answer is always the same - "we'll get back to you", but they never do' (interview notes). At Hull, redundant dockers have been forced to set up their own casual labour agency which operates out of a local pub. Union activists in particular are now 'obliged' to work for this agency, despite their lifelong fight against such forms of employment in the industry, for want of alternative employment. According to the local T&GWU official, 'There's no way any of 'em would find work anywhere else in this town' (interview notes).

More invidious than the (ab)use of taxpayers' money to sack registered dockers in order to restructure port operations has been the use of the redundancy process to cut pay and conditions in the industry. As Table 4 demonstrates, dockers who have been re-employed in the industry having previously been made redundant are re-engaged on inferior wages and employment conditions. Ironically, dockers can only return to the docks *because* they have their redundancy money and (usually) their pension to fall back on. Comparison with Table 2, which reports the conditions of those who retained continuous employment after July 1989, indicates a much more extensive reduction in conditions. For example, 86 per cent of redundants re-engaged in the docks suffered a cut in wages, whereas the dockers who were retained following deregulation generally maintained their wages. The same is true of pension entitlements.

**Table 4. Comparison of Employment Conditions Before and After Abolition for Dockers Returning After Redundancy (%)**

	<u>Improved</u>	<u>Unchanged</u>	<u>Deteriorated</u>
wages	6.2	5.8	86.0
hours	7.6	12.8	79.7
job security	8.5	10.1	81.4
pension entitlement	13.7	40.4	45.9
union influence	4.7	14.2	81.1

Number of dockers returning after redundancy = 139

Of particular concern to many dockers re-employed in the industry, but not captured in Table 4, were the problems associated with working alongside unskilled or unqualified workers. In Aberdeen, for example, one employer suggested that, 'If you get a big ship in, it'll be loaded by window cleaners and hamburger salesmen' (*Port Development International*, September 1990). At Hull, a docker explained the problems they now face:

It's difficult to work alongside these men, they don't know the job. With registered dockers everybody could look after themselves, although we all looked out for each other - we were all mates. But with the new recruits you're always looking over your shoulder, they're just not safe (interview notes).

Where manning levels have been reduced, and working hours extended, this represents a significant strain on former registered dockers. As a Tees docker argued, 'When you've been working 16 hour doubles the last thing you want to be doing is looking out for somebody else's neck. You're just too tired' (interview notes). Not surprisingly, even those dockers who were working for their 'own' company suggested that,

If the contract went tomorrow, most would just say 'fuck it, I've had enough'. While the work's there, we come in. After all, it's money, isn't it? But if the port authority ask for any more, most of us would just pack up (interview notes).

Unlike other major redundancy programmes in traditional industries, such as coal, steel and shipbuilding, there were no provisions for retraining redundant dockers under the terms of the Dock Work Act (1989) or the DLCS. Given the geographical dispersion of the ports, the problems created by large scale redundancy has been less visible, and had less impact on local unemployment rates. For those affected by redundancy, however, the trauma of losing their jobs was no less real. A docker at Bristol suggested that 'it was a real culture shock leaving the docks - regular hours, regular work and all that. It takes some getting used to' (interview notes). The absence of specialised training provision for redundant dockers made it particularly difficult for many to find alternative work. Incredibly, given the government's emphasis on training to encourage labour market mobility, only twenty dockers in our sample had received retraining. A docker at Hull, for example, was denied training when he enquired at his local Job Centre: 'You've been paid £35,000 and you expect us to train you as a bus driver?' (interview notes). The principal motivation for undertaking retraining was to enhance job prospects, and eighteen of those who had undertaken retraining secured employment. Five of the twenty simply retrained because they felt it was better than being unemployed.

Of the continuously unemployed dockers who did not retrain, the majority (61 per cent) believed they were too old. Three other reasons commonly cited were that they already had skills, the skills on offer through re-training were irrelevant, or they simply had no information on retraining programmes. The 'sack 'em and forget 'em' philosophy of the employers and the government was indicated by the fact that a third of those who failed to retrain reported that the main reason for this was an absence of any information on retraining opportunities. However, some redundant dockers did not retrain because they found alternative employment. In order to find work, redundant dockers relied heavily on local newspapers, the local job centre, and friends and relatives, as reported in Table 5.

**Table 5. Looking for Work After Redundancy**

<u>Method</u>	<u>% job searchers using method</u>
Job Centre	61.1
newspaper advertisements	71.8
visiting or writing to firms on the off chance	35.6
visiting or writing to firms in response to a vacancy	47.7
information through friends and relatives	51.2
through union channels	5.7
number of job seekers = 224	

In general, the only jobs available to redundant dockers were those, such as driving, that used skills related to those needed in the docks, or else unskilled jobs such as labouring and cleaning. Taxi driving, for example, proved to be popular, but many dockers found it difficult to obtain a licence. One docker, who could only obtain night work, declared nights to be 'for lovers, burglars and taxi drivers! Compared to the docks its terrible work' (interview notes). A breakdown of dockers' employment outside the ports is given in Table 6.

**Table 6. Jobs Secured by Ex-Registered Dockers**

	<u>Number</u>
labouring	57
production line	14
shop	10
community	9
clerical	32
security	18
cleaning	29
driving	77
other*	82

\* includes hospital portering, part-time post man, odd jobbing

dockers employed = 245

Of greater note than the generally unskilled nature of the jobs that dockers secured outside the ports was the insecurity and instability of those jobs. Although 50.5 per cent of actives had secured a job outside the docks, 92 per cent of all actives had experienced at least one spell of unemployment between July 1989 and July 1992. The average spell of unemployment for this group of active redundant dockers lasted over 12 months. Of those who had secured work, 19 per cent had experienced further redundancy. Thus the experience of work for redundant dockers outside the ports was one of insecurity, as Table 7 illustrates. In addition, these jobs were generally low paid. Once more, with a lump sum severance payment of £35,000 plus a weekly pension paid to many redundant dockers, taking a low paid, insecure job became a viable option: 'Its beer money really. I've still got a few thousand after paying off my mortgage, and of course my pension' (interview notes). In this way, the DLCS was not only instrumental in the return of casualism to the docks, but served to promote, or at least perpetuate, wider casualisation and poverty wages in the local labour markets around Britain's ports.

**Table 7. Comparison of Employment Conditions Between Jobs in the Docks and Jobs Outside (%)**

	<u>Improved</u>	<u>Unchanged</u>	<u>Deteriorated</u>
wages	10.6	7.7	81.7
hours	20.9	17.5	61.6
job security	14.9	13.9	71.2
pension entitlement	12.2	33.8	46.0
union influence	4.8	11.1	84.1

Number of active workers working outside the docks = 245

Finally, 19 per cent of all actives had experienced continuous unemployment since being made redundant. These men are truly those who now experience life without a job rather than a job for life as was assumed under the Scheme. Overall they were more likely to be older men (50 years or more), and continuous unemployment was closely related to length of service in the industry - it seems that, after 25 years or more work in the docks, these men become unemployable, or more accurately employers will not hire them. In all, 68 per cent of active redundants reported difficulty in securing work, and 34 per cent of these men attributed this to stigmatisation in the eyes of employers (23 per cent cited age). Another important characteristic of this group, which reinforces what has already been noted, was that if a redundant docker is currently pursuing legal action, especially a claim for unfair dismissal, he is much more likely to have been continually unemployed.

No doubt it might be suggested in some quarters that these men are simply living off their redundancy pay and have no intention of finding alternative employment. This was *not* the case. Although 85 per cent of all redundant dockers received between £30,000 and £40,000 severance, this is unlikely to be sufficient to live on indefinitely, especially for younger dockers. Furthermore, those with the lowest severance payments (15 per cent of all redundants received less than £30,000) were in fact *more* likely to have been continuously unemployed since losing their job. Nor was it the case that the continuously unemployed failed to look for work: they want work, but cannot find any. The effects on their personal lives include significantly greater feelings of isolation, anxiety about money, loneliness, and a sense of loss without the social life of work. This is likely to continue as their prospects of finding work are remote. But their disillusion with the deregulated world of the docks and the surrounding economy is on occasion coloured by a sense of humour. One Hull docker, who had never before experienced a day's unemployment in his life, recalled his first visit to the local unemployment office to claim

benefit. On being asked whether he was looking for work, and if so what type of work, he responded that he was looking for dock work. The rather curt response was that there was no longer much work available in the docks. 'But your Secretary of State told us there would be over 50,000 new jobs created when the Scheme was abolished', came the reply, 'I'll have one of those!'

### **VIII. Conclusions - Counting the Costs**

The full socio-economic costs of the abolition of the NDLS cannot be measured, as it is impossible to put a price on the personal costs incurred by individual dockers since July 1989. As has been demonstrated throughout, whether employed or unemployed, working in the docks or elsewhere, on a full-time or casual basis, the ex-registered dockers' experience of deregulation has been extensively negative. Only those who used their severance pay from the DLCS in order to retire gained a net benefit. These were the only dockers for whom redundancy was a 'great escape' from the deregulated ports. Those who have suffered most are no doubt the continuously unemployed, but even those who secured work, either inside or outside the docks, experienced considerable hardship. In fact, although the dockers who remained in the industry were financially the most secure, their experience of deregulation was arguably more adverse than that of redundant dockers who returned to the ports or those who found employment outside the industry. As Table 8 illustrates, they experienced higher levels of anxiety about work, family stress, discontentment, despondency, and were more likely to feel unsettled.


**Table 8. Impact of Abolition on the Personal Lives of Dockers (%)**


	<u>Returning</u>	<u>Remaining</u>	<u>Re-employed</u>	<u>Total</u>
more unsettled	52.3	58.7	43.0	43.9
anxiety about money	33.8	17.2	25.6	25.4
anxiety about work	52.1	47.4	41.9	37.9
family stress	23.7	32.8	19.8	23.7
depression	31.2	16.8	15.2	20.4
frustration	53.9	40.2	25.4	32.5
discontentment	39.3	42.2	23.0	30.6
despondency	17.1	22.4	9.8	13.5
N	139	171	245	809

For individual dockers, then, the costs arising from the abolition of the Scheme have been considerable, both financially and psychologically. At the extreme, two deaths have occurred over the past year where the intensity of work was cited in the coroner's report as a 'contributing factor' in the accident causing the death. Do the benefits of deregulation outweigh such costs? Who benefits from deregulation? The consumer? The unemployed living in dockland areas? Or the port authorities and the international shipping lines?

While it might be impracticable to produce a full 'balance sheet' for the abolition of the Scheme and the DLCS, our survey results allow us to detail at least some of the costs and benefits of deregulation. As a first step, Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the fate of the dockers who completed the questionnaire (weighted up to the population of ex-registered dockers, as explained in the Appendix, and from which we can therefore derive general conclusions). Of the 9,220 dockers registered in July 1989 79 per cent were declared redundant by August 1992. Of these, 24 per cent are now inactive. Of the active redundants, 50.5 per cent had secured work outside the docks *at some time* since July 1989, although 92 per cent of these ex-dockers had experienced at least one spell of unemployment (and the average length of unemployment for this group was 12 months). Almost 19 per cent of the actives had been continuously unemployed, while 29 per cent had been re-employed in the docks. A significant number of these (30 per cent) are now employed on a purely casual basis.

**Figure 2. Labour Market Destinations of Surveyed Dockers**  
 (weighted results)





It is evident from Figure 2 that the DLCS has been (ab)used by employers to effect what can only be described as an 'occupational cleansing' of former registered dockers. In the restructuring of cargo handling operations, which can now be performed by *any* grade of dock worker, employers have discriminated against registered dockers in general, and trade union activists (past and present) in particular. The financial costs of this cleansing have been considerable. The PLA, for example, paid almost £30million in severance and other costs associated with the abolition of the Scheme, and almost £5 million in costs arising from the Industrial Tribunal (including legal payments and compensation for the shop stewards and other dockers who were unfairly dismissed). The direct costs to the taxpayer for severance payments was in excess of £13 million and the costs of the Tribunal were £376,000. In other words, the taxpayer has not only paid half the severance costs to allow management to unfairly dismiss registered dockers, but then paid for an Industrial Tribunal case at which management lied and ignored the Tribunal's recommendation to reinstate twelve dockers. In addition, with the PLA recording a loss of almost £21 million on the privatisation of Tilbury, the taxpayer has subsidised the sale of the port to managers who only a short time ago were public servants.

Similar costs can be estimated for the Scheme ports as a whole. The direct costs of severance payments made by the government have been of the order of £132 million, of which £27.5 million has been paid to dockers who have been re-employed in the industry. Many are working for their previous employer, usually under new contractual arrangements but invariably on the same work, which again suggests an abuse of taxpayers' money. In addition to the direct costs of severance, there is the loss of tax revenue and the costs of paying unemployment and other benefits to redundant dockers, estimated to be around £9,000 per person per annum to the Treasury. Over 14 per cent of all redundant dockers have been continuously unemployed since July 1989 (nationally well over 1,000 dockers), giving an annual cost of £9.4 million. In addition, even those dockers who secured employment outside the docks experienced prolonged spells of unemployment and, in any case, can be assumed to have displaced other workers (as unemployment was rising throughout 1989-92 in the travel to work areas of each of the ports included in the survey), adding a further cost of £25 million per annum. In total, then, over the three year period of the DLCS, the total cost of severance payments, unemployment benefits and Tribunal costs is estimated to be £235 million.

The employers, of course, have also paid out substantial sums of money to rid themselves of registered dockers. In July 1991 this sum was estimated to be £94 million (CPA, 1991:3), and the final figure was of the order of £100 million. Other costs associated with abolition, such as legal costs, compensation for unfair dismissal, the payment of twelve weeks lieu of notice to many dockers in addition to their severance pay, and the costs of restructuring operations (e.g. new training programmes and the like) have added considerably more to this figure. The fact that the employers have been willing to finance redundancies on this scale has been assumed to be 'pretty good evidence that the overall abolition has made sense from their commercial point of view' (Sir Alan Bailey, CPA, 1991:3). As Sir Alan went on to elaborate,

Under the Act the employer has the right to make compulsory redundancies but he pays half. That is the test, under the Act, of whether it is worth it from the employer's point of view (*ibid*:17).

This same point had previously been made by Nicholas Finney, the former Director of NAPE (*Financial Times*, 5 January, 1990), and not without good reason. Leaving aside the obvious point that the decision to dismiss ex-registered dockers was as much a *political* as a commercial decision, the cost to the employers of abolishing the Scheme proved to be far less than any negotiated restructuring. At the end of 1986, NAPE had set up a working party of managers from eight ports (including London, Liverpool, Bristol, Tees, Clyde and ABP) to examine the prospects, and costs, of reform or repeal of the NDLS (see Turnbull *et al.*, 1992:95). Their report, delivered in March 1987, suggested that the cost of 'buying the book', estimated to be around £400 million, was prohibitive, and recommended instead a concerted campaign to persuade the government to abolish the Scheme (and in doing so to share the costs). The employers have therefore achieved their objectives at only a third of the cost they had anticipated. The cost to the taxpayer has been far more. Our estimates suggest that the *total* cost of abolition (including severance payments, unemployment benefits, Tribunal costs and general restructuring costs) have been at least, if not more than, the cost of a negotiated restructuring. This estimate, of course, excludes the on-going costs of unemployment benefits after July 1992, and the substantial personal costs to the dockers both on and off the docks.

The principal beneficiaries of deregulation have been the port authorities, who were the major employers of registered dock workers (accounting for around two-thirds of the total). Having shed labour on a massive scale (ABP, for example, now employs fewer than twenty ex-registered dockers, compared to over 1,700 under the Scheme), and in many cases having moved out of stevedoring all together, the port authorities can now rely on a more predictable revenue stream (from port charges, licence fees and the like) (see Turnbull, 1993; and Turnbull and Weston, 1993a). The increase in profits of the four major port authorities (PLA, MDHC, ABP and Tees and Hartlepool) between 1989 and 1990 was over £49 million, equivalent to the annual cost to the employers *as a whole* of financing the NDLS. ABP's profits from its port and transport activities, for example, increased from £28.2 million in 1989 to £35.5 million in 1990. In 1991 they reached a massive £76.1 million, and fell to only £64.4 million in 1992 despite the recession (no doubt partly attributable to yet another increase in port charges). Likewise, MDHC made a record pre-tax profit of £16.4 million in 1992. While the profits of Britain's major port owners, the majority of whom are now in private hands, continue to rise, the majority of port employers are embroiled in a price war. This no doubt benefits the international shipping lines but has squeezed the profit margins of many employers (and as a consequence the pay and conditions of their workforce) to the bone. For the average consumer there has been little tangible, and certainly no visible evidence of the supposed benefits of deregulation. For workers in the ports or the surrounding area there is little evidence of new employment opportunities.

In summary, then, the restructuring of Britain's port transport industry has been facilitated by the government, financed by the taxpayer, exploited by the major port authorities, and paid for by the former registered dock labour force. The experience of ex-registered dockers since July 1989 highlights the inadequacy of existing legal protections for workers and exposes the fallacy of the government's White Paper which predicted that casual employment would not return to the docks. Labour demand still fluctuates markedly from one day to the next, and while the proportions of casual and permanent workers may be different than in the past, the basic characteristics, and associated problems, are still very much in evidence. In the absence of appropriate regulations, then, the docks are once more characterised by casual employment and sub-standard conditions of employment. In the past, such conditions were associated with industrial conflict and economic inefficiency. Who would gainsay that such outcomes may characterise the industry in the future?

## **Appendix - Survey Administration and Analysis**

### Administration of the Survey

The survey of ex-registered dockers involved extensive interviews and a self-completion postal questionnaire initially targeted at ex-registered dockers from ten UK ports. The questionnaire was designed and piloted by the research team at Cardiff. The final questionnaire was sent out from and returned to the regional offices of the T&GWU at each port during July and August 1992. Union membership lists were used as a means of contacting individual dockers at their home address, or were distributed at the workplace where ex-registered dockers are still employed in the docks.

### Survey Response

A number of difficulties were encountered in the administration of the questionnaire which adversely affected the response rate. In particular, trade union membership records were found to be incomplete (three quarters of employees registered with the National Dock Labour Board in the second quarter of 1989 appeared on union membership records in 1992). In addition, a certain amount of antagonism and ill-feeling was apparent between ex-registered dockers and the Union as a result of the strike in 1989 and the dismissals which followed the abolition of the NDLS. Consequently, some dockers were reluctant to co-operate with the survey. Furthermore, relations between the port management and the Union had deteriorated in some ports to such an extent that it was difficult for the Union to conduct the survey. Finally, in one port where the workforce had established a co-operative, the loss of the company's only customer and the imminent collapse of the co-operative prevented administration of the survey.

As a result of these difficulties five of the ports initially targeted were excluded from the statistical data analysis. However, the five remaining ports are all major ports and collectively account for 40 per cent of employment in the industry. These ports cover a wide geographical area and are representative of the different effects of deregulation observed at the national level.

In total, 809 usable questionnaires were returned from the sample of ports. The returns represent 29 per cent of employees recorded by the NDLB in these ports. However, when the response rate is measured against the list of union members, it is somewhat greater at around 35 per cent.

Accounting for non-response in a survey is important where the intention is to generalise the results from respondents to a wider population. It is not possible to know the precise reasons for non-response but some reasonable inferences can be made. Given the incomplete nature of the union membership lists vis-à-vis NDLB records, it is possible that the lists contain additional errors - for example, old addresses for members who have subsequently moved, ex-members who may have left the industry prior to the DLCS and others who have died. Dis-satisfaction with the Union as a reason for non-response is evident on a port by port level and may also be present at an intra-port level. Finally, it must be remembered that redundancy is an unpleasant and even painful experience. Who can blame a docker who does not wish to take part in a survey whose purpose is to revive memories of that experience?

#### Adjustments for Non-Response and Sampling

Low response is a particular difficulty associated with postal surveys. The problem becomes critical if respondents differ from non-respondents and therefore are not representative of ex-registered dockers more generally. A number of techniques are available which first indicate whether or not respondents are representative and secondly adjust the data to account for any unrepresentativeness. With information about the survey sample and population of ex-registered dockers available from both the NDLB and the registered dockers pension fund, two sets of weights were compiled in order to adjust for the effects of non-response and sampling. In the first instance, actual responses were compared with potential responses using information about the sample from the NDLB. This comparison revealed significant differences both between and within ports. The survey responses were adjusted by the use of weights to ensure that respondents are represented in the correct sample proportions. For example, less weight is given to respondents from ports where the response rate was high and to redundants within a port where redundants are over-represented among respondents. Similarly, more weight is given to respondents from ports where the response rate is low and to redundants where they are under-represented at the port level. The weights used are shown in the Table A1.

Secondly, for practical reasons, the sample is based on five clusters, or natural groups of dockers, based on ports, and does not constitute a random sample. Where inter-port variation is high, the potential for sampling error is high and consequently generalisability beyond the sample is restricted. In order to reduce this potential bias, the sample (already adjusted for non-response) is weighted up to the population proportions. The weights reported in Table A2 indicate that the sample of ports contains a small under-representation of both younger and older remaining dockers and an over-representation of redundants, particularly older redundants, when compared to the national population of ex-registered dockers.

**Table A1 Sample Weights**

	port 1	port 2	port 3	port 4	port 5
redundant	0.62	0.84	0.92	3.20	2.88
remaining	0.88	0.79	1.01	0.45	0.55

**Table A2 Population Weights**

	under 50 years of age	50-55 years of age	over 55 years of age
redundant	0.99	0.92	0.57
remaining	1.11	0.81	1.26

After adjustment, it is possible to infer that the information gained from the survey of ex-registered dockers is broadly representative of the sample of ex-registered dockers from the surveyed ports, in terms of key characteristics. Moreover, the sample is broadly representative of the wider population of ex-registered dockers, again in terms of the key characteristics of age and redundancy outcome.

### Statistical Analysis

The statistical analysis reported here comprises simple descriptive statistics - averages, proportions, distributions and the like and uses responses which have been weighted to adjust for both non-response and sample selection, i.e. the data are weighted according to both sets of weights. Where comparisons are made to test hypotheses - for example, the age distribution between redundant and remaining ex-registered dockers is compared to test the hypothesis that older workers

experienced a greater risk of redundancy than younger workers - the diagnostic test used is the  $\chi^2$  test. The test is carried out at the 5 per cent level of significance.

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